978-94-015-9247-5_2

JAY MOORE

The Basic Principles of Behaviorism Systematic viewpoints in psychology are often characterized in terms of their stances on the subject matter and methods of the discipline. In this regard, behaviorism is often characterized as the viewpoint holding that the appropriate subject matter for psychology is behavior, rather than mental/subjective experience, and that the appropriate methods are those of the natural sciences, rather than introspection (see Addis, 1982; Bergmann, 1956). However, for most individuals, behaviorism means a great deal more than simply a statement about subject matter and methods. An entire set of collateral assumptions typically accompanies the position. For example, some individuals assume that in order for psychology to be an "objective" science, its subject matter should be only behavior, which is publicly observable and amenable to intersubjective agreement, rather than mental/subjective experience, which is private and not amenable to intersubjective agreement. Notwithstanding their concerns with objectivity, these individuals may well assume that mental/subjective phenomena do exist, that they are not reducible to objective phenomena, and that they playa causal role in behavior, at the same time the individuals rule the mental/subjective phenomena out of direct scientific consideration. In an effort to make their science complete, these individuals then suggest that the appropriate way to consider the mental/subjective phenomena in psychological science is indirectly, as inferred constructs, rather than as directly observed phenomena. Of course, the inferred constructs must be appropriately derived from publicly observable phenomena, which is how their objectivity is ensured. Further, they must be parsimonious, and they must "pay their way" by facilitating inductive systematization. Consideration of such inferred constructs is presumably required for adequate explanations in psychology, in the same way that constructs have played an important role in advancing many other sciences (Zuriff, 1985, pp. 73-78). Strictly speaking, however, constructs in psychology cannot be inferred on the basis of just introspective verbal reports, but rather only on the basis of behavioral data (for additional discussion of the role of verbal reports, see Alston, 1972; Zuriff, 1979, 1980). The constructs then playa major role in the development of theories. Theories evolve into laws, and the resulting network of interlocking constructs, theories, and laws constitutes psychological knowledge (see also Moore, 1981, 1990a).

41 B.A. Thyer (ed.), The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism, 41-68. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Moore

Alternatively, other individuals embrace an entirely different set of collateral assumptions. These individuals assume that psychology is concerned with only one dimension, the dimension in which organisms interact with their environments, because it is the only dimension that exists. Talk of a mental dimension with subjective phenomena that differs from a physical dimension with objective phenomena, or talk of using behavioral data to validate inferred constructs from a mental or subjective dimension, is a legacy of traditional assumptions about the causes of behavior that are cherished for extraneous and irrelevant reasons (Moore, 1981, 1994; Skinner, 1945, 1953). Any question regarding introspection concerns the processes by which statements descriptive of internal states and conditions are acquired and maintained, and the processes by which the introspected phenomena come to influence subsequent behavior. Perhaps some parts of the one dimension are presently inaccessible to others, but qualitatively different dimensions are not involved for that reason. Theories and laws are important because they permit individuals to interact effectively with nature, not because of their "logical" status. Speaking critically of the first set of collateral assumptions, this alternative group of individuals feels that those assumptions have misled the science of behavior for decades, precisely because the assumptions are mistaken about the nature of human knowledge. Given such dramatically different assumptions about behaviorism, one might legitimately wonder whether both are really concerned with the same viewpoint in psychology. In any case, the present chapter will attempt to secure a broader understanding of the nature and principles of behaviorism. We will first review some matters relating to the historical development of behaviorism. Then, we will extensively consider various conceptual matters relating to the nature and principles of behaviorism, primarily from the point of view of B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism. Finally, we will examine more precisely how radical behaviorism differs from alternative positions. (For additional overview of the major features of Skinner's behaviorism, see Delprato and Midgley, 1992, as well as a discussion of the work of Willard Day in Moore, 1991). We begin with a review of the historical record.

THE HISTORICAL RECORD

Texts in the history of psychology typically identify the first quarter of the twentieth century as the period of "the behavioral revolution." As most readers undoubtedly know, at the beginning of the century, structuralism and functionalism were the mainstream viewpoints, and psychology was dominated by an interest in analyzing experience and specifying the contents of