Administrative Law Case Digests.docx

Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al. FACTS: The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S.Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case” ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees. HELD: YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside. RATIO: When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur asociis, the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated. Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges. In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption against Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and several other government officials of the Department of Health (DOH). The Ombudsman (then Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier, being the officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the suspension order. NCMH submitted its Comment on the Petition where they attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers of Buenaseda et al. Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension order, which is a lawful order from a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers constitute a violation against the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenaseda’s lawyers as he maintained that all the Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based his argument on Section13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to: Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials. Whether or not a Motion for Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action. HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies that what the Ombudsman issued is an

order of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or investigation thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive suspension). What the Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman may recommend are punitive suspensions.

Masangcay vs COMELEC Facts: On October 24, 1957, Benjamin Masangcay – then provincial treasurer of Aklan designated to take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province – with several others, was charged before the Comelec with contempt for having opened 3 boxes containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated on September 2, 1957, and its unnumbered resolution dated March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and Citizens’ part, as required, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay et. Al complied with the summons issued by the Comelec to appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the charge. On December 16, 1957, the Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer 3 months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of 2 months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence. Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Comelec as well as its members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among the 3 departments of our constitutional form of government. The SC reversed the decision appealed from insofar as Masangcay is concerned, as well as the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him; without pronouncement as to costs. Issue: WON Comelec may punish Masangcay for contempt Ruling: No. Under the law and the constitution, the Comelec has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear, and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. The Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Art. VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction. The Comelec lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to Masangcay in the decision subject to review. When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice. The resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election

paraphernalia among the different municipalities. The Commission, thus, has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and void. Ratio: An administrative agency has no inherent powers, although implied powers may sometimes be spoken of as “inherent.” Thus, in the absence of any provision to punish for contempt which was always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of the courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.

TAULE vs. SANTOS This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void. Facts: An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president. Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989.Thus this petition before the Supreme Court. Issues: 1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC. 2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest. Decision: Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5,1989 resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted. Ratio Decidendi: 1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code. It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it. 2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC. The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over there organizational meeting, there being a

quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said mandatory provision. • Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.

GUERZON vs Court of APPEALS Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative Agencies Facts: Petitioner Pedro Guerzon executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corporation, which was later acquired by respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, a contract denominated as “Service Station Lease” for the use and operation of respondent SHELL’s properties, facilities and equipment. Petitioner likewise executed with the same Corporation a “Dealer’s Sales Contract” for the sale by petitioner of respondent SHELL’s petroleum and other products in the leased service station. Respondent Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the Dealer’s Sales Contract and issued a certificate of authority in petitioner’s favor, which had a 5-year period of validity, in line with the terms of the contract. Paragraph 9 of the Service Station Lease Contract provides: The cancellation or termination of the Dealer’s Sales Contract executed between the COMPANY and the LESSEE on January 7, 1981 shall automatically cancel this lease. As early as January 2, 1986, respondent SHELL wrote to petitioner informing him that the Company was not renewing the Dealer’s Sales Contract which was to expire on April 12, 1986. A copy of this letter was furnished respondent BEU. In view of failure of petitioner to surrender the station premises and all the respondent’s equipment, BEU ordered petitioner to immediately vacate the service station, and turn it over to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and to show cause in writing, under oath within 10days from receipt of the order why no administrative and/or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against him for the violation of BEU’s laws, rules and regulations. Respondent SHELL, accompanied by law enforcement officers, was able to secure possession of the gasoline station in question. Petitioner filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the decision of the RTC which dismissed his complaint “for lack of jurisdiction to annul the order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as the RTC. The Solicitor General contends that since petitioner’s license to sell petroleum products expired on April 12, 1986, when his dealership and lease contracts expired, as of te following day, April 13, 1986 he was engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products in violation of BP Blg, 33, which includes the “sale or distribution of petroleum products for profit without license or authority from the Government.” Thus, concludes the Solicitor General, the Bureau of Energy nation had the power to issue, and was justified in issuing, the order to vacate pursuant to PD No. 1206, which confers, among others, to BEU the power to impose and collect a fine for every violation or non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license, or permit issued by the Bureau or of any of its orders, decisions, rules and regulations. Issue: WON the CA erred in holding the respondents BEU has jurisdiction to eject the petitioner from the gasoline service station leased Ruling:

Yes. The order merely makes a vague reference to a “violation of BEU laws, rules and regulations,” without stating the specific provision violated. That petitioner had engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products cannot even be implied from the wording of the assailed order. Even if petitioner was indeed engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products, there was no basis under BP Blg. 33 to order him to vacate the service station and turn it over to respondent SHELL. Illegal trading in petroleum products is a criminal act wherein the injured party is the State. Respondent SHELL is not even alleged by the Solicitor General as a private party prejudiced and, therefore, it can claim no relief if a criminal case is instituted. Under Section 7 of PD No. 1206, BEU may (1) impose a fine not exceeding P1,000; and (2) in case of failure to pay the fine imposed or to cease and discontinue the violation or noncompliance, order the suspension, closure or stoppage of operations of the establishment of the guilty party. Its authority is limited to these 2 options. It can do no more, as there is nothing in PD No. 1206, as amended, which empowers the Bureau to issue an order to vacate in case of a violation. As it is, jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful detainer or accion publiciana. There is nothing in PD No. 1206, as amended, that would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been granted to the BEU. It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. That issuing the order to vacate was the most effective way of stopping any illegal trading in petroleum products is no excuse for a deviation from this rule. Otherwise, adherence to the rule of law would be rendered meaningless. Moreover, contrary to the Solicitor General’s theory, the text of the assailed order leaves no room for doubt that it was issued in connection with an adjudication of the contractual dispute between respondent SHELL and petitioner. But then the BEU, like its predecessor, the defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no power to decide contractual disputes between gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an express provision of law granting to it such power. As explicitly stated in the law, in connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the Bureau’s jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations. Ratio: Grant of particular powers must be found in the law itself. Where there is nothing in the law that would suggest that a particular power has been granted, such as the power to decide contractual disputes, the same cannot be exercised.

On October 12, 1988, the trial court denied the intervention of private respondents. The denial was affirmed by the CA and thereafter by the Court. The collection case was terminated when the parties entered into a compromise agreement duly approved by the court and a decision rendered thereon on December 5, 1988. However, FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian, defendants in the trial court, failed to comply with the judgment. On January 30, 1989, a writ of execution was issued. Two parcels of land belongin to FREEMAN covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220 were levied upon and sold at public auction on March 31, 1989. The highest bidder was one of the petitioners, FREEMAN Management and Development Corporation, which thereafter registered its certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds. On May 23, 1989, before FREEMAN MANAGEMENT could consolidate its title over the properties purchased at the auction sale, private respondents, representing the minority shareholdings of FREEMAN, filed a petition with the SEC seeking the dissolution of FREEMAN, accounting and reconveyance of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220. On April 5, 1990, private respondent filed a similar complaint against petitioners with the RTC of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to annul the compromise agreement between EQUITABLE on one hand and defendants FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian on the other, as well as the promissory notes executed by Saw Chiao Lian, the auction sale, and the sheriff’s certificate of sale of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220. Pettioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the same was a duplication of the case pending in the SEC. But the motion was denied. Petitioners went up on certiorari to the CA which reversed the trial court and directed the dismissal of the complaint by reason of the pendency of the case. On January 7, 1992, on motion on private respondents in SEC Case No. 3577, and despite opposition thereto by petitioners, SEC Hearing Officer Juanito Almossa, Jr. issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the consolidation of ownership of petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT over the properties it acquired in the auction sale of March 31, 1989, the redemption period having expired on April 7, 1990. Issue: WON the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the order of its Hearing Officer granting the writ of injunction enjoining consolidation of ownership in FREEMAN MANANGEMENT Ruling: SEC Case No. 3577

Freeman, Inc. vs. SEC Facts: This petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the order of respondent SEC dated January 7, 1993 in SEC-EB No. 308 denying the action of petitioners to nullify the January 7, 1992 order of the SEC in SEC Case No. 3577. Sometime in 1986 and 1987, Freeman, Inc., was granted a loan by Equitable Banking Corporation as evidenced by 2 promissory notes, PN No125957 dated December 8, 1986 for P1.7M payable December 8, 1987, and PN No. TL-369 dated April 4, 1987 for P6M payable April 24, 1988. Saw Chiao Lian, President of Freeman, Inc. signed as co-maker in both promissory notes. When FREEMAN failed to pay its obligations, EQUITABLE instituted for collection suit against FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian. EQUITABLE also prayed for preliminary attachment. On May 27, 1988, private respondents Saw Mui, Ruben Saw, Dionosio Saw, Lina Chua, Lucila Ruste and Evelyn Saw filed an answer in intervention claiming that they owned the minority interest in FREEMAN.