Alegre.evidence.docx

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. CA (298 SCRA 83) Topic: Tax exemption²charitable institutions Facts: Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA), a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public pursuant to its religious, educational, and charitable objectives, is contesting the tax assessment made upon it by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, citing Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution. Issue and Ruling: 1.W/N YMCA is exempt from the payment of taxes. NO. What is exempted by Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution is not the institution itself; the exemption pertains only to property taxes. Moreover, Section 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code expressly disallows the exemption claimed by YMCA, as it mandates that the income of exempt organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax imposed by the same Code. Thus, YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a nonstock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.

Private respondent contends that the February 16, 1994 CA Decision reversed the factual findings of the CTA. On the other hand, petitioner argues that the CA merely reversed the ruling of the CTA that the leasing of private respondents facilities to small shop owners, to restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of parking lots are reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the private respondent and that the income derived therefrom are tax exempt.i[12] Petitioner insists that what the appellate court reversed was the legal conclusion, not the factual finding, of the CTA.ii[13] The commissioner has a point. Indeed, it is a basic rule in taxation that the factual findings of the CTA, when supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the said court committed gross error in the appreciation of facts.iii[14] In the present case, this Court finds that the February 16, 1994 Decision of the CA did not deviate from this rule. The latter merely applied the law to the facts as found by the CTA and ruled on the issue raised by the CIR: Whether or not the collection or earnings of rental income from the lease of certain premises and income earned from parking fees shall fall under the last paragraph of Section 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended.iv[15] Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the aforementioned issue, as indeed it was expected to. That it did so in a manner different from that of the CTA did not necessarily imply a reversal of factual findings. The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been held that [t]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law

is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.v[16] In the present case, the CA did not doubt, much less change, the facts narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to the facts. That its interpretation or conclusion is different from that of the CTA is not irregular or abnormal.

Notes: A claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest, and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by private respondent to prove that it met the said requisites. Note: Mainly pang tax yung topic niya talaga pero under sa syllabus ni Sir Question of Law and Fact siya.

VILLANUEVA V. CA(294 SCRA 90) 1998 FACTS: Almario Go Manuel filed a civil action for sum of money with damages before the RTC of Cebu against Felix Villanueva and his wife Melchora. The check issued by Villanueva supposedly represented payment of loans previously obtained by Villanueva from Manuel, as capital for Villanueva’s mining and fertilizer business. The check when presented for payment was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. A demand was made upon petitioner to make good the check but failed to do so. Manuel then filed a criminal complaint for violation of BP22. On the RTC, It rendered a decision in favour of Manuel. The Ca affirmed the same.

pparently aggrieved, both parties appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner prayed for the reversal of the trial courts decision and contended that his principal obligation is only P23,420.00, while private respondent sought interest of ten percent (10%) of the principal obligation; twenty-five percent (25%) as attorneys fees, as well as moral and exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court subject to the modification that petitioner was directed to additionally pay private respondent attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of ten (10%) percent of P167,600.00, and the entire obligation to earn interest at six (6%) percent per annum from the filing of the complaint.vi[4] Petitioner now comes before this Court basically

alleging the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals as follows: (a) the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the five (5%) and ten (10%) percent interest imposed is not enforceable due to absence of such stipulation in writing; (b) the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that petitioner is only liable for the amount P23,420.00; and (c) the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the Central Bank and Monetary Board has no power or authority to repeal the usury law.vii[5] ISSUE: W/N the SC acquires jurisdiction over the case. Ruling: No. the petition should be denied. The petitioner failed to raise issues which would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts. RATIO: Time and again it has been rules that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to there view and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such, this court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh allover again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; When there is a grave abuse of discretion; When the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; When the judgement of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; When the findings are conflicting; When the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7. When the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9. When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and 10. When the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. After a review of the case at bar, we consider petitioner to have failed to raise issues that would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of the trial and appellate courts

11. Applying the foregoing rules, since the principal obligation in the amount of P167,600.00 is a loan, the same should earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the time the complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. On the other hand, if the total obligation is not satisfied it shall further earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the finality of the

decision until payment thereof, the interim period being deemed to be a forbearance of credit. 12. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV 39731 dated January 30, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the rate of legal interest to be paid is TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per annum of the amount due computed from the time the complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per annum shall be additionally imposed on the total obligation until payment thereof is satisfied. No costs. FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in civil case entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages on the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal defendants in the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power; (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal defendants; (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ; (4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds; and (5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.

On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents was denied by respondent court in its resolution dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal basis

thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the particular acts allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein.

In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying his motion for a bill of particulars as well as its resolution, dated 29 May 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 should they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against petitioner until the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other than the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed resolutions.

Ruling:

Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts.

The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the complaint how petitioner allowed himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of illgotten wealth, what the concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the petitioner's name does not even appear in annex of the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and Participations of Some Defendants". The allegations in the

complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.

Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.

The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions. The petition is granted and the resolutions in question are annulled and set aside. The respondents are ordered to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by petitioner, or otherwise, respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude the herein petitioner as defendant in the above-mentioned civil case.

Fareast Marble, Inc., and Tabuenas v. CA, BPI Facts: · In 1976, petitioner Fareast Marble received from private respondent (the former Commercial Trust Bank Company which was absorbed by BPI) the following, viz: (1) several loans evidenced by promissory notes; AND (2) the former was extended by the latter credit facilities in the form of Trust Receipts; · Petitioner Tabuenas (Ramon and Luis) executed in favor of BPI a “continuing guaranty” whereby they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to answer for the loan obligations of Far East to the bank; · Far East failed to pay its obligations (both the promissory note and the trust receipts) and Ramon and Luis Tabuenas also did not comply with their solidary liability under the “continuing guaranty”; · As a result, in 1987, private respondent BPI filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin against petitioners; · Far East filed a compulsory counterclaim where it admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes but alleged further that it has already prescribed, so it raised the defense of prescription and lack of cause of action; it also denied that BPI made prior demands for payment; · BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative defenses, alleging that its cause of action against Far East have not prescribed, since within 10 year from the

time its cause of action accued, various written extrajudicial demands were made by BPI to Far East; Lower court rulings: RTC: · dismissed the complaint based on prescription and lack of cause of action ratio: Apart from the fact that the complaint failed to allege that the period of prescription was interrupted, the phrase “repeated requests and demands for payment” is vague and incomplete so as to establish in the minds of defendant, or to enable the court to draw a conclusion, that demands or acknowledgments of debt were made that could have interrupted the period of prescription. CA: Reversed the RTC and remanded the case for further proceedings Issue: WON the claim in the allegation in the complaint of private respondent has already prescribed and has no sufficient cause of action because the phrase “repeated requests and demands for payment” is not sufficient to state a cause of action Ruling: No, the claim in petitioner’s complaint has not prescribed and petitioner has a valid cause of action. Complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action. Section 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise statement of theultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action." Further elaboratingthereon, Section 1 of Rule 8 declares that every pleading, including, of course, a complaint,"shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of theultimate facts . . . omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." "Ultimate facts" arethe essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant (Tantuico,Jr.vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., 204 SCRA [1991]), while "evidentiary facts" are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts . . . A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegation may be vague or indefinite, for in such case, the recourse of the defendant would be to file a motion for bill of particulars (Ramos vs. Condez, 20 SCRA 1146 [1967]). It is indeed the better rule that, pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims so as to void possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities (Adamo, et al vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 191 SCRA 195 [1990]). In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credit to Far East and the failure of the latter to pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts which have to be pleaded, although the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid enforceable must be proven during the trial (Ortiz v.Garcia, 15 Phil. 192 [1910])

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOODGOVERNMENT), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R.SANTIAGO, respondents G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991 FACTS: The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of Other Portions." The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition. Tantoco and Santiago then presented a “motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of which the PCGG responded by filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan denied with a Resolution. Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents respectively. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989, it also filed an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions. Hence, this present petition. ISSUES: 1. WON PETITIONER CAN OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES SERVED ON IT INACCORDANCE WITH RULE 25 OF THE RULES OF COURT. 2. WON SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ORDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION ANDINSPECTION OF SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS AND THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN THEPOSSESSION OF PCGG. Ruling: 1. No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the state, even while assuming to represent or act for the State. 2. No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those

documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.

FORTUNE CORPORATION VS. CA AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION Facts: This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent CA affirming the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Teope who was the chairman of the Board Directors of private respondent. An action for breach of contract was filed by the petitioner against the private respondent and after the latter filed its answer petitioner served them with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the ROC. The pre-trial was scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April 22, 1992. On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the latter that petitioner would take the deposition of the chairman in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24. Private Respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not to Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff’s Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleging that: a) petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition, c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, d) deponent has no intention of leaving the country, e)the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits. Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the grounds that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope appears unwarranted since the proposed deponent had already responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court. The petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the SC and was referred to the CA for further adjudication on the merits. CA ruled dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for the ruling. This is provided for in Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that the right of the party to take depositions as means of discovery is not absolute. They reasoned that: a)proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories; b)deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; c)to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory question. With the denial of the petitioner’s MFR the instant petition was filed with the SC. ISSUE: 1.WON that the decision of respondent court dismissing its petition on the ground that appeal and not certiorari is the proper remedy in this case, is erroneous for the reason that such ruling is based on facts which are not obtaining in the case at bar, viz.: (a) that petitioner had already obtained a deposition, which it had not; (b) that said deposition was offered as evidence, which was not done because there was nothing yet

to offer, and (c) that said offer was rejected, which did not happen because there was nothing to reject as nothing was offered. 2. WONthe trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the deposition be not taken in the absence of good cause therefor. It asserts that the reasons advanced by the trial court cannot be considered "good cause" within the contemplation of the law, which reasons, to repeat, are: (a) that the proposed deponent had earlier responded to written interrogatories; (b) that the proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; and (c) that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions to the vital witness. RULING: The SC discussed that the finer attributed of the rules of discovery would contribute immensely to the attainment of the judiciary’s primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases. The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue formulation and face revelation theretofore performes primarily by the pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve 1) as a device, along with the pre trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties and 2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is to enable the parties consistent with recognized privileges to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end , the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at trial. I. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition shall not be taken. This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited: that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. 11 This is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable, 12 considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it. However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion. It is our considered opinion that on the bases of circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, and which will hereinafter be discussed, certiorari may be

availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. SC ruled that certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. II. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be untrammeled and efficacious, Rule 29 imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to comply with or respond to the modes of discovery, such as dismissing his action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out his pleadings or parts thereof; or staying further proceedings. Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause shown that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. The requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements, is required to establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. 16 What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective order that is sought. The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking of the deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine," nor that privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in the course of the examination, nor that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in writing. 18 In the present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken. 1. On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken after service of interrogatories, the courts took a relatively liberal view. In Howard v. States Marine Corp., the first case in which this question was raised, Judge Hilbert said that: "Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has been inadequate, the court unquestionably has, and in a proper case should exercise, discretion to permit an oral examination. But it should be made to clearly appear that the relevant subject matter will not involve the interrogation of the witness with respect to those particulars upon which he was examined by interrogatories." It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence. 2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. 25 But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.

The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact investigation, our legal system is now thoroughly committed to the notion that on the trial itself the adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of witnesses — whose demeanor and manner are subject to the observation of the judge — is superior to the use of written statements of the same witnesses. Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the use of depositions as evidence. And since their use as evidence was originally conceived as the sole function of depositions proper, the limitations on their taking dovetailed with the limitations on their use. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable. 3. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not observe the behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition. Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party. 4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition. Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party. Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. 32 No doubt, private respondent and its representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced — as are all parties when required to submit to examination — but this is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process. On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that respondent court erred in affirming the same. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the court a quo to allow herein petitioner to take the deposition upon oral

examination of Juanito S. Teope in and for purposes of Civil Case No. SP-3469 pending before it. SO ORDERED. People of the Philippines vs Abelardo Parungao FACTS The accused-appellant Parungao was arraigned and tried separately for the information filed against him and the other 15 jail-breakers of the the Provincial Jail of Pampanga of the crime of robbery with homicide upon which on the incident of the jailbreak 2 jail guards were killed on the discharge of their duties and of the missing 6 firearms and for serious physical injury caused to the other jail guard, he was convicted as a co-conspirator and principal by inducement. Unsatisfied with the lower court's ruling hence the case was elevated to the court of appeal upon which the accused- appellant contended that the testimonies of the 4 witnesses presented by the prosecution are merely hearsays of which the witnesses testified and conveyed matters to court that are not of their own personal knowledge and were merely narrated to them with the other detainees. ISSUE The admissibility of a hearsay evidence. RULING The court ruled in favor of the accused-appeallant, acquitting him of the crime charged against him, citing that Generally hearsay evidence are inadmissible however when not objected may result in its being admitted, but the same should not mislead into thinking that its admission is equated with weight evidence. That hearsay evidence whether objected to or not be given credence for it has no probative value. The court also emphasizes that the trial court gravely erred in giving weight to the hearsay evidence that was presented since it it is violative of the hearsay rule and same was unconstitutional for said act-the accused was not given an opportunity to meet the witnesses face-to-face and to subject the source of the information to the rigid test of cross-examination. Conspiracy against the accused-appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS et al [G.R. No. L-22793, May 16, 1967]

Facts:

At first, petitioners, thru their mother as guardian ad litem, sued respondent Tan for acknowledgment and support. The first civil case was dismissed on the ground that parties have already come to an amicable settlement.

1 year and eight months thereafter, petitioners, this time thru their maternal grandfather as guardian ad litem, commenced the present action before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court for acknowledgment and support, involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter. The case was again dismissed by reason of res judicata and insufficiency of evidence.

On appeal, petitioners contends that the testimony of their witnesses, who were unable to testify in the 2nd trial must be admissible, applying Rule 130 Sec 41.

SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a former case between the same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity to crossexamine him, may be given in evidence.

Notably, the witnesses were subpoenaed by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court a number of times. But, they did not appear to testify. These witnesses were neither dead nor outside of the Philippines.

Issue:

Are the witnesses' testimonies in the former trial within the coverage of the rule of admissibility intended for witnesses of the class unable to testify?

Held:

NO. They cannot be categorized as witnesses of the class unable to testify. The witnesses in question were available. Only, they refused to testify. No other person that prevented them from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not come within the legal purview of those unable to testify.

To emphasize, subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to testify. To be qualified,

such inability should proceed from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech.