Admin Chapter 1.docx

CHAPTER I – GENERAL PRINCIPLES A. Definition of Administrative Law 01. Luzon Dev. Bank vs. Association of LDBE, G.R. No. 120319 Oct. 6, 1995; G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents. FACTS: At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. Voluntary Arbitrator: the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same. ISSUE: WON the voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA. HELD: YES. In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,8 on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al.,9 this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-

judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.10 Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. xxx xxx xxx An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency.12 Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed.13 The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function.14 An individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an estate,15 in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court,16and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state.17 The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasijudicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to

the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. 02. Iron & Steel Authority vs. CA, G.R. No. 102976 Oct. 25, 1995; G.R. No. 102976

October 25, 1995

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 dated 9 August 1973 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of five (5) years counting from 9 August 1973. When ISA's original term expired on 10 October 1978, its term was extended for another ten (10) years by Executive Order No. 555 dated 31 August 1979. The National Steel Corporation ("NSC") then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such a steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the Government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on 16 November 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land (totalling about 30.25 hectares in area) located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC. Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, also dated 16 November 1982, was issued directing the NSC to "negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject land." LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC. Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. RTC: the trial court granted MCFC's motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The dismissal was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that "only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case." The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating, among other things that: CA:affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner ISA, "a government regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions," did not have the same rights as an ordinary corporation and that the ISA, unlike corporations organized under the Corporation Code, was not entitled to a period for winding up its affairs after expiration of its legally mandated term, with the result that upon expiration of its term on 11 August 1987, ISA was "abolished and [had] no more legal authority to perform governmental functions." ISSUE: WON the Republic of the Phil is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term HELD: Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It is worth noting that the term "Authority" has been used to designate both incorporated and nonincorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.

When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a nonincorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic. In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272. From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings. 03. PLDT vs. City of Bacolod, G.R. No. 149179, July 15, 2005 G.R. No. 149179. July 15, 2005 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., Petitioners, vs. CITY OF BACOLOD, FLORENTINO T. GUANCO, in his capacity as the City Treasurer of Bacolod City, and ANTONIO G. LACZI, in his capacity as the City Legal Officer of Bacolod City, Respondents. FACTS: In August 1995, the City of Bacolod, invoking its authority under Section 137, in relation to Section 151 and Section 193, supra, of the Local Government Code, made an assessment on PLDT for the payment of franchise tax due the City. Complying therewith, PLDT began paying the City franchise tax from the year 1994 until the third quarter of 1998, at which time the total franchise tax it had paid the City already amounted to ₱2,770,696.37. On June 2, 1998, the Department of Finance through its Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF), issued a ruling to the effect that as of March 16, 1995, the effectivity date of the Public Telecommunications

Policy Act of the Philippines (Rep. Act. No. 7925), PLDT, among other telecommunication companies, became exempt from local franchise tax. Pertinently, the BLGF ruling reads: Invoking the aforequoted ruling, PLDT then stopped paying local franchise and business taxes to Bacolod City starting the fourth quarter of 1998. The controversy came to a head-on when, sometime in 1999, PLDT applied for the issuance of a Mayor’s Permit but the City of Bacolod withheld issuance thereof pending PLDT’s payment of its franchise tax liability in the following amounts: (1) ₱358,258.30 for the fourth quarter of 1998; and (b) ₱1,424,578.10 for the year 1999, all in the aggregate amount of ₱1,782,836.40, excluding surcharges and interest, about which PLDT was duly informed by the City Treasurer via a 5th Indorsement dated March 16, 1999 for PLDT’s "appropriate action".4 In time, PLDT filed a protest5 with the Office of the City Legal Officer, questioning the assessment and at the same time asking for a refund of the local franchise taxes it paid in 1997 until the third quarter of 1998. City Legal Officer Antonio G. Laczi: denied the protest and ordered PLDT to pay the questioned assessment. RTC: dismissed PLDT’s petition ISSUE: WON BLGF is an administrative agency with technical expertise and mastery over the specialized matters in the case at bar. HELD: NO. PLDT likewise argued in said case that the RTC at Davao City erred in not giving weight to the ruling of the BLGF which, according to petitioner, is an administrative agency with technical expertise and mastery over the specialized matters assigned to it. But then again, we held in Davao: To be sure, the BLGF is not an administrative agency whose findings on questions of fact are given weight and deference in the courts. The authorities cited by petitioner pertain to the Court of Tax Appeals, a highly specialized court which performs judicial functions as it was created for the review of tax cases. In contrast,

the BLGF was created merely to provide consultative services and technical assistance to local governments and the general public on local taxation, real property assessment, and other related matters, among others. The question raised by petitioner is a legal question, to wit, the interpretation of §23 of R.A. No. 7925. There is, therefore, no basis for claiming expertise for the BLGF that administrative agencies are said to possess in their respective fields.15 B. Origin and Development of Administrative Law Cases: 04. Solid Homes vs. Payawal, G.R. No. 84811, Aug. 29, 1989 G.R. No. 84811

August 29, 1989

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree." After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from 1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. 1 Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court,

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which also berated the

appellant for its obvious efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory tactics during the trial. The petitioner was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the further amount of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for realty taxes and registration expenses despite its inability to deliver the title to the land. ISSUE: WON trial court had jurisdiction over cases involving claims, refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law is PD No. 957. The National Housing Authority has the jurisdiction. The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (P.D. 957 as amended by P.D. 1344) 05. Christian General Assembly vs. Ignacio, G.R. No. 164789, Aug. 27, 2009 G.R. No. 164789

August 27, 2009

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC., Petitioner, vs. SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO and PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO, Respondents. FACTS: On April 30, 1998, CGA entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision lot4 (subject property) with the respondents – the registered owners and developers of a housing subdivision known as Villa Priscilla Subdivision located in Barangay Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan. Under the Contract to Sell, CGA would pay

₱2,373,000.00 for the subject property on installment basis; they were to pay a down payment of ₱1,186,500, with the balance payable within three years on equal monthly amortization payments of ₱46,593.85, inclusive of interest at 24% per annum, starting June 1998. On August 5, 2000, the parties mutually agreed to amend the Contract to Sell to extend the payment period from three to five years, calculated from the date of purchase and based on the increased total consideration of ₱2,706,600, with equal monthly installments of ₱37,615.00, inclusive of interest at 24% per annum, starting September 2000. According to CGA, it religiously paid the monthly installments until its administrative pastor discovered that the title covering the subject property suffered from fatal flaws and defects. CGA learned that the subject property was actually part of two consolidated lots (Lots 2-F and 2-G Bsd-04-000829 [OLT]) that the respondents had acquired from Nicanor Adriano (Adriano) and Ceferino Sison (Sison), respectively. Adriano and Sison were former tenant-beneficiaries of Purificacion S. Imperial (Imperial) whose property in Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan5 had been placed under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27’s Operation Land Transfer.6 According to CGA, Imperial applied for the retention of five hectares of her land under Republic Act No. 6657,7 which the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted in its October 2, 1997 order (DAR Order). The DAR Order authorized Imperial to retain the farm lots previously awarded to the tenantbeneficiaries, including Lot 2-F previously awarded to Adriano, and Lot 2-G Bsd-04-000829 awarded to Sison. On appeal, the Office of the President8 and the CA9 upheld the DAR Order. Through the Court’s Resolution dated January 19, 2005 in G.R. No. 165650, we affirmed the DAR Order by denying the petition for review of the appellate decision. Understandably aggrieved after discovering these circumstances, CGA filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC on April 30, 2002.10 CGA claimed that the respondents fraudulently concealed the fact that the subject property was part of a property under litigation; thus, the Contract to Sell was a rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. CGA asked the trial court to rescind the contract; order the respondents to return the amounts already paid; and award actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.11 Citing PD No. 95712 and PD No. 1344, the respondents claimed that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. CGA opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that the action is for rescission of contract, not specific performance, and is not among the actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, as specified by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344. RTC: issued an order denying the respondents’ motion to dismiss, is outside the HLURB’s jurisdiction. CA: ruled that the HLURB had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint ISSUE: Which of the two – the regular court or the HLURB – has exclusive jurisdiction over CGA’s action for rescission and damages. HELD: HLURB The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law governing at the time the action was commenced. The jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law, not by the parties’ consent or by their waiver in favor of a court that would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of an action.14 Thus, the determination of whether the CGA’s cause of action falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB necessitates a closer examination of the laws defining the HLURB’s jurisdiction and authority. The surge in the real estate business in the country brought with it an increasing number of cases between subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers on the issue of the extent of the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction. In the cases that reached us, we have consistently ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.15 We view CGA’s contention – that the CA erred in applying Article 1191 of the Civil Code as basis for the contract’s rescission – to be a negligible point. Regardless of whether the rescission of contract is based on Article 1191 or 1381 of the Civil Code, the fact remains that what CGA principally wants is a refund of all payments it already made to the respondents. This intent, amply articulated in its complaint, places its

action within the ambit of the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction and outside the reach of the regular courts. Accordingly, CGA has to file its complaint before the HLURB, the body with the proper jurisdiction. C. Criticisms and Advantages of Administrative Law Cases: 06. Dadubo vs. CSC, G.R. No. 106498, June 28, 1993 G.R. No. 106498

June 28, 1993

LOLITA DADUBO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Lolita A. Dadubo, Senior Accounts Analyst and Rosario B. Cidro, Cash Supervisor, of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Borongan Branch were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.1 The charges were based on reports on the unposted withdrawal of P60,000.00 from Savings Account No. 87-692 in the name of Eric Tiu, Edgar Tiu, and/or Pilar Tiu. After banking hours, another withdrawal slip was presented by Feliciano Bugtas, Jr., also an employee of the Tius.3This was the second P60,000.00 withdrawal. Veloso did not know about it. The withdrawal slip was processed and approved on the same day, August 13, 1987. The space Posted by was initialed by Babaylon but no posting was actually made because the passbook was not presented. While the withdrawal slip was dated August 13, 1987, all other supporting documents were dated August 14, 1987, this being a withdrawal after banking hours (ABH). When Dadubo informed Cidro about the third withdrawal, till money of P100,000.00 was made to service it. Prior to the payment of the third P60,000.00 withdrawal, Veloso came back and presented another withdrawal slip for P40,000.00.5 The petitioner claimed she disbursed P100,000.00 to Veloso, covering the third P60,000.00 and the P40,000.00 withdrawals. On the basis of these findings, DBP found Dadubo guilty of dishonesty for embezzlement of bank funds. She was penalized with dismissal from the service.6 Cidro was adjudged guilty of gross neglect of duty and fined in an amount equivalent to one month basic salary, payable through salary deductions in not more than 12 installments. However, DBP was reversed by the Civil Service Commission in its Resolution No. 91-642, dated May 21, 1991,8which reduced Dadubo's penalty to suspension for six months on the ground that: xxx

xxx

xxx

This act of admission needs no further elaboration to prove that Dadubo is guilty of the charge. Further, it should be noted that the report was made only on September 28, 1987 (the date the report on reconciliation was submitted to the Regional Office). It should be emphasized as earlier stated that Dadubo was not authorized to reconcile the subsidiary ledger cards for the period ending August 20, 1987. Hence, as emphatically stated in the MSPB decision, ". . . respondent Dadubo manipulated the bank records to conceal the offense which constituted the act of dishonesty." ISSUE: WON that CSC failed to complied with the constitutional requirement clearly state the facts and the law which the decision based HELD: The petitioner's challenges are mainly factual. The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority.

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is settled that it is not

for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.

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Administrative decisions on matters within

their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.

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None of these vices has been shown in this case.

It is true that the petitioner was formally charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the bank and not specifically with embezzlement. Nevertheless, the allegations and the evidence presented sufficiently proved her guilt of embezzlement of bank funds, which in unquestionably prejudicial to the best interest of the bank. The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. 15

We must also dismiss the petitioner's complaint that CSC Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which a decision is based. We have held that this provision applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the Civil Service Commission.

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In any event, there was an earlier statement of the facts and the law

involved in the decision rendered by the MSPB dated February 28, 1990, which affirmed DBP's decision to dismiss the petitioner. In both decisions, the facts and the law on which they were based were clearly and distinctly stated. 07. Lianga Bay vs. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987 G.R. No. L-30637

July 16, 1987

LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First, Instance of Agusan, and AGO TIMBER CORPORATION, respondents. FACTS: The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other. The concession of petitioner Lianga Bay Logging Corporation Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Lianga) as described in its Timber License Agreement No. 49, is located in the municipalities of Tago, Cagwait, Marihatag and Lianga, all in the Province of Surigao, consisting of 110,406 hectares, more or less, while that of respondent Ago Timber Corporation (hereinafter referred to as respondent Ago) granted under Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-60 [New] is located at Los Arcos and San Salvador, Province of Agusan, with an approximate area of 4,000 hectares. It was a part of a forest area of 9,000 hectares originally licensed to one Narciso Lansang under Ordinary Timber License No. 584-'52. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-whereby the eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. The western boundary of petitioner Lianga is described as "... Corner 5, a point in the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Los Arcos-Lianga Road; thence following Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary in a general northerly and northwesterly and northerly directions about 39,500 meters to Corner 6, a point at the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Nalagdao Creek ..." The eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is described as "... point 4, along the Agusan-Surigao boundary; thence following Agusan-Surigao boundary in a general southeasterly and southerly directions about 12,000 meters to point 5, a point along Los Arcos-Lianga Road; ..."

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Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the Director of Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective concession areas. Director of Forestry: The decision fixed the common boundary of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. as that indicated in red pencil of the sketch attached to the decision. Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources: "(T)he common boundary line of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and the Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., should be that indicated by the green line on the same sketch which had been made an integral part of the appealed decision."

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Office of the President: reversing and overturning the decision of the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and affirming in toto and reinstating the decision, dated March 20, 1961, of the Director of Forestry.

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Office of the President: denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Ago On October 21, 1968, a new action was commenced by Ago Timber Corporation, as plaintiff, in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, Branch II, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 1253, against Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., Assistant Executive Secretaries Jose J. Leido, Jr. and Gilberto M. Duavit and Director of Forestry, as defendants, for "Determination of Correct Boundary Line of License Timber Areas and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" reiterating once more the same question raised and passed upon in DANR Case No. 2268 and insisting that "a judicial review of such divergent administrative decisions is necessary in order to determine the correct boundary fine of the licensed areas in question."

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On November 10, 1968, defendant Lianga (herein petitioner) moved for dismissal of the complaint and for dissolution of the temporary restraining order on grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent public officials and respondent corporation.

It also submitted its opposition to plaintiff's (herein respondent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

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A supplemental motion was filed on December 6, 1968.

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ISSUE: WON the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. HELD: NO. Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago, asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary fine of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may repeal or in the decision of the Director of Forestry when advisable in the public interests,

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whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of the President.

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In giving due course to the complaint below, the respondent court would necessarily have to assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings,

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which is beyond its competence

and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence already presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. Such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

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