Admin.docx

Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995 Kapunan, J. FACTS: Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial laborsectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for theSangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary of theDepartment of Local Government. They took their oath of office. Petitioners filed a petitionwith the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. The latter,however, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize privaterespondents as sectoral representatives. Undaunted, petitioners filed an action with the RTCof Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents assectoral representatives. Meanwhile, private respondents also filed before theSandiganbayan a complaint against petitioners for violation of section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 onthe ground that petitioners refused to give them their per diems, salaries and otherprivileges and benefits as sectoral representatives. Petitioners filed a motion with theSandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings on the ground that a prejudicial questionexists in the civil case pending before the RTC of Dumaguete City. The RTC rendered adecision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by the Department of LocalGovernment to the private respondents as sectoral representatives for having been done inviolation of Section 146 (2) of the Local Government Code. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayanissued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. Isthe legality or validity of private respondents’ designation as sectoral representatives aprejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case againstpetitioners? In the event that private respondents’ designations are finally declared invalid,may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actuallyrendered? HELD: The issue in the civil case constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrantsuspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case againstpetitioners. The facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal case are closelyrelated. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners’ alleged partiality andevident bad faith in not paying private respondents’ salaries and per diems as sectoralrepresentatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not thedesignations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordancewith law. The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following: 1) There mustbe a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public;and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. One can qualify as a de facto

officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no defacto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.

Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997 Panganiban, J. FACTS: Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally, he engagedthe services of subcontractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’spremises A Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIRaddressed to the Regional Director or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10,Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and otherpersonal property of Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla.Azarcon, in signing the “Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue,” assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt.Subsequently, however, Ancla took out the distrained truck from Azarcon’s custody. For thisreason, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised PenalCode. Can Azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by theBIR as a depositary of distrained property? HELD: Article 223 of the RPC defines a public officer as “any person who, by directprovision of the law , popular election , or appointment by competent authority ,shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the PhilippineIslands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as anemployee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes”. Azarcon obviously may notbe deemed authorized by popular election. Neither can his designation by the BIR as acustodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or bycompetent authority. While it is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by theprosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring

“any person” topreserve a distrained property there is no provision in the NIRC constituting such person apublic officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR’s power authorizing a privateindividual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him asa public officer. The charge against Azarcon should forthwith be dismissed

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises. On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla. After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility. Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property. Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged. Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for

the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.

Laurel vs. Desierto [GR 145368, April 12, 2002] Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

(Public Officers, Chair of National Centennial Commission) Facts: Petitioner is the Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), tasked to “take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created and Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. An investigation of the anomalies in the construction and operation of the centennial projects was effected and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report recommending for “the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, in violation of the anti-graft law.” The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding “probable cause to indict petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594.” Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because he, both as chairman of the NCC and of the EXPOCORP was not a “public officer.” Issue: WON petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer. Held: No. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer (Mechem). The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports) thereof:

Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations. In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998: Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity; Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values; Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-range planning and continuous developmental programming; Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and capability, particularly in communication and information dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning and continuous developmental programming; Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary task of harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project; Hence, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

GR No 145368

April 12, 2012

Laurel vs. Desierto

Facts: Petitioner is the Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), tasked to “take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created and Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. An investigation of the anomalies in the construction and operation of the centennial projects was effected and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report recommending for “the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of

NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, in violation of the anti-graft law.” The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding “probable cause to indict petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594.” Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because he, both as chairman of the NCC and of the EXPOCORP was not a “public officer.” Issue: WON petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, is a public officer. Held: yes. .—The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office . The court hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private organizations and to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries and to carry them into effect.Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

Laurel v. Desierto GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one

of the nine (9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari. The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation. Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no part of the office.

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.

FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon

Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents. ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question. HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "naturalborn" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "naturalborn" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is

not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

MAQUERA vs BORRA Facts: Maquera seek to ask Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent tothe one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, ISSUE: whether or not RA no. 4421 is unconstitutional HELD:Supreme Court held that property qualifications are inconsistent with the natureand essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same. The court reasoned out thatSovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates fromthem, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be votedshall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned. Social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to publicoffice.

AQUINO vs. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400) Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representativefor the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was aresident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended theentry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Electionsdismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on amotion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspendingthe proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Electionsfound Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Issue: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant thedisqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district. Held: The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matterwhere he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that towhich the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is toexclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish apermanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The shortlength of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not toacquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second Districtof Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978 FORTUNATO R. PAMIL, petitioner-appellant, vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch III, and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA, respondents-appellees. FACTS : Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining

the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised. ISSUE” WON the disqualification of the respondent based on Administrative Code provision Constitutional HELD: The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate.

Pamil v Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978) 2/14/2011

F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed against him on the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from provincial funds, or contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed the petition on the ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code. The 1987 Constitution of the PhilippinesPhilippine government in action and the Philippine constitution HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven justices held that section 2175 is no longer operative. Justice Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on the exercise of the right to run for public office contrary to Art. III of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Teehankee held that section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. Five justices held that section 2175 is constitutional.

National Amnesty Commission vs. COA Case Digest Facts: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created in 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of 7 members: a Chairperson, three regular members

appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members. After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, in 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada. Section 1, Rule II thereof provides that ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law. Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the National Government Audit Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio members' representatives, to no avail. Issues: 1. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code 2. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion disallowing the payment of honoraria on the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex officio members 3. Are the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances?

Held: 1. No. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. We

clarified

this

publication

requirement

in

Taada

vs.

Tuvera:

[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructionsissued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.

2. No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives. The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designationfrom the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such. There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation. In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, we upheld COA's disallowance of the payment of honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply with equal force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise restricted.

3. No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. (National Amnesty Commission vs. COA, G. R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004)

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the constitution. RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.