Article Guilt-schopenhauer.docx

Considerations on the concept of guilt in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Eli Vagner Francisco Rodrigues

Abstract: The thesis of the moral order of the world (moralische Weltordnung - sittliche Weltordnung) defended by Schopenhauer implies in determining a meaning for the existence of evil and suffering and, consequently, for the problem of attribution of guilt. From the negation of a transcendence in the sense of dogmatic metaphysics, the traditional solutions to the problem of human imputation are compromised. Notwithstanding the denial of free will, Schopenhauer asserts an original guilt for the human condition, which at first seems to contradict the idea of necessity inherent in his conception of human nature. The assertion of the dogma of original sin as an allegorical truth, which will be explained in a strict sense by its philosophy, places the philosopher in the obligation to prove a guilt before action, in the very essence of the human. This article represents an effort to understand how Schopenhauer sustains human guilt from an anti-dogmatic perspective. For this I analyze the occurrences of the concept of guilt (Schuld) in the published work of the philosopher as well as in the posthumous manuscripts. Last but not least, I turn to the works of Mathias Kossler, Copleston, Atwell and ... in order to clarify the problem of guilt from the point of view of important interpreters and specialists.

Keywords:

Guilt, moral order, responsibility, ethics, morality, retribution, metaphysics, deciphering.

1- Introduction:

Max Scheler wrote, a few weeks before his death, in the preface to the work "The Position of Humans in the Cosmos."

Die Fragen: Was ist der Mensch, und was ist seine Stellung im Sein… Haben mich seit dem ersten Erwachen meines philosophischen Bewustseins wesentlicher beschäftige als jede andere philosophische Frage.“ (Max Scheler, Die stellung des Mensche im Kosmos)

This question is directly related to the theme of this work which deals with the question of the moral ordering of the world in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. For Schopenhauer, the major question of philosophy, which since Socrates has loomed as an enigma about philosophy, is that of relating the force that produces the phenomenon of the world, and determines its nature, with morality. In other words, the main question of philosophy would be to explain whether or not there is a moral order in the world. This problem is the most fundamental and difficult in philosophy, and it has occupied itself with the most influential forms of explanation of the phenomenon of the world. Schopenhauer judges all previous attempts insufficient. If we go back to Scheler's question: "Was ist der Mensch", and, hypothetically, to address Schopenhauer, the answer to the question would be: Menschliches Dasein ist Schuld. Der Wille ist schleht und sundlich, dem dasein ist das nichtsein vorzusiehen: der mensch ist etwas, das nicht sein sollte. Schopenhauer's attempt to elucidate the enigma of the world has as one of its principles a condemnation of the world and man. Becoming is not characterized as something beneficial and man has a share in the reprehensible nature of the evil of the world. So what ethically characterizes man is an original guilt or a existencial guilt and what characterizes the world is a onthological guilt. Is this conception a true revolution in the Western ethical conception, or does it have antecedents in the history of thought? Traditionally the doctrines that have as presupposition the human imputability in the existential sense are religious doctrines and, therefore, dogmatic. The question that I put in discussion with this text and that, in general, runs through this text is whether it would be possible to philosophically sustain a theory of guilt for the world and for man. We shall see that the question of human guilt is quite complex and based, as far as Schopenhauer's philosophy is concerned, not on an uncritical adherence to dogmas and religious myths as it may seem at first. The assertion of guilt, whether existential, ontological or originating, logically implies the prior existence of a system of values. What we may ask is: how would be this system of values on which Schopenhauer would sustain his imputation? Moreover, as we can see in the work "On the freedom of the will" the philosopher affirms that a bad action that is carried out by a man must be attributed to his creator or to nature. Since Schopenhauer's philosophy is characterized as an immanent metaphysics, the attribution of guilt can not be transferred to a transcendence or to a creative instance.

The problem seems to lead us, then, to the possibility or legitimacy of imputation of a being who is not responsible for its existence. The question of the moral ordering of the world is related to the broad conceptual lines of Schopenhauer's philosophy, for example: the question of man and the meaning of his existence, the question of immanent metaphysics, the problem of the justification of guilt attributed to man, the affirmation of original sin, its philosophical meaning, and the question of human freedom. All these questions, if clarified, would be a way to clarify the question of original guilt. Among these issues the issue of freedom and responsibility deserves to be highlighted. We will see that the difficulty lies in understanding whether Schopenhauer defends a deterministic thesis (natural determinism) or affirms the freedom of man as the basis of his imputability (guilt), which in another aspect will be the legitimation of his suffering. The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine the theory of the moral order of the world (sittliche Ordnung, Weltordnung) in the moral philosophy of Schopenhauer having as central question the problem of guilt. In Schopenhauer's own words, "Schuld des Daseins selbst" (Da die größte Schuld des Menschen Ist, daß er geboren ward.) "And which, as we have seen above, will be referred to here as original guilt, existential guilt or ontological guilt. The imputation of dasein has direct consequences on human imputability and, ultimately, is related to the idea of human nature, guilt and innocence of becoming (Werdens).

Physikalische Wahrheiten können viel äußere Bedeutsamkeit haben; aber die innere fehlt ihnen. Diese ist das Vorrecht der intellektuellen und moralischen Wahrheiten, als welche die höchsten Stufen der Objektivation des Willens zum Thema haben; während jene die niedrigsten. (PP, K. VIII, Absatz. 108)

This statement highlights the importance of ethics as a discipline of philosophy. But it is in the following paragraph that Schopenhauer presents, in a synthetic and curious way, his position in relation to the problem.

Daß die Welt bloß eine physische, keine moralische, Bedeutung habe, ist der größte, der verderblichste, der fundamentale Irrthum, die eigentliche Perversität der Gesinnung, und ist wohl im Grunde auch Das, was der

Glaube als den Antichrist personificirt hat. (PP, K. VIII, Absatz. 109) According to J. Salaquarda it is exactly in this sense that Nietzsche will use the word antichrist. The central opposition between Schopenhauer's philosophy and Nietzsche's philosophy was about the moral ordering of the world. On the one hand, then, we would have Schopenhauer and an imputatious metaphysical, accusatory, and another Nietzsche with an attempt to return to a sense of innocence of becoming. In fact, in my view, this opposition enunciated by Salaquarda, exposes, on the other hand, that the great challenge of philosophy, pointed out by Schopenhauer, which would be to demonstrate the nexus between the force that causes the phenomenon and the ethical sphere to arise, both in the sense of guilt as in the sense of an innocence of becoming. The great challenge, therefore, of moral philosophy is to determine and justify that, or whether there is a possibility of moving from an empirical judgment, to an evaluative judgment on life. If Schopenhauer accuses man and the world, Nietzsche accuses the accuser himself. In the twilight of idols Nietzsche accuses Schopenhauer of having created a metaphysic of executioner. If Schopenhauer's philosophy is as Schopenhauer himself states, "Christian philosophy itself, however paradoxical it may seem to one who does not attain the core of things but remains on the surface," Nietzsche's accusation is also addressed to Schopenhauer. Heute, wo wir in die u m g e k e h r t e Bewegung eingetreten sind, wo wir Immoralisten zumal mit aller Kraft den Schuldbegriff und den Strafbegriff aus der Welt wieder herauszunehmen und Psychologie, Geschichte, Natur, die gesellschaftlichen Institutionen und Sanktionen von ihnen zu reinigen suchen, giebt es in unsern Augen keine radikalere Gegnerschaft als die der Theologen, welche fortfahren, mit dem Begriff der „sittlichen Weltordnung“ die Unschuld des Werdens durch „Strafe“ und „Schuld“ zu durchseuchen. Das Christenthum ist eine Metaphysik des Henkers…(GD, Die vier Grosser Irthümer, 7)

Here I indicate Nietzsche's criticism only to point out the importance of the theme of guilt and imputation to the framework of German moral philosophy, for the complexity of this critical relationship would require further research.

Returning to the theme in Schopenhauer, we see that, while affirming a moral order for the world, on the other hand, Schopenhauer denies the existence of a moral law for life. Meaning, which results from an interpretation, (deciphering), is not converted into an ethical prescription. There can be no rule imposed at will if the will is free. What seems unquestionable is that Schopenhauer attempts to make explicit a moral meaning for the world, and that such a meaning is based on a condemnation of becoming and an imputation of the will and man. There would be a moral meaning for the world, but the verdict of this meaning, relative to man, is not of innocence. Directly connected to them are the questions of justice and human suffering. Indeed, it is possible to say that for Schopenhauer there is not only a moral order of the world but also an order of salvation. In spite of his nihilism characterized, above all by Nietzsche, as a philosophy of denial and a soteriology it is possible to affirm that the ordering of the world does not mean an optimistic position inthe broader sense. The problem is that when one tries to legitimize a moral order one must solve the problem of evil and suffering. In Schopenhauer's fundamental conception of moral order there is a relationship between suffering and justice. For Schopenhauer, there can be no suffering without a legitimation, without an attribution of guilt. Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception is based on a law of compensation, this is clearly demonstrated, as we shall see, with the balance metaphor that is presented in paragraph 63 of the fourth book of The World as Will and Representation. In diesem Sinne können wir sagen: die Welt selbst ist das Weltgericht. Könnte man allen Jammer der Welt in eine Waagschale legen, und alle Schuld der Welt in die andere; so wurde gewiß die Zunge einstehen. (WWV, V, Ansatz 63) The philosophical characterization and legitimation of this guilt, which counteracts suffering, however, is quite complex. Was this guilt innate or acquired by man's action? In both ways. Denn das menschliche Daseyn, weit entfernt den Charakter eines Geschenks zu tragen, hat ganz und gar den einer kontrahirten Schuld. Die Einforderung derselben erscheint in Gestalt der, durch jenes Daseyn gesetzten, dringenden Bedürfnisse, quälenden Wünsche und endlosen

Noch. Auf Abzahlung dieser Schuld wird, in der Regel, die ganze Lebenszeit verwendet: doch sind damit erst die Zinsen getilgt. Die Kapitalabzahlung geschieht durch den Tod. – Und wann wurde diese Schuld kontrahirt? – Bei der Zeugung. – (W II, 71 Von der Nichtigkeit und dem Leiden des Lebens) Suffering can only be explained by merit, if it is not merited it is absurd and the moral ordering of the world is refuted. If man receives suffering it is because he deserves and if he deserves it is because he is guilty.

The logic of compensation, or retribution, characteristic of religious perspective, is adapted from a transcendent conception to the immanence of its philosophy. It is worth noting that this logic of compensation is also the logic of economic and law. The notion of compensation, balance, and equity are conceptions that permeate and underlie many of our worldviews. That is, Schopenhauer is not alone in his view of compensation whether in the ethical or natural sense. Life is a "Strafen Gelüstens", a punishable lust. The judge and the court become the world. The logic of punitive compensation continues, but the locus of punishment shifts from a divine, transcendent tribunal to the here and now of the phenomenal world, more specifically to the body and to the mind. At the basis of the conception of retribution is the supposed necessity relation between innocence and happiness, suffering and guilt. And Schopenhauer himself criticized this supposedly necessary relation when he criticized the philosophers who tried to substantiate the virtues in this conception. But in Schopenhauer's ethic, in my view, there remains this notion that innocence should be free from suffering. Rather, the problem would be to find an innocent since all nature is affirmation of the will. So if a being suffers he must be guilty. He who suffers atone for guilt. Life is the atonement of an original sin and guilt. The effectiveness of this reasoning will be fundamental for the support of the moral order proposed by Schopenhauer. After these initial considerations, I cast some questions that can be addressed to the philosophical system in question. Some I intend to respond to throughout the text. Does Schopenhauer attempt to philosophically legitimize the dogma of original sin with his conception of moral freedom and his theory of character?

Would Schopenhauer's propositions on guilt and freedom continue to be dogmatic responses, even though they were based on a point of view inspired by criticism? Is Schopenhauer's conception of guilt in fact compatible with the Hindu and Buddhist views, as the philosopher has repeatedly stated?

2 - First consideration: Guilt, Art and Tragedy (WWV Book III).

The first occurrence and mention of the problem of guilt in Schopenhauer's published work appears in his "theory of tragedy" contained in paragraph 51 of book III of The World as Will and Representation.

Der wahre Sinn des Trauerspiels ist die tiefere Einsicht, daß was der Held abbüßt nicht seine Partikularsünden sind, sondern die Erbsünde, d.h. die Schuld des Daseyns selbst: Pues el delito mayor Del hombre es haber nacido. (Da die größte Schuld des Menschen Ist, daß er geboren ward.) Wie Calderon es geradezu ausspricht. (W I, 51)

In the chapter on tragedy, Schopenhauer presents an interpretation, in my view, bold but extremely consistent with the foundations of his moral philosophy. According to the philosopher, tragedy would be, as an artistic form, a perfect translation of the world view characteristic of his philosophy. From the tragic theme we can find, in this supreme art form, a significant indication of the essence of the world and the being and the guilt inherent to the human being. Tendenz des Trauerspiels, der letzte Zweck der absichtlichen Darstellung der Leiden der Menschheit, und ist es mithin auch da, wo diese resignirte Erhebung des Geistes nicht am Helden selbst gezeigt, sondern bloß im Zuschauer angeregt wird, durch den Anblick großen, unverschuldeten, ja, selbst verschuldeten Leidens (WWV II, Kapitel 37) The tragic fate, the fall of the hero would not be an injustice, in the broadest sense. Guilt as a fundamental element of human nature could not fail to play an important role in art.

The tragedy represents, ultimately, the unsaved fall of the just and innocent. He who is innocent in the plot, is not innocent as a human being. Thus, tragedy represents the highest degree of translation of the essence of life and of man. When the public understands this aesthetic essence it enters the heart of the true nature of the world. Es ist für das Ganze unserer gesammten Betrachtung sehr bedeutsam und wohl zu beachten, daß der Zweck dieser höchsten poetischen Leistung die Darstellung der schrecklichen Seite des Lebens ist, daß der namenlose Schmerz, der Jammer der Menschheit, der Triumph der Bosheit, die höhnende Herrschaft des Zufalls und der rettungslose Fall der Gerechten und Unschuldigen uns hier vorgeführt werden. (WWV I, Kapitel 51) (our emphasis). It is precisely for these reasons that Schopenhauer argues that the introduction of poetic justice (poetisch Gerechtkei) into the universe of tragedy implies the loss of the true meaning of the literary genre in question. Poetic justice would be an artifice of justification or a compensation for the suffering of the tragic hero, that is introduced in the dramatic action of some tragedies. poetic justice would not be limited to the idea of demanding that vice be punished and virtue rewarded, but it would also require the triumph of a notion of balance, even in pieces with an end characterized by strong fatalism. According to this principle, dramatic action should contain a moral appeal, although in its expressive totality it was tragic. What is at stake here, as far as art and morality are concerned, is the possibility of teaching it. For Schopenhauer, poetic justice would betray the very essence of art which should be characterized as a mirror of life and not satisfy some momentary yearning for justice of the public. If the injustice that strikes the hero was an injustice originated in the dramatic action itself, that is, if it arose in the course of time and because of human actions, poetic justice would even do something sense. But when injustice is timeless, if it has not elapsed or originated in time, in dramatic action itself, poetic justice makes no sense at all. If we return to the text of paragraph 51 of The World as Will and Representation, we shall see that for Schopenhauer, "the true meaning of tragedy lies in the profound insight that heroes do not atone for their individual sins, but original sin, the guilt of existence itself.

Der wahre Sinn des Trauerspiels ist die tiefere Einsicht, daß was der Held abbüßt nicht seine

Partikularsünden sind, sondern die Erbsünde, d.h. die Schuld des Daseyns selbst…(W I 51)

In chapter 37 of Volume II of The World as Will and Representation called On the Aesthetics of Poetry (Zur Äesthetik der Dichtkunst) and also in the Lessons on the Metaphysics of the Beautiful, Schopenhauer states that the pleasure that tragedy gives us does not belong simply to feeling of beauty, but to the very feeling of the sublime.

Unser Gefallen am Trauerspiel gehört nicht dem Gefühl des Schönen, sondern dem des Erhabenen an; ja, es ist der höchste Grad dieses Gefühls WWV II, Kapitel 37) 2 - Second consideration: The problem of freedom (Über der Freiheti des Willens):

The problem of freedom is central to the question of guilt. It is not possible to clarify Schopenhauer's position on guilt if the issue of freedom is not effectively clarified. Therefore, in the following lines I present a brief but, I hope, sufficient explanation of the problem from the philosopher's work.

One of the problems that the philosopher faces in the writing On the freedom of the will is the conciliation of the principle of sufficient reason with the affirmation of the free will.

Leibniz would have realized the problem but since he did not have the aid of the transcendental distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself, he was not able to solve the problem. To the question of the Norwegian Society, namely, whether self-consciousness can offer any data in relation to freedom of will, Schopenhauer directly responds that it does not. It seems clear to consciousness that we can do one thing and / or the opposite, but it is not clear about the fact that we can want to do it indistinctly. With this we are still at the level of that empirical and popular concept of freedom, physical freedom, referred only to doing something. Self-consciousness always affirms this freedom. It consists in that every act of the will manifests immediately as an action of the body. By this, only action is known, not the decision-making instance of will. In fact we only know our willingness in experience.

The whole problem is related to the law of motivation. Of the four modalities of the principle of sufficient reason two of them are fundamental at this point. The law of causality and the law of motivation. The two laws become one, the law of motivation or the causality seen from within, from the point of view of self-consciousness. In the distinction between animal and human motivation lies an important explanation. Man has cognitive ability and has, beyond intuitive representations, the reason or faculty of concepts, abstract motives that may be empirically absent, projected in the past and in the future. In this sense the competition of motives is much more complex. Abstract motives are complex causes, but they do not cease to operate within a sphere of necessity. The distance between the abstract motive and the act of the will gives the act of the will the illusion that it is produced without cause. The abstract representations of the past and the future simultaneously or successively present divergent motives that struggle to determine the will. According to Schopenhauer, these competing abstractions, in their abstract nature, lead to the false assumption according to which we possess a liberum arbitrium indiferentiae. The law of motivation will not be attenuated by the abstractions of motives. We may want different and opposing things, but we can only want one in each case. Thus every act of will is determined by a motive that constitutes its sufficient reason and without which the act does not take place. In this sense, everything that occurs, occurs with necessity. But this need has an internal factor that determines it. Looking at the issue from another perspective, we must consider that motivation acts on a character. In man the character is individual, empirical, constant and innate. (in another part we can include the acquired character). The receptivity of motives will be determined by character. Every act of will is the necessary result of two factors: motive and character. From this encounter of factors will arise a truth classically known as a principle of scholasticism: operari sequitur esse. The negation of liberum arbitrium indiferentiae is, for Schopenhauer, the same as affirming that there can be no existence without an essence. The denial of free will, however, puts us before the question of determinism. If man is subject only to necessity and to determinism the thesis of the moral ordering of the world is affected. That is, in a world in which man has no freedom, it can not be said that there is a moral meaning. The denial of free will seems at first to contradict the moral order of the world. However, for Schopenhauer, we will see, in chapter V of the essay on free will, whether the philosopher completely renounces all freedom of human action and recognizes it as

subject to the strict necessity, we can still understand a true moral freedom of a higher type . This true freedom (wahre moralische Freiheit), which has not yet been explained in the text on freedom of will, comes from the clear sense of responsibility for what we do.

Wenn wir nun, in Folge unserer bisherigen Darstellung, alle Freiheit des menschlichen Handelns völlig aufgehoben und dasselbe als durchweg der strengsten Nothwendigkeit unterworfen erkannt haben; so sind wir eben dadurch auf den Punkt geführt, auf welchem wir die wahre moralische Freiheit, welche höherer Art ist, werden begreifen können. Es giebt nämlich noch eine Thatsache des Bewußtseyns, von welcher ich bisher, um den Gang der Untersuchung nicht zu stören, gänzlich abgesehen habe. Diese ist das völlig deutliche und sichere Gefühl der Verantwortlichkeit für Das was wir thun, der Zurechnungsfähigkeit für unsere Handlungen, beruhend auf der unerschütterlichen Gewißheit, daß wir selbst die Thäter unserer Thaten sind. Vermöge dieses Bewußtseyns kommt es Keinem, auch dem nicht, der von der im Bisherigen dargelegten Nothwendigkeit, mit welcher unsere Handlungen eintreten, völlig überzeugt ist, jemals in den Sinn, sich für ein Vergehen durch diese Nothwendigkeit zu entschuldigen und die Schuld von sich auf die Motive zu wälzen, da ja bei deren Eintritt die That unausbleiblich war. (E, Kapitel IV)

In this passage, in my view, there is a total inversion in the game of argumentation developed so far in the essay. The feeling of responsibility (Gefühl der Verantwortlichkeit), which, like compassion, is a feeling, takes on a capital importance for the determination of a central point of Schopenhauer's ethics. This feeling comes from the unshakable certainty that we are the authors of our actions. „Diese ist das völlig deutliche und sichere Gefühl der Verantwortlichkeit für Das was wir thun,“. This certainty determines "true moral freedom" (die wahre moralische Freiheit) and, in my view, opens the possibility of a compatibilist interpretation of Schopenhauer's ethics regarding freedom and necessity. Responsibility institutes moral freedom. The sense of responsibility belongs to the character of the individual. But it can not be of the empirical character, because it is subject to necessity, but to the intelligible character.

If freedom means the absence of sufficient reason, freedom means an aseity. Die Verantwortlichkeit fällt auf Den zurück, der sie hineingelegt hat, d. h. dessen Werk der Mensch mit solchen Neigungen ist. Daher ist er nur in dem Fall, daß er selbst sein eigenes Werk sei, d. h. Aseität habe, für sein Thun verantwortlich. (GM, Kapitel IV – Vorgänger) By the word „aseity“ (Aseität) is meant the characteristic of something that has not received its being from another place, or from another being. If action comes from being, the responsibility for what one is rests on one's being. It is this reasoning that grounds imputability. The question raised in this writing about the possibility of imputation of a being by his birth is answered in this way. He who acts is responsible for his action and is therefore guilty of all his actions, including his birth, for his essence determines an aseity of birth. Through this conception of true moral freedom, based on the sense of responsibility, Schopenhauer seeks to reconcile freedom with the principle of reason through Kantian duplicity (intelligible character, empirical character) that would allow the coexistence of transcendental freedom with empirical necessity. If Schopenhauer's contribution to the problem of human freedom does hold, it is not our goal to examine this specific problem in this work. As far as coherence is concerned with the question of guilt and human imputability, Schopenhauer's solution to the question of freedom is, in my view, consistent with his accusation. Man would be responsible for his actions and true moral freedom would justify his guilt. It remains for us in this problem to examine the nature of the intelligible character, the question of imputation over what is beyond experience. That is, the question now arises as follows: Is it the fault of man or will? The question can be answered in the same way that eternal justice is presented. The distinction between what causes and what suffers pain, between moral and physical evil, occurs only in the here and now of the phenomenon. If man is free, guilt can be attributed to him in the context of an imputation, if he is not free the responsibility for the action is not of the man, therefore the autonomy does not belong to him. As we see in paragraph 70 of the first volume of the world, for Schopenhauer: Allein der einzige Fall, wo jene Freiheit auch unmittelbar in der Erscheinung sichtbar werden kann, ist der, wo sie Dem, was erscheint, ein Ende macht, und weil dabei dennoch die bloße Erscheinung, sofern sie in der Kette der Ursachen ein Glied ist, der belebte Leib, in der Zeit, welche nur Erscheinungen enthält, fortdauert, so steht der Wille, der sich

durch diese Erscheinung manifestirt, alsdann mit ihr im Widerspruch, indem er verneint was sie ausspricht. (WWV I Ansatz 70) This point, crucial for solving the problem of guilt, will be taken up throughout this study. What has been characterized as transcendental freedom differs radically from what has traditionally been taken as freedom, in the form of a "libero arbitrum indiferentiae."

3 – Third consideration - "Debt / guilt of the human race" (Verschuldung des Menschengeschlechts, WWV II Kapitel, 48)

Schopenhauer states, In Chapter 48 of W II, entitled "On the theory of the denial of the will to live", that man receives his existence by his will, that is, with his consent or without his consent. In the second case, such an existence marked by so many irreparable sufferings would be a patent injustice. Der Mensch hat sein Daseyn und Wesen entweder mit seinem Willen, d.h. seiner Einwilligung, oder ohne diese: im letztern Falle wäre eine solche, durch vielfache und unausbleibliche Leiden verbitterte Existenz eine schreiende Ungerechtigkeit. (W II Kapitel 48) The question of human consent for existence itself, in my view, is the most difficult proposition to prove. What kind of consent would that be and when is this consent given? In this chapter also arises an association and fundamental relation for the understanding of Schopenhauer. According to the philosopher, as we have seen previously, all attempts to justify suffering occurred through the following logic: that which is innocent must not suffer. Therefore, if man suffers, then he must have guilt. This would be a supposed justice of things. The concept of justice is important in this conception. There is a notion of justice according to which suffering is deserved and, at the same time, by deduction, that innocence can not be punished. Schopenhauer points out that traditionally, behind this reasoning, there has always been a theory of virtues. The innocent would be happy, while the guilty party should atone for their guilt. To this conception Schopenhauer opposes the christian doctrine according to which works do not justify. Thus, Schopenhauer states that man came to the world guilty, because his will necessarily had to commit the sin of the affirmation of living and therefore, even exercising the virtues proposed by all moral systems, will suffer

continually. Now, what Schopenhauer is presenting to us is a theory of human nature. Human nature is corrupted because it has an essence that is always affirmative of will. Daß demnach der Mensch schon verschuldet auf die Welt kommt, kann nur Dem widersinnig erscheinen, der ihn für erst soeben aus Nichts geworden und für das Werk eines Andern hält. In Folge dieser Schuld also, die daher von seinem Willen ausgegangen seyn muß, bleibt der Mensch, mit Recht, auch wenn er alle jene Tugenden geübt hat, den physischen und geistigen Leiden preisgegeben, ist also nicht glücklich. Dies folgt aus der ewigen Gerechtigkeit, von der ich § 63 des ersten Bandes geredet habe. Daß aber, wie St. Paulus (Röm. 3, 21 ff.), Augustinus und Luther lehren…“ (W II Kapitel 48) Still in Chapter 48, Schopenhauer makes a statement that is quite relevant. In addition to confirming his position under Luther's probable influence on the doctrine of grace (die Werke nicht rechtfertigen können). Schopenhauer states that we are what we should not be. That is, that existence is an error that must or can be corrected. The idea of a moral order, therefore, must be in accordance with this need for redemption.

die Werke nicht rechtfertigen können, indem wir Alle wesentlich Sünder sind und bleiben, – beruht zuletzt darauf, daß, weil operari sequitur esse, wenn wir handelten, wie wir sollten, wir auch seyn müßten was wir sollten. Dann aber bedürften wir keiner Erlösung aus unserm jetzigen Zustande, wie solche nicht nur das Christenthum, sondern auch Brahmanismus und Buddhaismus (unter dem auf Englisch durch final emancipation ausgedrückten Namen) als das höchste Ziel darstellen: d.h. wir brauchten nicht etwas ganz Anderes, ja, Dem was wir sind Entgegengesetzes, zu werden. Weil wir aber sind was wir nicht seyn sollten, thun wir auch nothwendig was wir nicht thun sollten. Darum also bedürfen wir einer völligen Umgestaltung unsers Sinnes und Wesens, d.i. der Wiedergeburt, als deren Folge die Erlösung eintritt.” (W II Kapitel 48)

If works (Werke) can not justify us, since we are in essence and remain sinners, only redemption can remove us from this condition. The reason for this is in the "operari sequitur esse", to act as we should have to be as we should be, that is, essentially different. So we need to be converted into something distinct and even opposed to who we are. Here the thesis of a human nature, an

interpretation of what man is, is reinforced here. Because we are what we should not be act like we should not act. Taken in a moral sense. the existence of man is a mistake. Its nature is imposing a fault, a transgression and a debt. The assumption of this accusation is suffering. If human existence did not deflagrate a debt, man would not suffer.

Schopenhauer is presenting a thesis on human nature according to which our only definite sin is original sin, this sin, in fact, as we have seen, determines our nature or, in other words, holds the meaning of our affirmative nature of the will ( sinner). In chapter 49 of the same W II, Schopenhauer again presents a connection of guilt with knowledge. By situating and defining our intellect as a mere instrument of the will, so that guilt, as we saw in paragraph 28 of W I, on the differences between plants, animals and man, arises in the conjunction of phenomena, essence and knowledge. nicht im Wollen, sondern im Wollen mit Erkenntniß liegt dieSchuld.” (W I, Par. 28)

At this point a question arises. Schopenhauer states that guilt arises with knowledge, so it would be reasonable, according to his system, to assert that the will without knowledge is not guilty since it is not itself cognitive ... as we see in the following passage of the same chapter: Das innere Wesen an sich der Dinge ist kein erkennendes, kein Intellekt, sondern ein erkenntnißloses: die Erkenntniß kommt erst als ein Accidenz, ein Hülfsmittel der Erscheinung jenes Wesens, hinzu, kann daher es selbst nur nach Maaßgabe ihrer eigenen, auf ganz andere Zwecke (die des individuellen Willens) berechneten Beschaffenheit, mithin sehr unvollkommen, in sich aufnehmen. Hieran liegt es, daß vom Daseyn, Wesen und Ursprung der Welt ein vollständiges, bis auf den letzten Grund gehendes und jeder Anforderung genügendes Verständniß unmöglich ist. So viel von den Gränzen meiner und aller Philosophie. (W II Kapitel 50) A perfect understanding of existence is not possible. Schopenhauer will then present an interpretation of life, a decipherment (entziferung) of the puzzle as we shall see later.

3.1 - Individual blame for their own unhappiness, (Schuld der individuelen Unglükseligkeit, WWV II Kapitel 49)

In Chapter 49 the guilt for one's own unhappiness (individual unhappiness) is thematized and the focus of guilt is on sexuality. As Pilar Lopes de Santa Maria analyzes in his introduction to his translation of the two fundamental problems of ethics. According to Santa Maria, human sexuality adopts a clear metaphysical dimension in Schopenhauers Philosophy, because what is at stake is something as important as the composition of the future generation. The lovers believe that they pursue their own interests when in fact they serve the interest of the will, determined to maintain in its greatest possible purity the type of the species through that son that only they can engender. And more specialized and intense will be his passion the more suitable and irreplaceable this new individual is for the ends of the will. Sexuality is, then, the preferred instrument of the will to live and its most energetic affirmation. This gives him a character of guilt, since through it the error of existence is perpetuated; and that guilt will have to be paid with death. But, at the same time, procreation opens a door to hope: for every individual that is born is a new possibility that finds the will to get to deny itself. "

Sexuality is determinant for guilt because it is in sexuality that the will presents its greatest force of action and affirmation of species and of wanting life in general. The guilt for the sexual act has a metaphysical meaning in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Der Zeugungsakt verhält sich ferner zur Welt, wie das Wort zum Räthsel. Nämlich, die Welt ist weit im Raume und alt in der Zeit und von unerschöpflicher Mannigfaltigkeit der Gestalten. Jedoch ist dies Alles nur die Erscheinung des Willens zum Leben; und die Koncentration, der Brennpunkt dieses Willens, ist der Generationsakt. In diesem Akt also spricht das innere Wesen der Welt sich am deutlichsten aus. (W II Kapitel 45) The sexual act would be the "origo poenitenda" of which man, as a species, should repent. 4 – Fourthy consideration - History of philosophy and original guilt:

In the parerga and paralipomena, we can analyze from the writing about the history of philosophy, an attempt by Schopenhauer to find predecessors for his conception of ontological guilt. Attempts to find their predecessors in the matter of guilt offer us, I believe, a way to determine their influences. Thus from the pre-Socratics to Kant, we find some authors who, in one way or another, sustained the conception of guilt.

4.1 - Empedocles The first of them was, according to Schopenhauer, Empedocles.

Vor Allem aber ist, unter den Lehren des Empedokles, sein entschiedener Pessimismus beachtenswerth. Er hat das Elend unseres Daseyns vollkommen erkannt und die Welt ist ihm, so gut wie den wahren Christen, ein Jammerthal, — Ατης λειμων. Schon er vergleicht sie, wie später Platon, mit einer finstern Höhle, in der wir eingesperrt wären. In unserm irdischen Daseyn sieht er einen Zustand der Verbannung und des Elends, und der Leib ist der Kerker der Seele. Diese Seelen haben einst sich in einem unendlich glücklichen Zustande befunden und sind durch eigene Schuld und Sünde in das gegenwärtige Verderben gerathen, in welches sie, durch sündigen Wandel, sich immer mehr verstricken und in den Kreislauf der Metempsychose gerathen, hingegen durch Tugend und Sittenreinheit, zu welcher auch die Enthaltung von thierischer Nahrung gehört, und durch Abwendung von den irdischen Genüssen und Wünschen wieder in den ehemaligen Zustand zurückgelangen können. (PP I Fragmente fur Geschichte der Philosophie, grifo nosso) On the doctrine of Empedocles, Schopenhauer further observes that it would be probable that he, whom the ancients consistently refer to as a Pythagorean, has acquired his view of guilt from the influence of Pythagoras, especially since Plato also shares this conception and Plato, especially from the doctrine of metempsychosis, is under the influence of Pythagoras. It seems reasonable that the religions and philosophies that adopted the doctrine of metempsychosis adopted it based on the presupposition of the inevitable guilt of humanity. In ancient Greece this belief dates back to the Orphic cults. There is clearly a great difficulty in identifying the origins of a belief in guilt attached to the doctrine of metempsychosis. However, the deduction of a need for imputation and atonement as the basis of this doctrine seems to make much sense. Again the question brings us back to the problem of evil and suffering. The doctrine of metempsychosis presupposes an atonement plan in order to solve the ethical problem of the evil committed (generated, done) by an individual and the need of counterpart or balance of that offense, of that evil. Again the notion of compensation and retribution arises. Schopenhauer himself affirms this need. If there is no compensation or retribution, the imbalance installs injustice.

4.2 - Plotino.

Schopenhauer points out in Plotinus' doctrine something that is, in my view, directly related to the role of the concept of individuationis principle in the characterization of the objectification of man. Human sin seems to be grounded in the impulse to the condition of plurality in the temporal sphere.

Besonders interessant ist das 8. Buch dieser Enneade, welches darstellt, wie jene φυχη durch ein sündliches Streben in diesen Zustand der Vielheit gerathen sei: sie trage demnach eine doppelte Schuld, erstlich, die ihres Herabkommens in diese Welt, und zweitens die ihrer sündhaften Thaten in derselben: für jene büße sie durch das zeitliche Daseyn überhaupt; für diese, welches die geringere, durch die Seelenwanderung, (c. 5). Offenbar der selbe Gedanke, wie die Christliche Erbsünde und Partikularsünde. (PP I - Fragmente fur Geschichte der Philosophie, grifo nosso)

4.3 - The Gnostics: The problem of guilt was one of the main questions from which the Gnostics created their interpretations of the world. This is clear in relation to the question of the origin of evil. In order to solve the problem of the contradiction that exists between the signing of a creator beneficial to the world and the flagrant and real suffering, representing the evil of the world, the Gnostics relied on intermediary entities in which they laid the blame for the imperfections and contradictions of notion of guilt over the supposed perfection and benevolence of a transcendent creator. Thus the pleroma, the hylé, the aeons and the demiurge, took the guilt of suffering and evil. For Schopenhauer, the theoretical juggling of both Gnostics and Kabbalists, in the case of the Jews, reveals their dogmatism and confusion.

Die Kabbalistische und die Gnostische Philosophie, bei deren Urhebern, als Juden und Christen, der Monotheismus vorweg feststand, sind Versuche, den schreienden Widerspruch zwischen der Hervorbringung der Welt durch ein allmächtiges, allgütiges und allweises Wesen, und der traurigen, mangelhaften Beschaffenheit eben dieser Welt aufzuheben. Sie führen daher, zwischen

die Welt und jene Weltursache, eine Reihe Mittelwesen ein, durch deren Schuld ein Abfall und durch diesen erst die Welt entstanden sei. Sie wälzen also gleichsam die Schuld vom Souverän auf die Minister. Angedeutet war dies Verfahren freilich schon durch den Mythos vom Sündenfall, der überhaupt der Glanzpunkt des Judenthums ist. Jene Wesen nun also sind, bei den Gnostikern, das πληρωμα, die Aeonen, die υλη, der Demiurgos u. s. w. Die Reihe wurde von jedem Gnostiker beliebig verlängert. (PP I, Fragmente zur Geschichte der Philosophie)

Thus, according to Schopenhauer's interpretation, the Gnostics would have created all the cited entities (the pleroma, the hylé, the aeons and the demiurge), in order, ultimately, to solve the problem of guilt. 4.4 - Scotus Erigena: Schopenhauer's reflections on Scotus Erigena's solutions to the problem of guilt and free will clarify some aspects we have seen in the chapter on the work Über des Fraheit des Willens. The problem of free will is approached from the point of view that something that is created already has a nature and can not be different from what it is, so it is not free. We always have in mind the idea that a being that is not free can not be imputed. Schopenhauer's brief remarks on the work of Scotus Erigena sum up, in my view, to a great extent the central problem pursued here. Schopenhauer maintains that the order of reasoning always stumbles into contradictions when one tries to adapt the theses of theism to the dogmas of Judaism. In Jewish theism, it is necessary to divert from the creator the origin of guilt for evil. Following this premise, for example, Scotus Erigena is led to assert absurdities as the idea that sin has no cause and no subject, that is, imputability for evil would be without a subject. If in Hinduism the origin of the world is an evil, the sinful act of Bramam, and this very evil are we, on the contrary, in Christian doctrine, which had to be grafted in Judaism, according to which God would have created the world and found the excellent creation, the origin can not be evil. In this theological structure can not be blamed on the creator, therefore it is necessary to create an artifice of imputability to the creature. The author, according to Schopenhauer, directly identifies the problem in this passage: In der That ist der Ursprung des Uebels die Klippe, an welcher, so gut wie der Pantheismus, auch der Theismus

scheitert: denn Beide impliciren Optimismus. Nun aber sind das Uebel und die Sünde, beide in ihrer furchtbaren Größe, nicht wegzuleugnen, ja, durch die verheißenen Strafen für die Letztere, wird das Erstere nur noch vermehrt. Woher nun alles Dieses, in einer Welt, die entweder selbst ein Gott, oder das wohlgemeinte Werk eines Gottes ist? Wenn die theistischen Gegner des Pantheismus diesem entgegen schreien was? alle die bösen, schrecklichen, scheußlichen Wesen sollen Gott sein? — so können die Pantheisten erwiedern: wie? alle jene bösen, schrecklichen, scheußlichen Wesen soll ein Gott, de gaieté de coeur, hervorgebracht haben? — In derselben Noth, wie hier, finden wir den Erigena auch noch in dem andern seiner auf uns gekommenen Werke, dem Buche de praedestinatione, welches jedoch dem de divisione naturae weit nachsteht; wie er denn in demselben auch nicht als Philosoph, sondern als Theolog auftritt. (PP I - Fragmente fur Geschichte der Philosophie, grifo nosso) But it is further that Schopenhauer makes a remarkably important observation for our study. For the philosopher there is an essential contradiction between being created and being free. For Schopenhauer, to affirm that man was created and that he was endowed with free will is a contradiction. This means, for Schopenhauer, to have created and not to have created. We see that the formula that justifies this interpretation "operari sequitur esse" appears again in the Schopenhaueran text, the action follows from the essence of being. To be free a being must lack a pre-determined nature. This means that a free being can not be created, but it also means that it can not be defined from an essence, it can not be, ultimately (a logical instance), predicate. An existence without essence, however, can not be conceived.

Denn operari sequitur esse, d. h. die Wirkungen, oder Aktionen, jedes irgend möglichen Dinges können nie etwas anders, als die Folge seiner Beschaffenheit seyn; welche selbst sogar nur an ihnen erkannt wird. Daher müßte ein Wesen, um in dem hier geforderten Sinne frei zu seyn, gar keine Beschaffenheit haben, d. h. aber gar nichts seyn, also seyn und nicht seyn zugleich. Denn was ist muß auch etwas seyn: eine Existenz ohne Essenz läßt sich nicht ein Mal denken. Ist nun ein Wesen geschaffen; so ist es so

geschaffen, wie es beschaffen ist: mithin ist es schlecht geschaffen, wenn es schlecht beschaffen ist, und schlecht beschaffen, wenn es schlecht handelt, d. h. wirkt. Demzufolge wälzt die Schuld der Welt, eben wie ihr Uebel, welches so wenig wie jene abzuleugnen ist, sich immer auf ihren Urheber zurück, von welchem es abzuwälzen, wie früher Augustinus, so hier Skotus Erigena sich jämmerlich abmühet. (PP I - Fragmente fur Geschichte der Philosophie, grifo nosso)

In this sense, I believe, the term "Aseität" is important for solving the problem. As we see in the next passage: Soll hingegen ein Wesen moralisch frei seyn; so darf es nicht geschaffen seyn, sondern muß Aseität haben, d. h. ein ursprüngliches, aus eigener Urkraft und Machtvollkommenheit existirendes seyn, und nicht auf ein anderes zurückweisen. (PP I - Fragmente fur Geschichte der Philosophie, grifo nosso)

The word "Aseität" is fundamental for understanding the sense of freedom in this context. By Aseität is meant the being in itself, something that did not receive from another its characteristic, it means independence, the pure personal existence, autonomy, perhaps.

Schopenhauer seems to use the term as having an original existence by its own power and omnipotence and does not refer to any other being. His existence is his own creative act, a nature that is his own work and so, for all that, he is responsible for it (by its nature).

Only in this case would the imputation be possible. Thus, therefore, the responsibility and imputability that our moral conscience enunciates follows with certainty that the will is free. And finally, in this text, Schopenhauer makes a verdict on legitimized guilt and imputation. — Die Schuld der Sünde und des Uebels fällt allemal von der Natur auf ihren Urheber zurück. Ist nun dieser der zu allen ihren Erscheinungen sich darstellende Wille selbst; so ist jene an den rechten Mann gekommen: soll es hingegen

ein Gott seyn; so widerspricht die Urheberschaft der Sünde und des Uebels seiner Göttlichkeit. — (PP I - Fragmente fur Geschichte der Philosophie, grifo nosso)

In the chapter on clarification on Kantian philosophy, still from the fragments on the History of philosophy, Schopenhauer takes up enlightenment in the same terms. The central problem concerns theism. It is not possible, according to Schopenhauer to reconcile theism with morality, that is, theism is in contradiction with morality because it suppresses freedom and imputability. A parte ante nun wieder ist der Theismus ebenfalls mit der Moral im Widerstreit; weil er Freiheit und Zurechnungsfähigkeit aufhebt. Denn an einem Wesen, welches, seiner existentia und essentia nach, das Werk eines andern ist, läßt sich weder Schuld noch Verdienst denken. (PP I - Fragmente fur Geschichte der Philosophie, grifo nosso)

The theme is human nature, which is central to Schopenhauer's argument. The philosopher affirms that like all other beings imaginable man can only act according to his nature. If it acts badly, it is due to the fact that it is evil. The inventor of his nature is the inventor of his acting. Precisely to eliminate this terrible difficulty was created the liberum arbitrium indiferentiae, which contains a monstrous fiction. To affirm that a being is free, that is, to affirm that in a given circumstance he can act in a way and also in another way is to affirm that he has an existence without an essence. Thus we would be saying that he is "without" being "something." Thus for Schopenhauer the hypothesis according to which the creator has created the free man is an impossibility. Daß der Schöpfer den Menschen frei geschaffen habe, besagt eine Unmöglichkeit, nämlich daß er ihm eine existentia ohne essentia verliehen, also ihm das Daseyn bloß in abstracto gegeben habe, indem er ihm überließ, als was er daseyn wolle. Hierüber bitte ich den §. 20 meiner Abhandlung über das Fundament der Moral nachzulesen. — Moralische Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit, oder Zurechnungsfähigkeit, setzen schlechterdings Aseität voraus. (PP I - Fragmente fur Geschichte der Philosophie, grifo nosso)

5- On the concept of guilt in posthumous manuscripts. (Handschrift Nachlass – Senilia, Kolerabuch, Vorlesung über Die gesamte Philosophie oder die Lehre vom Wesen der Welt und dem menschlichen Geiste. Metaphysik der Sitten)

5.1 – Senilia

Nothwendgkeit des Todes ist zunächst daraus abzuleiten, das der Mensch eine blosse Erscheinung, kein Ding an sich, also kein ontos on, ist. Denn, wäre er dieses, so könnte er nicht vergehn. Dass aber nur in Erscheinungen dieser Art das ihnen zum Grunde liegende Ding an sich darstellen könne, ist eine Folge der Beschaffenheit desselben. (Senilia- SEITE 5 - 5.1) 30.1 Im Vergleich mit dem Menschen haben Thiere einen gewissen Ausdruck von Unschuld um sich, der viel beiträgt, uns ihren Anblick, zumal im Zustand der Freiheit, so erfreutlich zu machen. Aber der Eintritt im Vernunft un mit ihr der Besonnenheit hat den Menschen der Unschuld der Natur entrückt. Daher könnte man auch den Mythos auslegen, dass er vom Baume des Guten und Bösen gekostee hat. – Bloss Kinder, und zwar nur Knaben, tragen bisweilen das Gepräge der Unschuld. 41.4 Der Grund des Alterns und Sterbens ist kein Physicher, sondern ein Metaphysicher. 76.3 Die Verantwortlichkeit für das Daseyn und die Beschaffenheit dieser Welt kann nur sie selbst tragen, kein Andrer, denn wie hätte er sie auf sich nehmen können? 79.5 Die moralische Resultate des Christentums, bis zur höchsten Askese, findet man bei mir rationell und im Zusammenhange der Dinge begründet, während sie es im Christenthum bloss durch Fabeln sind. Der Glaube an diese schwindet täglich mehr: daher wird man sich zu meiner Philosophie wenden müssen. 5.2 Cholerabuch: In the writings of the so-called Cholerabuch we find a note on original sin and the problem of guilt.

Das das Leben etwas ist , das wir irgendwie verschuldet haben, is der wahre Grundgedanke des Brahmanismus und Buddhaismus: das es ein uns gemachtes angenehmes Geschenkt sei, der falsche Grundgedanke des Judenthus und seiner Sekten. Aber auch bei diesen haben wir durch den Südenfall eine Schuld kontrahirt. Sie setzen nur in das Daseyn, was dem Daseyn selbst angehört. Das ist eine Ausbesserung: aber docch ist die Erbsünde der tiefste und richtigste Gedanke dieser Religionem. (Cholerabuch, 114.1) Schopenhauer's statement in this passage corroborates the several other passages in which he affirms the allegorical truth of original sin and indicates that guilt is contracted. Here is the use of Südenfall (fall of man) and Erbsünde (original sin). The most profound truth of the religions cited is the original sin. The expression "fall of man" may suggest a state prior to sin. Original sin, however, seems to be closer to the conception according to which human nature is inclined to evil, that is, by nature and by essence it is an affirmation of the will. If guilt is incurred, however, a state prior to guilt is assumed. As we have seen, the symbolic act of debt contraction is the sexual act, in which the will affirms itself vehemently. In addition there is the double meaning of the word Schul in German, which can mean guilt and debt. This distinction is, in my view, important not only for the interpretations that were developed later on to the philosophy of Schopenhauer, especially in the second dissertation of the Genealogy of Morals, by Nietzsche, but mainly to support the second interpretation to which the compensation or retribution as used Schopenhauer is based on a metaphysical conception that follows the logic pointed out by Kelsen in his writing on the origin of the notion of retribution (Nature and Society).

6 – Interpretação e crítica: Copleston, Hamlin, Atwell, Cartwrigth, Kossler.

Some critical aspects are extremely relevant to the problem of guilt. In my view, the basis of retribution is one of the central points. The criticism of Schopenhauer's conception of guilt was developed by leading commentators. There is, as we shall see, a tendency to judge the doctrine of eternal justice as perverse and absurd. In his lecture notes (Vorlesung über Die Gesamte Philosophie, Metaphysic des Sittes), Schopenhauer states that the concept of reward is foreign to temporality, it is transcendental. How can such a retribution be understood? Retribution can not be the object of experience, it does not occur in time. If the will to live has, at first, three metaphysical properties: Unity, infundability and unknowability, retribution also seems to have unknowability.

As we approach the most difficult metaphysical questions, the problem of dogmatism arises and with it the question of the sense of the judgment of life in Schopenhauer's philosophy and with it the questions of suffering and evil. It should be noted that there is an unavoidable link between the judgment on life and the imputation of the world and man. Moreover, it must be made clear that death, final debt repayment, and evil (suffering) atonement of guilt, qualify and elevate philosophical admiration. As Kossler notes in "Life is just a mirror," the meaning of these realities must be sought in an interpretation (Deutung) of life. The problem of the ordering of the world, then, also as an authentic "Rätzelhaftigkeit", an enigma. Life is not seen as an end, but as a means to another end. This end may be an ethical end. Life (human) is a means for the ethical knowledge of the world, for the solution of the enigma. In this sense human life would be a means for the denial of life, since it is through human life that the will knows its own essence. Metaphysik ist für Schopenhauer nicht, wie Nietzsche meinte, ein Überbleibsel der philosophischen Tradition, ein „Nachschossling“8 der Religion, sondern macht den „noch nie dagewesenen Gedanken“9 aus, den er für seine Lehre reklamiert. Denn ihm ist durchaus klar, daß der Bereich der Erfahrung nicht wie in der traditionellen, vorkritischen Metaphysik durch Schlüsse auf transzendente Gründe überschritten werden kann. An die Stelle der nach dem Satz vom Grunde verfahrenden traditionellen Metaphysik setzt er seine Konzeption einer „immanenten“ Metaphysik, die darauf beruht, das der Wille „den Schlussel zum Rathsel der Welt“10 bietet. „Immanente Metaphysik“ bedeutet nicht die Erklarung der Welt durch die vorgebliche Erkenntnis eines außerhalb der Erfahrung Liegenden, sondern die „Entzifferung“ der Welt mithilfe der inneren Erfahrung in der Art und Weise, in der eine Geheimschrift durch den richtigen Code dechiffriert wird. (Kossler, Das Leben ist nur ein Spiegel p. 3) Thus, I believe, the problem of guilt can also be characterized as a component of this enigma of life and, therefore, its solution or explanation must be found from the interpretation of philosophy in the hermeneutical sense, that is, considering its philosophy as an attempt to decipher the enigma of the world and life and not as an explanation in the sense of an empirical knowledge, using the philosophical scientific method based on a strict order of reasons. Frederick Copleston in the chapter titled "Morality and Liberty" of the book "Schopenhauer: philosopher of pessimism" examines the problem of guilt from the chapter "Zur Ethik" of Parerga and Paralipomena. Copleston, following Schopenhauer's reasoning of imputation, asks himself: If our existence is a crime, who committed this crime?

The will, which makes us come to be and who we are, and is in each one of us, according to our inner, inner nature. Similarly, the will, in and through us, pays for this crime for its suffering. This inevitable retribution is eternal justice. Is this determination enough to assert that the world has a moral significance? Copleston picks up the question by asking how it is possible for the will to be guilty or to commit any crime. A crime is a transgression of a law and Schopenhauer does not admit the existence of any law previous to the will or to which the will is submitted. It seems to us that the problem faced, not only by Copleston, but by other commentators, is separation between the mythical discourse and the philosophical or legal discourse in the case. Continues Copleston: "Guilt, in the moral sense presupposes freedom, but the will is not free." Schopenhauer admittedly declare that its free, but al lhe meant by this was that it is self-determined and acts under no external constrain, fort he constrian it. (Copleston, p. ) Copleston does not admit that it is fair that a world that is ultimately the result of an original guilt, in which the will is to blame for the crime committed, but it is the individual who pays with the suffering. This can not be a just world or a world that has some moral significance. Where would eternal justice be if it is the individual who feels the suffering alone? Even the idea that all individual suffering is the atonement of personal guilt would be, according to Copleston, unsustainable. For Copleston, it is not possible that the world, as presented with the assumptions pointed out by Schopenhauer, has, in fact, a moral meaning. I think Copleston is reasoning in the following sense: If the world is not amoral, it can not be immoral or unjust either. An unjust world, by its very nature, can not be a morally ordered world. The world with all the many phenomena it contains is one Will: consequently, if one man injures another, the inner truth oft he matteris that one Will is inflicting suffering on itself. „The inflicter of suffering and sufferer are one. The former errs in that he believes he is not a partaker [participant] in the suffering: the latter, in that he believes he is not a partaker in the guilt. In short, the suffering in the world ist he effect of guilt, of wickedness. Of whose guilt? Of Everybody, oft he will itself? What does this guilt consist in? Inexistence. (Copleston, 1975, p.146) The problem that he points out as unjustifiable is that, even if the will is to blame for the crime of the existence of the world, the individual ultimately ends up paying the guilt alone, because suffering happens, in fact, in the individual and not in the will as a whole.

Copleston does not, in fact, accept Schopenhauer's theory of metaphysical compensation. Thus Copleston concludes that the world, as Schopenhauer presents it, has no moral significance. The doctrine of eternal justice is interpreted as absurd and perverse. According to Copleston, if we take the words blame and crime literally the doctrine of guilt Schopenhauer becomes fragile (easy victim). Hence all pain or suffering are a direct resulto of the existence of the world and of man whithin world. I fail to see how this theory could possibly simply any „moral significance” to the world though it might make a man hate the world and desire own personal extinction. (Copleston, 1975, p.146) Thus Copleston concludes that the world has not meant moral to Schopenhauer and that its premises are sufficient to determine that the world is worthless and evil and that man can achieve an ethical position by denying this world. Atwell John E. Atwell, in "The Human Character" analyzes eternal justice in the chapter titled Pessimism, Suffering, and Salvation. After a brief presentation of the foundations of eternal justice Atwell asks the same Copleston question about eternal justice and adds some perspectives, But who or what is the doer of the crime? Who or what is the subject of punishment? And ist he doer oft he crime identical with the subject of punishment?

Questions can be answered, according to Atwell, as follows: The doctrine of eternal justice is presupposed in the metaphysical thesis that the will to live is the only reality. So if there is always a cause for suffering, it is provoked by the will to live, and there is nothing. Each specific evil or injury is immediately balanced by some specific reception of evil and injury. The will to live perpetuates precisely and precisely the degree that the experience of another phenomenon receives. Our questions can be answered explicitly: The doer of the crime is the will to live. The subject of punishment is the will to live, and, indeed, the doer of the crime and the subject of the punishment are one and the same, namely, the single reality, the will to live

Atwell concludes from this presentation that denying the doctrine of eternal justice is the same as denying all metaphysics of will, for that is the consequence of the latter. What Atwell admits, however, is that the doctrine of eternal justice would not have been correctly labeled. In principle, the doctrine of eternal justice would have been an answer to the question of human suffering. If it contains a justification for suffering, it should also contain an indication of guilt, accountability, a theory of responsibility. At this point Atwell presents an analogy to understand why, supposedly, eternal justice would justify suffering.

A person who, with his own hands, hurt his own feet would not have the right to complain about suffering. In fact he would not even think about complaining since it is he who commits the action. Just as in this situation, only the man deluded by the principle of individuation would think of his situation as an injustice. According to Schopenhauer's reasoning we will see that he affirms that the will to live receives what it deserves, which, according to him, is right and just. The result of this is that suffering is justified by being seen as not wrong, but, Atwell notes, this is not the same as saying that it is well-deserved. Thus the label, the title, „eternal justice“ would be inappropriate at the level of the will to live. We can still ask ourselves about the individual level. Was every perpetrator punished in proportion to the injury he inflicted on another? And yet, would every victim be guilty on the level of suffering inflicted on her by another? Schopenhauer seems to answer that yes and perhaps, according to Atwell, that is the aspect of the doctrine of eternal justice that critics consider absurd and perverse. In order to solve this question, it is necessary to point out and legitimize a responsibility. Cartwrigth David E. Cartwrigth in…

Schopenhauer's philosophy questions the existence of the world. A world that should not exist. The question is related to the sense of suffering, by the existence of evil. Metaphysics must answer this question non-dogmatically, since religion has already answered it in a mythical way. points out that the way Schopenhauer responds to the question of responsibility and guilt is considered by most commentators to be "perverse and absurd". The challenge of Schopenhauer's moral philosophy is to express the supposed truth of the myth of original sin in a philosophical language. Schopenhauer goes to great lengths to demonstrate that genuine Christianity, Brahmanism and Buddhism express in theological language the truths of his philosophy.

This effort of approximation and verification may have led to some inconsistencies. Cartwright's first objection, however, in relation to the thesis of innate human guilt, is based on a critique of the statement that the proof of our guilt is death. According to Cartwright this thesis is not at all clear. (Das er der Natur einen tod schuldig ist). Cartwrigth analyzes the structure of Schopenhauer's reasoning, arriving at the following synthesis: We suffer because we deserve it. The world, at least in its metaphysical aspect, is perfectly retributive. We deserve what we get because we are guilty. We are guilty because we exist. For Cartwright this logic is as clear as it is not convincing. The aim of demonstrating compatibility with the Eastern religions would have been to both the interpretation of the sacred texts and their moral theory. In fact, the realization that we suffer and die can not be called into question, but because it must mean that we are guilty and that we are guilty because we exist, this would be an absolutely plausible question. The issue of liability is key to solving this problem. Cartwright rejects the idea that we are responsible for our own existence. And it is here that, in my view, a significant part of the problem lies. What Schopenhauer designates as responsibility is, in my view, not a cause prior to the event of birth, but rather the affirmative nature of my character, our anxiety to the affirmation of the will. Every birth is an affirmation of a will and therefore corresponds to an instance of guilt, because it affirms what causes suffering. Cartwright states that Schopenhauer, playing with the ambiguity of the word "Schuld" which can mean guilt and debt, suggests that our death is a debt we owe to nature. To whom, however, we should. With whom we have this debt ... In Schopenhauer's worldview there is no god before whom we are guilty. There is no transcendent Shylock to whom we owe our flesh and blood. The problem, for Cartwright, however, is not death but life. Death would be the definitive payment of debt to nature, but it is the life that is the problem for the philosopher. The death of the individual has a lesser significance, since the species continues. Life is the question, what we are and what we should not be and necessarily do what we should not do. His metaphysics is geared to show us that this is the case. That original sin is in fact our only true sin, that is, our nature is the problem. The question of guilt concerns human nature, what man is and what he should not be. The difference in relation to religion, in this case, would be only that it, this human nature, is not created by a beneficent deity. The correlate in the form of a non-allegorical philosophical explanation for original sin must then be based on the idea that the affirmation of the will and its objectification as a human being, by the assertiveness relating to the sexual act, would be sin, the error and the cause of suffering.

It is the objectification of the will that causes the suffering and everything that is involved in this movement of affirmation will be guilty. If suffering is an evil, the basis of existence is evil. The problem of evil that could not be solved by the optimistic metaphysics of a Leibniz or a Hegel and was, in bad faith, Western theology tried to solve with the invention of liberum abitrium indiferentiae, is solved by the very demonstration of what and how it is human nature. Again the expression operari sequitur this figure as a key piece of the problem. In acting, one finds the being (esse) and that essence determines the (interpretative) judgment on life. Meine Philosophie ist aber die einzige, welche der Moral ihr volles und ganzes Recht angedeihen läßt: denn nur wenn das Wesen des Menschen sein eigener Wille, mithin er, im strengsten Sinne, sein eigenes Werk ist, sind seine Thaten wirklich ganz sein und ihm zuzurechnen. Sobald er hingegen einen andern Ursprung hat, oder das Werk eines von ihm verschiedenen Wesens ist, fällt alle seine Schuld zurück auf diesen Ursprung, oder Urheber. Denn operari sequitur esse.” (W II Kap.47) The will is responsible for suffering and evil since it expresses itself fully and completely. According to Cartwright, there is nothing else in the Schopenhaurian universe that carries the guilt of existence. The guilt for existence rests upon the will and its objectification. If we consider that the world of the in itself and the world of phenomena correspond to the whole, we have a universe of guilt. In conclusion, we can state: The fault is attributed to the will. With this proposition it is clear that the problem of blame in Schopenhauer's philosophy is also a problem of hermeneutics. This is because blaming something that is not an individual, which is not a person and can not be considered as something that is in space and time, that is, that belongs to a transcendent sphere can not have the same meaning as an imputation relating to a person to an individual. The sense of guilt must be taken as a figurative sense. 6 - Ética e Hermenêutica. O sentido do termo culpa. Interpretação e decifração do enigma.

I will not elaborate here enough on whether Schopenhauer is a compatibilist. I will only indicate a summary of the problem. The question that arises is whether Schopenhauer

held that we are free in a given world. Schopenhauer maintains, as we know, that time, space, and causality are the ways in which we know the world, and these intuitions are a priori responsible for our representations. The causal chain rules the whole world of phenomena, so everything is, in that sense, determined. In the world of things, however, there is no time, no space, no causality, which may mean that we can not think of the form of causal relations. If this can be called freedom, then we are, in essence, free. However, once we are in the world of representations, once our will is objectified, then, based on our essence and the motives that present themselves, everything is determined.1 In World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer understands "works" in Luther, as motivated actions; in the Manuscripts, he understood for a long time 'works' by actions derived from reason. Therefore, we see it constantly compared to the "dead work of the Law", or characterized as work (Werk) or tool (Werkzeug). But genuine moral action, or "Salvation," is understood by Schopenhauer as derived from the "better conscience," or what would be the faith for Luther. (Massei, 2008, P. 9)

5- Guilt and The Original Sin. (Erbsunde, Südenfalls 6 – Critical Considerations. 7 – Nietschean critics. 8 - Hermeneutic Religion Salaquarda

Darum also bedürfen wir einer völligen Umgestaltung unsers Sinnes und Wesens, d.i. der Wiedergeburt, als deren Folge die Erlösung eintritt. Wenn auch die Schuld im Handeln, im operari, liegt; so liegt doch die Wurzel der Schuld in unserer essentia et existentia, da aus dieser das operari nothwendig hervorgeht, wie ich in der Preisschrift über die Freiheit des Willens dargethan habe. (W II, K. 79)

1

the use of the term "works" as human deeds or human acts, at first caused me doubt. Which is the correct terminology to designate Luther's doctrine in this case. William Massei's work "The Limits of Reason in Luther and Schopenhauer" was useful in this case to clarify some points about the doctrine of grace.

Schuld. — Obschon die scharfsinnigsten Richter der Hexen und sogar die Hexen selber von der Schuld der Hexerei überzeugt waren, war die Schuld trotzdem nicht vorhanden. So steht es mit aller Schuld. (FW, A. 250)

Lieber schuldig. — „Lieber schuldig bleiben, als mit einer Münze zahlen, die nicht unser Bild trägt!“ — so will es unsere Souveränität. (FW, A. 252)

…Ich will keinen Krieg gegen das Hässliche führen. Ich will nicht anklagen, ich will nicht einmal die Ankläger anklagen… (FW, A. 276)