Bangladesh

1

The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model AND Bangladesh Grameen Bank

Dr. LEONIDAS A.PAPAKONSTANTINIDIS Professor ex Director School of Management & Economics, TEI-K

2009

2

Abstract The paper tries to create bridges between the “Bangladesh economic experiment and the well-known “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” theory, in order to explain their own identities and therefore the “Future Capitalist” resolution. From the one hand, the “Bangladesh experiment” may be concern as a form of well -known “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”. It should be viewed under the prism of a micro-credits worldwide successful application. From the other hand, “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” should be viewed as the theoretical base of Bangladesh experiment, although, Grameen micro-credits system is a form of money creation- out of the above model perception.

Key-words Behavioral Analysis, Social capital, Social trust, bargaining problem, games theory, modern innovation theory, instant reflection winning strategies, decision making – Future Capitalism

♥ Introduction Many of today’s most urgent challenges are explained by a competitive/ conflict perception (the bargaining problem). World Economic Crisis could be concern as the output of that “monopoly” perception. Is any hope to correct the system? The answer is YES, by the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” methodological approach. Starting from the Local Development field, win-win-win papakonstantinidis model could be applied in a numerous of cases in other scientific fields. From this point of view, “behavioural analysis” of “bargaining moments” –dt- should be the most important tools for our approach. From the other hand, “Yusuni Map”- 2007 (or Mapping Social Business) deals with those contrasting dynamics of different approaches to wealth creation: World dynamics are divided in two subtotals (a) the world of straight lines or the world made of separate, isolated parts, that are put together and taking apart and (b) of exponential curves or the world of interconnected relations where, one

3 action in one part has knock-on effects on the other. It is based on “virtuous spirals”, either leading to ever accelerating growth or doom loops (vicious circles which quickly spiral away to nothing). This approach justifies the necessity of social business on strong cash flow plus high social purpose (morality in human relations) by an empirical way. Grameen Bank, Bangladesh case is referred by Yusuni Map as the most successful example. win – win - win Papakonstantinidis model- a twenty five years output, coming from both theoretical/ academic and empirical (rural tourism, Leader EU Initiative etc) level- could be concerned as a Nash "Non Cooperative Games Theory” (trust theory)' s extension : Starting from the bargaining/ games theory analyzes individual winning strategies, through the utilities/shares possible combinations between two “players” The concept of this NEW methodological tool, is how to transfer a pure trust theory, to a social market approach, or, how to joint economic theory with pure Sociology, by an outside intervention; for this, Modern Innovation Theory- M.I.T (M. M Fischer) is useful. Combining knowledge transfer and knowledge creation, thus creating a “new” kind of information the “integrated information” (sensitization included), a “new” bargaining behavior has to be formed. This presupposes the acceptance of the “COMMUNITY” = “invisible part in the bargain (THE THIRD POLE), in terms of a minded “person”) in any bargain between TWO. Win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model (2002, August, SW) may, thus, transform individual winning –instant reflection –strategies (the win-win Nash Theory) in a new –three poles-equilibrium point, including the COMMUNITY (Environmental Protection, Value Systems, Ethic etc), which is the “absolute cooperation” limit point in the bargain between TWO. lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua Ub Uc = Ua+Ub+Uc i→∞ This concept should be concern as a revolution in Social Science Theory: By introducing the third pole (Community) in any bargain between two players in a game (through the sensitization process). This model contributes in behavioral Sciences. It forms the platform of a “Social Trust” creation, leading to Social Cohesion (at Local Level, at least). The “win - win - win Papakonstantinidis model” has been characterized as a new Theory in Social Sciences in many countries. It has been translated in Hungarian language. It has been accepted in India,

4 Philippines, South Africa (Durban) as well as in World Organization, as for example by the International Sociological Association (I.S.A) as it produces a new “bargaining philosophy”.

Methodological Steps The aim of this paper is to prove that, (1) Social Capital may be the concept

of community behavior and

natural resources management, in local level (at least)

It is defined as

the “capital that refers to connections within and between social networks” (emphasizing the social trust,

or even as something of a

cure-all, for the problems of a modern society” (Portes, A., 1998). From this point of view, it should be the base of a local development program, as well as to a number of applications (Nagopoulos, 2008, comments). From the other hand, Yusuni Map focuses on social business’s win-win-win by an empirical interconnected knock-on effect (pure conflict). (2) Local Development may be concerned as a unique diversification / declination from the globalization rules (Papakonstantinidis, 2007). From the other hand, Grameen Bangladesh Bank’s operationreferred as a typical “Social Business” case, due to its identificationcould meet with both, the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model and Yusuni Map approaches. (3) The discrete entity’s diversification rate (R*) from globalization/ or bargaining rules, (Walras S, 1980) may be the crucial parameter which would define “Local Development” as a social cohesion result at local level. From the other hand, Grameen Bank

identity may be concerned as

declination from pure Globalization Rules, due to “peer-pressure” or local skills’ loans to those poor rural Bangladesh areas people. (4)Local Development

may be concerned as the limit-end of a unique

and continuous sensitized development process, applied in a discrete spatial

entity/Papakonstantinidis,

5/08-

Aegean

Sociology

Post

Graduate Dept). From the other hand, Grameen Bank’s operation could be concerned as the limit-end of the sensitization process: Prof Yunus, the Bangladeshi

5 Grameen Bank Founder & Banker AND Grameen Bank have been awarded by the 2006

Peace Nobel Prize, for the same reason, due to

bottom-up & sensitization process. (i. e

"for their efforts to create

economic and social development from below”, according the Swiss Academy’s justification). (5) Local Development is achieved via GOOD CASES rather than “good practices”, due to the unique identity each region has, as well as its people with their own communication code, ethics, mentality & customs. (Katseli Luca 1979). By the same reason, Grameen Bank’s operation may be concerned as a very special case: It’s rather impossible to be applied in other L. D. C and/ or poor areas of the planet. Grameen Bank experiment is unique “good case. It has its own identity. (5) A win-win-win behavioural approach may be the appropriate methodological

tool

toward

introducing

“sensitization”

in

the

development process. It may strengthen social cohesion process by improving its confidential indicators (so to trust each-other in interrelations process). From the other hand, microcredit’s Grameen Banking for Poor, designed from Micro-Up entrepreneurs can sustain any deeply human purpose we focus on worldwide (based on a peer-pressure & poorpressure system) In order to meet with paper requirements it is indispensable that the appropriate methodology be adopted, step by step : (1) A theoretical foundation is provided by recent literature (in points), connecting “Local Development” with Social Capital/ Social Cohesion, as well as with

“The Bargaining Problem”- Games

Theory & the

Modern

Innovation Theory (M.I.T) [Fischer M. M 2002, Kamitza R 1994, Moseley M. 2003, Petrella R 2001 ], in comparison with the “Grameen Bank’s microcredit”

successful experiment

(2) According to the afore-

mentioned theoretical background, it is necessary to strictly define the “Bargaining Problem” (as the basis of Globalization “rules”) by its math /philosophical validation and try to process” in terms of

define

the “local development

diversification (R*) from Globalization Rules (3)

6 Next step is to create links between the “local development process” (as a continuous sensitization process) and the bargain in terms of diversification rate from G. R, building “Social Trust Links among local people. By the same reason, Grameen Bank’s experiment is been studied as a unique “Microcredit base Banking system

which has

created “links” between million of poor rural Bangladeshi , based on peer/ and /or/ poor- pressure “peer-pressure” are

(4) Finally, the Community/ and /or/ “

included in the model as the third or invisible

part of each bargain between two persons, based on instant reflection, so each part wins ( the win-win-win model) Limitations are resulted, both by the Games Theory and the Modern Innovation Theory application in social sciences and their synthesis into a social market problem within the Community.

Recent literature – in points a- win-win-win model supporting literature a1- Local, social field From the Local Development side, Kenneth Wilkinson (1991) focuses on the endogenous local development process / “bottom-up approach” (bargain, locally) 2nd, Friedman / Weaver – UCLA (1978) in their classic “Territory and Function” refer : “The base of an autonomous local development may be a discrete value system, an ideology, local people’s reaction to the dominant local principles (including local communication code, customs, culture), creating thus the “social cohesion environment” at local level. "In a homogenous society, norms or codes of behaviour will emerge and become laws where enforcement is necessary to preserve the unitary culture. But where separate cultures diverge from the mainstream, those minority groups will establish their own norms. Socialisation will therefore be to the subgroup and to the mainstream norms. When laws are enacted, they will represent the norms, values and interests of the dominant cultural or ethnic group which may produce Border Culture Conflict. When the two cultures interact and one seeks to extend its influence into the other, each side is likely to react protectively. If the balance of power is relatively equal, an accommodation will usually be reached. But if the distribution of power is unequal, the everyday behaviour of the

7 minority group may be defined as deviant. The more diversified and heterogeneous a society becomes, the greater the probability of more frequent conflict as subgroups who live by their own rules break the rules of other groups." From the pure Sociological side, J. Coleman (1988) as “Social Capital” describes the cooperation processes of individuals, which minimize possible dilemma, coming from individuals’, networks and common actions. Besides, Glen Loury (1977) used the term “social capital” to describe a dynamic theory of racial income differences’ discrimination (women, minorities, etc). J Coleman adopted Glen Loury’ s definition, in developing and popularizing the concept

Also, Putnam (2000)

describes social capital as the basis of social schemes creation (i. e networks) In conclusion, an increasing number of recent literature in the local development field, currently recognizes the existence of links among local development process, social trust & capital

A number of Local

Development approaches toward this theme are referred below: “ The Political Entity” (Freedman-Weaver, UCLA, 1978, the “Selected ClosedSpatial Discrete Entity” of the Intra-Scientific Vienna Centre (Stohr & Todtling 1980), The “S. H. I. E. L. D Model”, Papakonstantinidis, 1997, Rome) The “Tre Italy” Model, Bagnasco, 1987, The “parallel system” and “The sensitized Community” (Papakonstantinidis, 1998 & 2002), The “political Democracy (LSE, Fotopoulos, 1998), the “Grass Roots” Model in Latin America (Luis Llambi, 2003) Barquero A-Vasquez A (1991)

These theoretical approaches pre-existed to the suggested

win-win-win

a-2 behavioral science field From the other hand, a behavioral Model of Rational Choice (Decision Making Field), according to Dr Herbert A. Simon (1998) focuses on “Traditional economic theory postulates an "economic man," who, in the course of being "economic" is also "rational." This man is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also to have a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of

8 these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale. Recent developments in economics, and particularly in the theory of the business firm, have raised great doubts as to whether this schematized model of economic man provides a suitable foundation on which to erect a theory — whether it be a theory of how firms do behave, or of how they "should" rationally behave. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these doubts, or to determine whether they are justified. Rather, I shall assume that the concept of "economic man" (and, I might add, of his brother "administrative man") is in need of fairly drastic revision, and shall put forth some suggestions as to the direction the revision might take. Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist. One is tempted to turn…”

b- Yusuni Map supporting empirical base Yusuni Map (Mapping Social Business, 2007) is based on the empirical Notion of “Dynamics of different approaches to wealth creation” According to Yusuni Map “There are two types of mathematics used in economics. One – the mathematics of addition and subtraction – forms the basis of accounting and assumes the world is made of separate, isolated parts that are put together and taken apart. This is a world of straight lines. The other – of multiplication and division – forms the basis of Mapping and assumes the world is made of interconnected relationships where one action in one part has knock-on effects on other parts. This is the world of exponential curves: virtuous spirals where (say) 1.1 x 1.1 leads to ever accelerating growth; and doom loops or vicious circles of (say) 0.99 x 0.99 which quickly spiral away to nothing. According to this, the shareholder value maximising capitalist corporation

inevitably

generates

one

type

of

exponential:

the

downward spiral. Why? Because its demand that it must take the maximum possible value out of the system of which it is a part once

9 every three months inevitably ends up sucking the life out of that system, generating conflict along the way. This downward spiral can be hidden from view so long as the victims of this value extraction remain silent and powerless: people without a vote, people without a voice and/or people without money. Usually, all three come together: the only way to have a vote or voice in a capitalist marketplace is if you have money. If you have no money, you have no ‘vote’ and no voice. The

alternative

to

the

shareholder

value

maximising

capitalist

corporation is not the communist regime, or a charity, or a taxationsubsidised public service, but the social business. Why? Because the social business puts human purpose rather than value extraction at the heart of what it does, and it builds relationships around this human purpose. It is economically viable – it pays its bills – but it does so in a way that builds win-win-win relationships. These win-win-wins generate trust and become magnets of goodwill (a term accountants have always used and never understood), creating a positive multiplier exponential: expanding, inclusive virtuous spirals. The new media and metrics challenges of goodwill branding, business and economics integrate how to design, build and sustain these positive exponentials.

Yusuni Map

10 Strong financial muscle

Weak/nonexistent goodwill multipliers

Capitalist firm

Social business

Strong cash flows but artificially boosted by externalising risk and cost. Strong tendency to fall into bottom quadrant

Strong cash flows Plus high social purpose and strong network of win-win relationships. A virtuous spiral

Positive exponential

Strong goodwill multipliers

Negative exponential Market crash When the capitalist firm reaps what it has sown: eg today’s ‘credit crunch’ in the west, climate change crisis etc.

Charity High social purpose but financially not self-sustaining

Weak/non-existent financial muscle

Contrasting dynamics of different approaches to wealth creation The different dynamics of these contrasting approaches is illustrated by the contrasting fortunes of the western banking industry and microcredit. In the West, banking focused on driving up consumption while passing on risk to (unknown) third parties, while microcredit was focused on investing in entrepreneurial productivity and communal sustainability, and accepting known risks. By 1997 the success of microcredit banking was proven in Bangladesh, where it served nearly 10 million of the world’s poorest women. Since then, the microcredit movement has been expanding worldwide. With this exponential still rising, microcredit has taken less than a decade for worldwide networks to reach 100 million of the world’s poorest. The truly good news is: many of today’s most urgent challenges are explained by the same mathematical error of accounting: a monopoly measurement of the world as being only made up of separate, isolated

11 parts while devaluing relationships and the trust and goodwill that can flow through them. We have a good probability that by correcting the maths – by designing and sustaining complete systems that work on a ‘win-win-win’ basis – we can start curing all of humanity’s problems.

♥

Analysis PART I : model

win-win-win papakonstantinidis

Papakonstantinidis Concept a- The Bargaining problem A two-person bargaining situation involves two individuals (Neuman & Morgenstern 1947), who have the opportunity, either to be competitors to each-other (win-lose)[von Neumann-Morgenstern, 1928/1947-“zero sum two players game” Theory] Filinis Kostas (1973), or to make coalitions, or even to create pure individual strategies, based on bargainers’ instant reflection behavior (win-win) [Nash J. F, 1950, Arrow K 1954, Aumann Robert, 1987, Crawford V, 1997, Kottarides K, 2002, Varoufakis Y, 1990) J.F. Nash ( 1950) focused on payoff shares/utilities combination: Bargain may result either in agreement or disagreement. (Kuhun H.WNassar S, 2001) Papakonstantinidis, 2003, 2005, Varoufakis Y, 1990) Utility expresses the constraint or the “fear factor” of disagreement for the negotiator who desires negotiations to be led in agreement more than the other one. Who needs more, negotiation leading to an agreement expects more utility, but –probably there is a loss in terms of “shares”, due to lack of risk. On the contrary, who is indifferent about “agreement” or expects less utility /per unit, has- to win in “shares” under the dogma “the more risk, the more profit” (Crawford V. 1997) It is necessary to analyze the Nash “non-cooperative- instant reflection game” /or a “win-win perception” as follow: Non-co-operative game, is a game between two (2) players/ individuals who have opposite interests (Aumann Robert , 1987) Each player makes his own choices, based on instant reflections’ rational movements and his physical cleverness

12

The game/ bargain is defined by the result (pay-off) and not by players expectations- It presupposes best choices by both players towards meeting individual interests [“winning strategies”- Harsanyi John(1973] Players/ or negotiators do not regret, a posteriori, from their own decision taken, based on personal choices, during the bargain. Each of the players knows a priori that the other negotiator (or player) is as clever as he is. During the bargain, a “mutual respect” between the two bargainers to each other’s best choices’ is necessary. It is recognized that “The more DETERMINED to break down the negotiation (= less utility), the more satisfied (=better shares) – the more risk, the more profit Social behavior is not recognized as an acceptable one in the bargain, thus deriving unfair results: That means, “who needs the agreement as the result of a bargain, has to loose in shares, by accepting any result”. Information may be the “link” between knowledge creation and the bargaining process. In particular, “Information” is a power factor in pure individuals winning strategies (Aumann Robert, 1987) The more information, the better winning strategy, the more profit. Each of the players / negotiators, starting negotiations with the other, expects to gain the maximum profit. Interaction, based on instant reflection individual winning strategies, is the base of the Nash Non Cooperative Games Theory A two (2) 2– person anticipation is based on utilities. According to Nash Theory, a unique solution exists that maximises the product of the participants’ utilities. There is, therefore an interaction between “utilities” and “strategies” In particular, “utility” expresses individual choices based on individual necessities “Strategies” express choices + will in personal level, taking into account the interaction factor (the other’s choices) Utility is the subjective and strategy is the objective factor of the same anticipation. Negotiation may lead either to “agreement” or disagreement Utility expresses the “fear factor” constraint of disagreement for those who desire the agreement, more than the other negotiators. (Aumann 1987)

13 In conclusion, at any moment –according to the “N. C. G Theory”- there is only one “equilibrium point” at which any individual–at any moment- makes the best choices for himself, in relation with the other persons’ best choices.

b- The bargaining problem Utility Theory (math) Bargaining Problem is mainly based on “Utility Theory”- a mathematical theory of the Neo-classical School of Thought, able to satisfactory explain individual expectations/ anticipations, of a possible outcome. Usually it is expressed in the form of a mathematical function, f(u) = u1/2 Individual winning strategies are corresponding 1-1 to utilities U (A) and U (B) (Chun Youngub, 1990) Utility theory of the individual is mainly based on the “concept of anticipation”. In the “Two-person utility Theory” there are two (2) individuals in a bargain who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way. In its simple/initial version, no action, taken by one of the two individuals without the consent of the other can affect the well-being of the other one, but in real terms there is only ONE decision, taken by the involved in a bargain individuals. • Utility in the bargain is a personal matter: Utility “units” are not compared.(Kuhun-Nassar, 2001) • Utility “units” express “fear units of a disagreement outcome” • If “A” needs more the “agreement” to be achieved, than the payoff coming from the bargain, then he should be ready to accept any result of agreement, even if it is not favorable for him (loss of shares) • If “A” has decided not to accept an agreement during the bargaining process, then he risks more but –at the same timehas to win more from the agreement, in terms of shares. • The “utility range” expresses the optimist and/or the pessimist instant reflection of each party. • “Utility” expresses individual choices based on individual necessities and will. It is rather a subjective than objective factor, influencing individual behavior. On the other hand, “individual strategies” in the bargain –the objective factor- are defined by personal choices and “will”, resulting from the necessity to meet personal “needs”. From this point of view, “Utility” , as a subjective factor is expressed by “strategy” – an individual winning strategy- in the bargain, so as to meet “Utility”. There are “links” between “Utility” and “Strategy”: “Utility” is the

14

•

ability to meet “needs” and “Strategy” is the plan – the individual plan- to achieve this ability, step by step “Utility” is the subjective factor and the “Individual Winning Strategy” is the objective factor of the same “thing”: Bargainers have needs (=utilities). In order to satisfy these “needs”, they use “individual winning strategies”, as the result of their “instant reflections” in the Bargain. (table 1) ð Lim U1i(&)U2i(&)=max U1iU2i (1) ià∞

c- Nash’ win-win random sharing/utilities- An example It expresses utilities/strategies, as the interaction between two negotiators and (2) expresses the utility function- as a shares/utility combination The bargaining problem decision making during negotiations of A & B -Nash highlighted the “payoffs” of the bargain, # personal expectations (Table 1): Table 1 BARGAIN Random Sharing between “A” and “B” Share A (%) 100 90 80 70 60 50 45

Share B (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 55

Utility A

Utility B

Utility AXB

0 1 5 10 16 23 40

71 70 68 64 60 52 31

30 20 10 0

70 80 90 100

45 50 61 80

24 12 4 0

0 70 340 960 960 1196 1240 (max) 1080 600 244 0

d- The equilibrium point Suppose that “winning strategies” [ Pi, Qi] are in a fine ratio with the players’ (bargainers’) UTILITY ( linear function: corresponds 1-1 to bargainers’ Utility Function), under the dogma “the more decisive to break the contract down, the more satisfied from the bargain leading

15 to the contract” (Kuhun-Nassar, 2001). That is true: Bargainers expectations are 1-1 to expected Utilities for each of them, coming from the bargain. (Bernheim & Douglas B. 1984). On the other hand, the more information, the more uncertainty. Bargain gets its own rules out of cooperation. People are competitive rather, than co-operative: Winning strategies are led by bargaining rules (rules of pure competition). Nash has described the “bargaining problem” not by expectations, but, directly, by the results (pay-off) of the bargain. In our example, the crucial point [the max] is 1240 (40x31) : this is the point of final agreement led by the bargain. On that point, shares are: 40% for “A” and 60% for “B”. On that point, personal satisfaction or utility units are 40 units for A and 31 units for B : That’s the point of agreement, expressing “fear of breaking down the agreement for “player” “A” and , at the same time, the risk for the “player” “B” of breaking down the agreement. In a 2-person anticipation, each of the two (2) bargainers may ask themselves one question, as the result of “good strategies” [instant reflection thinking] in the bargain: What should be the best for me, taking into account that the other person (bargainer in a negotiation) should try for the best for himself – thus recognizing that the other person may be as clever as I am? According to the afore-mentioned analysis, paper contribution in the scientific thought (2008) should be summarized in introducing “the third “WIN” for the COMMUNITY (the third-part pole). According to my suggestion, COMMUNITY –the “C” factor must participate in any bargain by its “bargainers’ characteristics” (shares/utilities), thus adding the THIRD “WIN” at any two bargainers’ win-win expectation between TWO (the METRON analysis or the THREE POLES analysis like in other fields i.e philosophy, economy, creating an interactional flow By introducing the THIRD POLE in the bargain, then the crucial bargainers’ QUESTION must be changed in: What should be the best for me, taking into account that the other person (bargainer in a negotiation) should try for the best for himself – thus recognizing that the other person may be as clever as I am and, at the same time, taking into account that COMMUNITY, as the third or invisible part also participates by the “bargainers’ characteristics” (shares/utilities)

16

Information/ behavior & the bargaining problem (Knowledge transfer, information, behavior) Paper conception is mainly based on Games Theory – especially on its “Non-Cooperative Games Theory’s version by J. F Nash, 1950- in relation with the Modern Innovation Theory” - (M. M. Fischer, 2000) M. I. T provides us with useful methodological tools as knowledge creation and knowledge transfer (Table 2) Table 2 Scheme: Knowledge Creation/ Information/ Types of Behavior

Type of Type of Knowledge-1 Knowledge-2

Synthesis

Resulted Behavior

tacit

tacit

Sympathetic Socialization

tacit

codified

Conceptual Externalizatio n

codified

tacit

codified

codified

Procedural Internalizatio n Systemic Networking

sympathetic

systemic

Conceptual Sensitization

systemic

systemic

Procedural

Strategic

Papakonstantinidis, 2003 Literature (Reinsmann, Fischer,2002 & others) introduced various processes of “knowledge conversion” based on the proven and “built” information systems incorporated in an organization. Possible cases among different types of knowledge produce the four (4) major processes of knowledge conversion : (1) Tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge produces sympathized knowledge (socialization) (2) Tacit knowledge to codified knowledge produces conceptual knowledge (externalization) (3) Codified knowledge to tacit knowledge produces procedural knowledge (internalization) (4) Codified knowledge to codified knowledge produces systemic knowledge (combination) Each of these processes of “knowledge conversion” corresponds [1-1] to a specific type of information (Papakonstantinidis 2003) i. e , • Social Information-Sensitization

17 • • •

External Information- Participation Internal Information-Involvement Combined Information-Networking

e- The suggested win-win-win approach

According to the above analysis, paper contribution in the scientific thought (2007) should be summarized in introducing “the third WIN” or the third “person” in a two-party bargain, i. e the “C” “invisible part, which should be the “ Community interest” = “C” , thus taking part as “community” be present in every two-party bargain, claiming its own “share” from this Suppose that: • Ua = Pi, Ub = Ri , Uc = Qi , ....in a mathematical approach (tables 1, 2): • Ua = x , Ub = (100-x)k and f’ = [ x (100-x)k ]΄ = 0 , so that Ua + Ub = max THEN lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua Ub Uc = Ua + Ub + Uc i→∞ or, how to transform a “competition” into the absolute cooperation, taking into account the integrated information, coming from knowledge transfer AND the sensitization process in the community, thus maximizing bargainers utilities and the Community utility (Uc) The “Sharing problem” in a Bargain [Utilities, Shares, strategies, decision- choices, behaviour, Final Agreement] Having defined: (1) How information resulting from “knowledge creation /knowledge transfer” should contribute to what we call “social market” (2) How sensitization should be introduced to given information, as to turn it to an integrated information (Papakonstantinidis, 2006) (3) How “integrated information” should influence human behaviour during the bargain, or negotiations (4) How a human “social” behaviour could lead to a “new” perception of thinking or taking a decision, in the bargain (see at Calvert Randall, 1995, Berger,J 2005 Cinneide M. O’ 1991, Coleman J 1988, Yitzak Samuel 1997, Bernheim Douglas B. 1984 (5) How socialization could influence human choices or winning strategies during the bargain, based on instant reflection (Nash) (6) How scientific thought could transfer the problem from “utilities” (personal perception”) to pay-offs (objective perception = counting size) Harsanyi John(1973), then, the data of Table 2 may be transformed in a new set of data, as Table 3. TABLE 3 (Papakonstantinidis Proposal) Suggesting Sharing between “A , “B” and “C”

18

Share Α (%) 90 80 70 60 50

Share Β (%) 4 13 22 31 40

41 32

50 60

Utilit Utilit Utilit yA yB y AXB 1 71 71 2 70 140 5 68 340 10 64 640 16 60 960 23 31

52 40

1196 1240

Share C (%) 6 7 8 9 10

Utilit yC

9 8

4 3

1 2 3 4 5

Utility AXBX C 71 280 1020 2560 4800 max 4784 3720

23 70 40 24 960 7 2 1920 14 80 50 12 600 6 1 600 (Papakonstantinidis, 2002) SYMBOLS (a) “C” expresses the Community (an acceptable system value at local level), as the “third” or invisible part in the bargain- In real terms, it reflects the “confidence indicators”, or, in other words, if and at which level each member of the Community trusts the other, during the bargain (H. Hans 1997) (b)The less shares for A+ B the more share for “ C” part (c) Utility is a personal matter: Utility units are not compared to each other. They express the fear of breaking down the agreement (d) If “A” needs more the “agreement” than the payoff, then he should be ready to accept any form of agreement. This should be the “ground” for a Flag Theme local people creation (table, below) TABLE FLAG THEME - Flow Chart

Local Abilitie s

Leadersh ip

Properties Priorities

Flag Theme

Creating a Active team Participation psychology Roles in among local planning/ Papakonstantinidis, 2000

Jointing the endogenous forces on a common goal

“Flag Theme” may be concerned as an innovative idea- an “open discussion theme” basedindividual on thestrategies sensitisation process at local level Converging on a “common which concentrates local resources, goal”, through cooperation skills, abilities, talents, leadership

19 as well as “priorities” and properties at local level (Gannon Agnes, 1990, Wilkinson Kenneth, 1991) From this point of view (a) A “new bargaining perception” including the “Community profit” as the “third” or “invisible” parameter in a bargain between TWO persons-players may change some Globalization negative conditions, providing them with “rules”/ social rules through social behavior changing. (b) Reforming a bilateral contradiction in a 3-part bargain between two players (including the Community “C” as the “invisible” part between TWO, in fact may reverse the base of human negotiation : From “competition” to “co-operation” Reforming the “competition” to step towards “social cohesion” , the “objective perception of the world” may be changed into a more ideological: From material to a “thinking” world (Kamitza R 1994) The “C” partner my be proved to be the keyfactor, against war feelings thus introducing the Greek philosophy’s “METRON”

PART II Bangladesh case a- General Information Bangladesh is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, SAARC, BIMSTEC, the OIC, and the D-8. As the World Bank notes in its July 2005 Country Brief, the country has made significant progress in human development in the areas of literacy, gender parity in schooling and reduction of population growth. However, Bangladesh continues to face a number of major challenges, including widespread political and bureaucratic corruption, and discrimination against women and religious and ethnic minorities.

b- Grameen Bank- Bangladesh: b1- micro- credits

concept’ s (in short)

The concept of providing credit to the poor as a tool of poverty reduction was not unique. Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, founder of Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (now Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development), is credited for pioneering the idea. From his experience at Jobra, Yunus, an admirer of Dr. Hameed, realized that the creation of an institution was needed to lend to those who had nothing. While traditional banks were not interested in making tiny loans at reasonable interest rates to the poor due to high repayment risks, Yunus believed that given the chance the poor will repay the borrowed money and hence microcredit could be a viable business model.

20 The Grameen Bank started to diversify in the late 1980s when it started attending to unutilized or underutilized fishing ponds, as well as irrigation pumps like deep tube-wells. In 1989, these diversified interests started growing into separate organizations, as the fisheries project became Grameen Motsho (Grameen Fisheries Foundation) and the irrigation project became Grameen Krishi (Grameen Agriculture Foundation). Over time, the Grameen initiative has grown into a multifaceted group of profitable and non-profit ventures, including major projects like Grameen Trust and Grameen Fund, which runs equity projects like Grameen Software Limited. The success of the Grameen model of micro-financing has inspired similar efforts in a hundred countries throughout the developing world and even in industrialized nations, including the United States. Many, but not all, microcredit projects also retain its emphasis on lending specifically to women. More than 94% of Grameen loans have gone to women, who suffer disproportionately from poverty and who are more likely than men to devote their earnings to their families.

b-2 – Yusuni Map Concept According to Yusuni Map , traditional business and economics focuses most of its attention on just one entity and one problem: how to increase the profitability of the firm (regardless of the costs this might impose on other parties such as employees, the environment or society as a whole). Mapping is based on two assumptions. First, that real, wealth creation

flows

through

many

levels

simultaneously

including

individuals, groups (teams, communities), organizations, networks of organizations (supply chains, regions, nations), and global society (the environment, international relations etc). Second, that it is only sustainable if each level is systemically a) getting its core needs met and b) contributing what it can, rather than focusing simply on value extraction. The challenge of Mapping is to design and maintain allround ‘win-win-win’ systems where each ‘level’ benefits from its dealings with other levels. This is in contrast to the ‘win-win conspiracies’ that dominate most economies today: where two parties ‘win’ at the expense of a third (e.g. where shareholders and employees

21 ‘win’ at the expense of customers – bureaucracies; where shareholders and customers ‘win’ at the expense of employees – slave labour; where customers and organizations ‘win’ at the expense of the environment etc).This is the central challenge of mapping proposal: to invent or redesign wealth creating networks and systems so that win-lose relationships and win-win conspiracies are transformed into win-winwin virtuous spirals. This is not easy. It requires long, iterativelydetailed dialogues, series of micro experiments, trial and error etc. So the detail of Mapping can be very deep and local which is how usable geographical maps are also triangularised. But the idea behind it is incredibly simple: how to generate virtuous win-win-win spirals around human purposes? In other words, how to create sustainable social businesses and keep on regenerating the most humanly purposeful organization or network. From a Mapping perspective, Grameen has gone through four phases, each of them opening up new win-win-wins onto the whole ten-win model. 1976-1983 Microcredit’s Banking for the Poor. How the microcredit movement created a virtuous spiral around a 6-win model: -productive and

demanding

relationships

between

individuals,

centres/communities and an organization (Grameen). 1983-1995 Replicating the exponential nationally, and planting the seeds internationally. 1996-2005 Entrepreneurial revolution in mobile. The win-win exponentials extend to all ten nodes – to society as a whole. Meanwhile,

microcredit

goes

global

(ten

win)

via

the

microcreditsummit network. 2006 onwards: Worldwide acclaim with the Nobel Prize awarded half to

Dr

Yunus

and

half

to

Grameen’s

millions

of

female

microentrepreneurs Global brand architecture with the birth of

22 partnerships in Future Capitalism. As the new book by Dr Yunus reveals, Future Capitalism designed from Micro-up entrepreneurs and generating communal goodwill multipliers can sustain any deeply human purpose we focus on worldwide. However Future Capitalism partnerships need to be openly formed between the world’s deepest grassroots service networks - such as the 100000+ Bangladeshi’s employed in microcredit - and global corporations governed by winwin-win exponential rising metrics. We can start bridging cultures, rejoicing in young and old, and caring about male and female - and relentlessly priorities the end of poverty’s broken system, -by spreading the idea of social business and cheerleading microsummits. Grameen in 2008 is ready for collaboration agents who wish to connect www

entrepreneurial

summits

around

such

deep

community-

connecting sectors as solar energy and mobile ending of digital divides. These MICROsummits can invite youth of the world to join in and track as ambitiously collaborative goals as microcreditsummit started propagating in 1997 when it was launched by such partners as the Bangladeshi microcredit networks and the Washington DC social business results organizations. How

social

business/Mapping

forces

to

people

to

reinvent

economics.(a) The choice of seeing that human beings are not selfish, rational

profit

maximisers.

They

are

social,

reciprocal

beings.

Economics needs to be built on the foundation of humanity: reciprocity. (b) Real wealth creation can never be measured in terms of money profit. (c) Markets. Adam Smith rightly identified the importance of bottom-up entrepreneurial activity and of competition. However, his writings were seized upon by traditional economists to do something else completely: to argue that the ‘hidden hand’ of the market always creates the best of all possible worlds. This closed off investigation of the real challenge of economics: the design of sustainable, win-win-win systems. (d) Innovation. How the notion of entrepreneurship was

23 distorted into top down, value extraction, as distinct from creating bottom up, win-win-win exponentials.

CONTRADICTIONS

win- win- win papakonstantinidis model vs GRAMEEN BANK

Win-win-win papakonstantinidis model

Yusuni Map (Net)

Starting date:

Starting Year: 2007

Aug 14, 2002, Visby University , GOTLAND SW THE CAUSE

THE CAUSE

Traditional business and economics

Traditional business and economics

focuses most of its attention on just one

focuses most of its attention on just one

entity and one problem: how to increase

entity and one problem: how to increase

the profitability of the firm (regardless of

the profitability of the firm (regardless of

the costs this might impose on other

the costs this might impose on other

parties such as employees, the

parties such as employees, the

environment or society as a whole).

environment or society as a whole).

♦

♦

The shareholders value maximizing capitalist corporation , may generate a quite different output . It depends on

The shareholder value maximising capitalist corporation inevitably

24 generates one type of exponential: the how, it is used by shareholders, in order a “social trouble” to be avoided For this, it is needed social capital as well as the economic capital to be created especially in small communities. Social Capital as a concept of community behavior and natural resources management is defined as the “capital that refers to connections within and between social networks (emphasizing the social trust, in this paper)- something of a cure-all, for the problems of a modern society” (Portes, A., 1998) may be the base of a local development program. Especially, Local Development may be concerned as a unique diversification / declination from the globalization rules. The discrete entity’s “diversification rate” (R*) from globalization/ or bargaining rules, (Walras S, 1980) may be the crucial parameter which would define “Local Development” as a social cohesion result at local level. Local Development is concerned as the limit-end of a unique and continuous sensitized development process , applied in a discrete spatial entity. Hypothesis

downward spiral. Why? Because its demand that it must take the maximum possible value out of the system of which it is a part once every three months inevitably ends up sucking the life out of that system, generating conflict along the way. This downward spiral can be hidden from view so long as the victims of this value extraction remain silent and powerless: people without a vote, people without a voice and/or people without money. Usually, all three come together: the only way to have a vote or voice in a capitalist marketplace is if you have money. If you have no money, you have no ‘vote’ and no voice.

Hypothesis

INTERACTIVE APPROACH

INTERACTIVE APPROACH

INTERCONNECTED RELATIONS

INTERCONNECTED RELATIONS

INSTANT REFLECTION CHOICE

…….

One action in one part has knock-on effects on the other part(win-loose), but at the same time, it is an “instant (not a priori) cooperation” among the TWO parts, taking into account the THIRD -C – part This case may be proved to be more effective for both (A And B) negotiators

One action in one part has knock-on effects on the other part (win-loose. This is a world of exponential curves:

It is assumed that both of negotiators are adopting traditional economics, in their own behavior , from starting to the end of negotiation

Virtuous spirals leads to ever accelerating growth. On the opposite, doom loops, or, vicious circles which quickly spiral away to nothing It is assumed that both of negotiators are adopting traditional economics, in their own behavior , from starting to the end of negotiation A negotiator is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not absolutely

25

A negotiator have doubts about the other part’s (person, organization, state) intension, or “strategy”, or even expectation. For this, the SENSITIZATION process- as an outside intervention- make people to trust each-other or to build a social cohesion base.

complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also to have a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale.

There are TWO (2) negotiators, “A” , “B” but –at the same time they have to take into account (after the Sensitization process’ application) the THIRD (3rd ) , or INVISIBLE part of each negotiation , thus “smoothing their conflict perception

There are only TWO (2) persons who have opposite interests (“A” and “B”

win-win-win perception Avoiding the exponential curves, as well as maths of addition and subtraction : it is an “instant reflection” methodological tool Win-win-win methodology is motivated on that crucial dt instant reflection bargaining time, transforming individual winning strategies, into a NEW bargaining behaviour, through the SENSITIZATION process It is an INTERVENTION methodological tool in an animation “role” toward the Sensitization limit , which is the COMMUNITY win-win-win instant situation may be concert as the limit of the sensitization process

win-loose perception Exponential Type of Maths’ application Upward spiral vs Downward spiral ( win-lose model) It is an estimation only nothing more, nothing less It has no (positive or negative) influence coming outside win-win-win situation is a theoretical concept – a wish- to agree the three parts (a) shareholders, (b) CEOs who manage sharers owned to shareholders and (c) the customers of those Banks, or Stockholders Organizations, without any care for the other p4eople, or the Natural Environment , or even ethic, ideology

Starting Point:

Starting Point:

Maths : “Non Cooperative Games Theory” John Forbes Nash (1950)- Nobel Prize in Economics, 1994 in relation with Modern Innovation Theory (MIT) M.M Fischer

Maths of addition and subtraction- world of straight lines # Maths of multiplication and division –world of exponential curves (1.1x1.1..→∞.. # 0.99x0.99→0)

Based on Nash’ maths, plus MM Fischer (MIT- neural networks’ Theory)

Based on empirical Maths

26 Objective

Objective

A To produce a continuous win-winwin strategic and dynamic situation, based on instant reflection individual winning strategies

To produce a spiral win-win-win situation

To transform or create knowledge types (MM Fischer) by a synthesis (Papakonstantinidis) into “bargaining behaviours” used on decision making instant reflection (Papakonstantinidis) It has to prove that building social capital at local level on social trust links among local people : Social cohesion based on social capital may be measured by the diversification Rate (R*) from strict globalization rules : From this point of view, local people intervention should be useful, so as to diversify these “rules” at local level , adjusting them to local identity , including communication code, customs, culture, local ethic and an ideology, a people’s reaction against globalization rules, locally, by the SENSITIZATION process. Community is defined as a discrete entity (spatial/ cultural) at its sensitization process’s limit

To transform a monopoly measurement of the world as being only made up of separate, isolated parts while devaluating relationships and the trust and goodwill, by redesign and reprocess traditional business and economic focus from selfish to a those win-win-wins , generating trust & becoming magnets of goodwill thus creating a positive multiplier exponential: expanding inclusive virtuous spiral process, through Social business

Instant Reflection bargaining BETWEEN THREE (3) Parts: (a) & (b) the TWO Negotiators plus “C” as the third or invisible part (other people, Natural Environment, Ethic, Customs, acceptable Value System)

A continuous spiral dynamic process, coming from “Social Enterprises”

Win-win-win papakonstantinidis model focuses on those minimum time “time moments” (dt) Local spaces (small communities) are in the centre of our analysis, by the mean of a limitation process for space/time Especially, it is the “dealing instant moment” (the moment of taking the individual winning

“Time” is a basic parameter of this dynamic system, by a spiral process (exponential)

27 choices ’ Time is out of the suggested redesign , by the way of this individual responsibility, on “crucial moments” Time, is a sum of “moments” plus crucial decisions, taken on these moments -dt Methodology followed: Analyzing instant dealing reflection individual decision taken plus dealing individual behaviour on the crucial decision moment (for each deal) It has to make bridges between Social Sciences and Sciences of Economics, as well to Local Development Approaches (Coleman, SOCIAL CAPITAL approach, in relation with FRIEDMAN-WEAVER / UCLA Behavioural Local Development “as the local reaction to domain ethic, an ideology against globalization phenomenon THREE PARTS in the bargain : “A” and “B” negotiators, plus the “C” factor” (Community, Natural Environment, other people (out of the bargain) - It is an integrated widespread model (umbrella model) meeting a number of applications, in fields as economy, sociology, psychology, biology, history, laography, decision making analysis, the Decision Sciences, War analysis, “conflict Resolution, Trust Theory etc ALTERNATIVE TO NASH’ WINWIN

Methodology followed: Mapping all human relations, on some crucial production sectors (limited horizon, as it concerns only some specific activities, on specific sectors) It is a pure Sociological Approach

Three Parts in the bargain: (a) shareholders (b) Banks’ Directors (CEOs) and (c) customers -it is very limited approach, It only focuses on financing side of the world: Recent Crisis has proved that the system works – mainly- for CEOs It is suggested a form of “social Banking” as GRAMEEN BANK ALTERNATIVE TO SHAREHOLDERS

(NAH EXTENSION) Transforming a “win-win” economic

The alternative to the shareholder

trust theory, into a “social market”

value maximising capitalist corporation is

theory, including the “win-win-win

not the communist regime, or a charity,

perception” , by the same

or a taxation-subsidised public service,

“shares/utilities Nash payoffs ‘ approach

but the social business. Why? Because

From this point of view

the social business puts human purpose

the Nash equilibrium point of

rather than value extraction at the heart of what it does, and it builds relationships

Lim U1i (&) U2i( &)=max U1iU2i (1) ià∞

should became

around this human purpose. It is economically viable – it pays its bills – but it does so in a way that builds win-win-

28 win relationships. These win-win-wins generate trust and become magnets of

lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri (2) i→∞

goodwill (a term accountants have always used and never understood), creating a positive multiplier exponential: expanding, inclusive virtuous spirals.

R (&) expresses the “C’ s (as for example NATURAL ENVIRONMENT) instant reflection winning strategies R(i) expresses the sum of C’s (NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, for example) information coming from human behavior AGAINST it

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The challenge of WIN-WIN-WIN

The challenge of Mapping is to design

PAPAKONSTANTINIDIS MODEL is to

and maintain all-round ‘win-win-win’

design and maintain all-round ‘win-win-

systems where each ‘level’ benefits from

win’ systems where each PART OF

its dealings with other levels. This is in

INSTANT REFLECTION –dt- NEGOTIATION

contrast to the ‘win-win conspiracies’ that

OR MAKING CHOICE benefits from its

dominate most economies today: where

dealings with other PART (INCLUDING

two parties ‘win’ at the expense of a third

THE COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS THE

(e.g. where shareholders and employees

NATURAL ENVIRONMENT AND IDEOLOGY)

‘win’ at the expense of customers –

This is in contrast to the ‘win-win

bureaucracies; where shareholders and

conspiracies’ that dominate most

customers ‘win’ at the expense of

economies today: where two parties ‘win’

employees – slave labour; where

at the expense of a third (e.g. where

customers and organisations ‘win’ at the

shareholders and employees ‘win’ at the

expense of the environment etc).

expense of customers – bureaucracies; where shareholders and customers ‘win’

This is the central challenge of

at the expense of employees – slave

innovation: to invent or redesign wealth

labour; where customers and

creating networks and systems so that

organisations ‘win’ at the expense of the

win-lose relationships and win-win

environment etc).

conspiracies are transformed into winwin-win virtuous spirals. This is not easy.

This is the central challenge of innovation:

It requires long, iteratively-detailed dialogues, series of micro experiments,

29 trial and error etc. So the detail of ………..

Mapping can be very deep and local

Win-win-win papakonstantinidis model contributes greatly to a Social Sciences field that examines issues and forms of organization of social action at regional and local level. In the same framework, the author is trying –successfully- to link the notion of Social Capital to the limitations and conditions to ensure social cohesion and substantial social development at local level. Individual and social action and contribution to alternative developmental models is not seen as a simple and occasional parameter for the performance of these models. On the contrary, underpinned by convincing and practical arguments, the suggested win-win-win scheme a) is a basic condition for successful initiatives regarding local social development b) exploits and contributes to the creation of new labour opportunities for the citizens of local societies and c) activates intervention agencies.

which is how usable geographical maps are also triangularised. But the idea behind it is incredibly simple: how to generate virtuous win-win-win spirals around human purposes? In other words, how to create sustainable social businesses and keep on regenerating the most humanly purposeful organisation or network.

Furthermore, a new social prospect of development can be seen; a prospect that uses social skills, networks of partners and persons with high negotiating power and forms of democratic representation. Finally, from a sociological point of view, it is interesting to note any feedback to such a model that is open and flexible to reforms, having as principle the “third win” that is disseminated to all factors of local social development.

FLAG THEME Skills for realizing local development at local level, by a local FLAG THEME

PEER-PRESSURE Skills for loan

Local Quality CONTACTS experimental application

GRAMEEN BANK experimental application There are THREE parts (GRAMEEN)

There are THREE parts (a) family business claiming by low cost

max profit,

(b) customers claiming low cost vacation but better services (c) NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

“claiming”

(a) shareholders claiming max profit by low cost of banking services (b) customers claiming low cost bank services , but better loan conditions (micro-credits) Also as ( b ) factor should be the COMMUNITY as a whole : People are bound each-other by a “peer-pressure

30

respect from both , family business AND customers, as well as the COMMUNITY as a whole

win- win- win papakonstantinidis model approaches GRAMEEN Bank’ s operation by including AND the Community as the THIRD win in its construction. Win-win-win papakonstantinidis model may be concern as a model-umbrella under which all the win-win-win schemes should find their own express, as discrete entities INNOVATION- FUTURE CAPITALISM

cohesion’” through their own skills (not free will) (c) CEOs claiming better wages , but less work GRAMEEN BANK operation approaches the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model by including the Community as the THIRD “win” in its constructional form GRAMEEN may be concern as a sub-total case of win-win-win papakonstantinidis model , a model-umbrella for Social and Economic scientific fields INNOVATION- FUTURE CAPITALISM

PAPAKONSTANTINIDIS, 2009/ APRIL

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32 Papakonstantinidis, 2000) “ The Strategy of Local Development (Vo II, pp 6-7, 26-29, 30, 44-49, 66) Papakonstantinidis L. A (2002) “The Sensitized Community” Typothito Edition, Ath trnsl Papakonstantinidis L.A (2003“The Strategy of Economic and Regional Development” Typothito Papakonstantinidis L. A (2003, Nov) “Building the Social Capital and Local Capacities in Rural Areas” – special issue of Hungarian Academy of Sciences- Department of Regional Studies, Nov, 2003 Papakonstantinidis L. A (2004) “Sensitization and Involvement the Community: A Rural Tourism Application of the win-win-win Model” Review of Economic Sciences”-TEIEP, issue 6 Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) “Knowledge Creation and the win-win-win model” Scientific Review of Applied Economics TEIPI Ed, Jan 2004 Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004, Jan) “Rural Tourism: win-win-win” Journal of Hospitality and Tourism” , issue 2 , India Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004, Febr) “ Digital Economy and Hyper-cube space” “Journal of Applied Economics and Management”, issue 1, India Papakonstantinidis- Lagos“Integrated Total Quality Management and Sustainable Development” [Lagos D, Papakonstantinidis L.A] Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Volume 1, issue 1, /2003 pp 64-82, ISSN 0972-7787 www.johat.com Papakonstantinidis L.A (2003) “Digital Economy and Hyper-cube: New Applied Economics in Managing a Local Government Organization : A Proposal” Journal of Applied Economics and Management, Volume 1, issue 1,/ 2003, pp 17-34, ISSN 0972- 8937, JAEM- INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, Bundelkhand University, Jansi Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004)“Sensitization as a form of knowledge creation and the Win-Win-Win Model…” Scientific Review of Applied Research, Vol VIII, No 2 /2003, pp 89108, ISSN 1106-4110 Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) “Rural Tourism: Win-Win-Win- case study Women Cooperative Gargaliani”, Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Volume 1, issue 2, /2003 pp 49-70, ISSN 0972-7787 www.johat.com Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) “Sensitization and Involving the Community. A Rural Development Application of the Win-Win-Win Model” Review of Economic Research 6/2004 pp 177-192 Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005) “Operations Management by a hyper-cube & win-winwin perspective: A Local Development Approach” Journal of Applied Economics and Management, Volume 2, issue 2,/ 2004, pp 111-130, ISSN 0972- 8937, JAEM- Institute of Economic and Finance Bundelkhand University, Jansi Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005)“Win-Win-Win Model and Sensitization Process”-Journal of Space and Community- Hungarian Academy of Sciences/Regional Studies Dept Papakonstantinidis L.A (2002) “The win-win-win model” – “Developing Sustainable Rural Tourism” Thematic guide- chap 7.9 –“Euracademy Guide”, GotlandSweden, www.euracademy.org. Papakonstantinidis L.A (2003) “Building the Social Capital and Local Capacities in Rural Areas- The Animation Process”2003 [ Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Regional Studies] Gyor-Hungary “Euracademy Guide” –p 15 Papakonstantinidis L.A 2004) “Sensitization & the win-win-win model: An answer to Globalization’s Impact on Local Communities and Common Perceptions of the World Tendencies- Case Study: Community Redefinition- Tychero Evros- ISA e-Ed. Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) New trends in Regional Policy: Territory-Space Definition by a 3-level Bargaining Approach- The Win-Win-Win Model. Case Study: The LEADER EU Initiative Application in Greece” “Regional and Rural Development Interface” Babes-Bolyai University, Faculty of Economics – Cluj-Napoca Romania, - European Program “Reabalk European Project”.

33 Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005) “Le migration economique polonaise dans quelque lieux du Peloponnese” I.S.A. Ed Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005) “Networking SMEs: A win-win-win approach ISA Ed special issue “Networks and Partnerships for 'Learning Regions' in everyday practice”Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) “ Bargaining win-win-win Model and the Hypercube (the MARTIX concept) Dimension” – Journal of Applied Economic & Management vol 1 issue 1, JENSEN, India Papakonstantinidis L.A (2007) “Bargaining Problem and Local Development” Gutenberg, (trnsl –GREEK) Athens, 2007 Papakonstantinidis L.A (2007) “Clustering & Networking SMEs in Rural Areas & winwin-win Model” ISA – World Congress’s minutes, Durban South Africa (July, 2006) Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) Win-Win-Win Methodology on Rural Tourism Activities / Good Practices from Greece” The Asian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism (AJHT) – v1/iss 1 – Santo Tomas University Manila Philippines , pp 95-120 Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) "Forecasting the tourist impact based on GINI Index: Flexible development policies" Journal ITTM / India (Vol.1 No.2) pages 48-57. Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) “Bargaining as the basic Globalization Ideology” Review of Social Sciences –Dec 2008- draft (approved) Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008-Sept) Building Social Capital for Local Development : The Economy of Poor and the win-win-win Model” International Sociological Association/ First ISA Forum of Sociology “Sociological Research and Public Debate- Barcelona Spain September 5-8 2008, Official e-minutes (2008S00879) Petrella Ricardo (2001) “Globalization impact on space-time (trnsl) Local Government Journal (tetradia topikis autodioikissis) , Athens, Greece, Nov 2001 Portes A (1998) “”Social Capital : its origins and application in a modern sociology” Annual Review of Sociology –v. 24 p. p 1-24 Putnam R (2000) “Bowling Alone the Collapse and Revival of American CommunityNew York Simon and Schuster, based Development – The case of Mining Areas in Orissa India” Draft paper Social capital Initiative South Asia Infrastructure Unit” Ramonet Ignacio “Mondalisation et les perspecives sociale dans l’economie glolale” trnsl- Monde Diplomatique, Aug, 2000 Schor Juliet (2000) “The Over-worked American” Le Monde Diplomatique Simon By Herbert A(1998) A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice Stochr W and Todtling F (1979) “Spatial Equality : some antithesis to current regional development doctrine” H. Folms Ed. Swensen T (Danmark-2008) “Confidence Indicators” (trnsl in Greek) Torreta Gullietta (1997) “Sociological Aspects in the Human Resources Management inside the Public Administration” I (I.S.A) R.C 26 , special issue, Toronto Canada van Damme Eric, Stability and Perfection on Nash Equilibria, New York and Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1987, second edition, 1991. Varoufakis Yanis, Young, Conflict in Economics, Hemel Hempstead: Wheatsheaf and New York: St Martin's Press, 1990. Varoufakis Yanis,(1991) Rational Conflict, Oxford: Blackwell. von Neumann John, Morgenstern Oscar, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University Press, 1944 (second edition, 1947. third edition, 1953). Wilkinson Kenneth(1991) “Social Stabilisation: The Role of Rural Society”International Center for Development Studies –U.C.G –IRL, special issue,1991 Walras S.(1980) “Global Rules for a Global Economy” N.Y Ed Yitzak Samuel (1997) ”The Changing Realm of Organisations: New Challenges for Sociological Practice” International Sociological Association (I.S.A –R.C 26), special issue, Toronto Canada Yunus Muhammad (2008) A World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism; Public Affairs; ISBN 9781586484934

34 Yunus Muhammad(2003) Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty; Public Affairs; ISBN 9781586481988 Yunus Muhammad (1994) Grameen Bank, as I See it; Grameen Bank. Yunus Muhammad(1991) Jorimon and Others: Faces of Poverty (co-authors: Saiyada Manajurula Isalama, Arifa Rahman); Grameen Bank. Yunus Muhammad(1976) Planning in Bangladesh: Format, Technique, and Priority, and Other Essays; Rural Studies Project, Department of Economics, Chittagong University. Yunus Muhammad (1974) Three Farmers of Jobra; Department of Economics, Chittagong University.

Prof Papakonstantinidis L. A 2009, April