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Attorneys Listed on Signature Page

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN JOSE DIVISION RAMBUS, INC.,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., et al.,

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Defendants.

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RAMBUS, INC.,

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MANUFACTURERS’ DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MURPHY (DAUBERT NO. 3) Trial Date: Time: Courtroom: Judge:

December 2, 2008 2:00 pm 6, 4th floor Hon. Ronald M. Whyte

Case No. C 05-02298 RMW

Plaintiff,

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v.

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SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., et al.,

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Case No. C 05-00334 RMW

Defendants.

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RAMBUS, INC., Plaintiff, v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC., et al.,

Case No. C 06-00244 RMW

Defendants.

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MANUFACTURERS’ DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MURPHY (DAUBERT NO. 3)

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 2, 2008, at 2:00 p.m., or as soon

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thereafter as the matter may be heard before the Honorable Ronald M. Whyte, United States

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District Court for the Northern District of California, 280 South First Street, San Jose, California

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95110, Defendants Micron Technology, Inc. and Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc., Hynix

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Semiconductor Inc., Hynix Semiconductor America Inc., Hynix Semiconductor Manufacturing

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America Inc., Hynix Semiconductor U.K. LTD, and Hynix Semiconductor Deutschland GmbH,

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and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Semiconductor

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Inc., and Samsung Austin Semiconductor, L.P. (collectively “Manufacturers”) will and hereby do

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move this Court for an order precluding Robert J. Murphy (“Mr. Murphy”) from offering certain

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opinions or testimony, which are inconsistent with the Court’s previous rulings, pursuant to

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Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 403 and 702.

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Specifically, the Manufacturers request that Mr. Murphy be precluded from (1)

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offering opinions or testimony at trial that a transition-based signal of the type described in U.S.

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Patent No. 4,330,852 (“Redwine”) does not constitute an “operation code,” (2) offering opinions

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or testimony at trial that an external timing signal of the type described in Redwine does not

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constitute an “external clock,” and (3) offering opinions or testimony regarding a construction of

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the term “memory device” that is limited to a single chip. The first two are inconsistent with this

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Court’s Order Denying Hynix’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity of U.S. Patent Nos.

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6,378,020 And 5,915,105 Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 And/Or 103 (“Hynix Order”) (attached as

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Exhibit A to the Declaration of Dana Powers in support of Manufacturers’ Daubert Motion to

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Exclude Certain Testimony of Robert J. Murphy [hereinafter “Powers Decl.”]), and the third is

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directly contrary to this Court’s claim construction in Claim Construction Order For The

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Farmwald/Horowitz Patents And Order Denying The Manufacturers’ Motions For Summary

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Judgment Of Non-Infringement And Invalidity Depending On Claim Construction [hereinafter,

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“Claim Construction Order”] at 34 (attached as Exhibit B to Powers Decl.). This motion is

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supported by the points and authorities discussed below, the Omnibus Declaration of Sven Raz in

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Support of the Manufacturers’ Summary Judgment and Daubert Motions (hereinafter, “Omnibus MANUFACTURERS’ DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MURPHY (DAUBERT NO. 3)

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Decl.”) and exhibits attached thereto, the Declaration of Dana K. Powers in Support of the

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Manufacturers’ Daubert Motion to Exclude Certain Testimony of Robert J. Murphy (Daubert No.

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3) and exhibits attached thereto, and such other evidence and argument that may properly come

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before the Court.

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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In both his Expert Report and his deposition, Murphy advocates opinions which

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this Court has already rejected in Hynix I1 and in the July 10, 2008 Claim Construction Order in

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the instant cases. First, Mr. Murphy attempts to argue once again that transition-based signals

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do not satisfy the “operation code” limitation and that the external timing signal of the type

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disclosed in Redwine and Novak are not external clock signals. See, e.g., Omnibus Decl. Ex. 3

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(Attachment D to the Expert Report of Robert J. Murphy, dated September 26, 2008) at D-13.

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However, this Court has already held as a matter of law that a transition-based signal of the type

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described in Redwine does in fact “constitute a bit” and thus does satisfy the “operation code”

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limitation and the external timing signal

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under the Court’s construction. Powers Decl. Ex. A (Hynix Order) at 5. Mr. Murphy should not

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be allowed to resurrect an opinion which has already been rejected by this Court, and should be

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precluded from presenting any testimony or opinions at trial that transition-based signals are not

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bits and thus do not constitute an operation code.

Φ

does satisfy the “external clock signal” limitation

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Second, Mr. Murphy bases the opinions in his Expert Report on a claim

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construction that this Court has explicitly considered and rejected. The Court has stated

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specifically that a “memory device” is not limited to a single chip, as Rambus had proposed.

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Powers Decl. Ex. B (Claim Construction Order) at 34. But Mr. Murphy, citing only Rambus’s

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pending Motion to Reconsider, chose to base his opinions on Rambus’s proposed construction

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instead of the Court’s actual construction. Murphy’s unabashed use of a claim construction

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rejected by this Court is improper and should not be allowed.

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II.

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THE STANDARD FOR PRECLUDING EXPERT TESTIMONY Pursuant to Rule 702, expert testimony is admissible if:

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“(1) the testimony is

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based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

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methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the

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case.”

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Court provided the analytical framework for determining the admissibility of expert testimony

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under Rule 702. Under Daubert, the trial courts must act as “gatekeepers” to determine if expert

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testimony is admissible based on “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the

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testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be

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applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.

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“ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task

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at hand.” Id. at 597.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme

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III.

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ARGUMENT

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A.

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The trial courts are tasked with

Murphy’s Opinion Regarding Transition Based Signals Was Rejected As A Matter Of Law In Hynix I Mr. Murphy was retained by Rambus to offer opinions, inter alia, regarding the

validity of the asserted claims in the patents-in-suit.

When analyzing prior art in both his expert

report and his deposition, Mr. Murphy repeatedly offered his opinion that transition based signals are not bits of information, and thus do not constitute an operation code.2

In Murphy’s expert

report, he opines that Novak, U.S. Patent No. 4,663,735, Powers Decl. Ex. D, does not disclose an “operation code” because Novak has a “transition-based” (e.g. /RAS) asynchronous control interface, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood such an interface to receive operation codes as required by the claim.” Omnibus Decl. Ex. 3 (Attachment D to the Expert Report of Robert J. Murphy, dated September 26, 2008) at D-13. Moreover, at his

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The claim term “operation code,” as in Hynix I, has been construed by this Court to mean “one or more bits to specify a type of action.” Powers Decl. Ex. B (Claim Construction Order) at 37; Powers Decl. Ex. C (Hynix I Claim Construction Order) at 19. MANUFACTURERS’ DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MURPHY (DAUBERT NO. 3)

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deposition, Mr. Murphy testified that it was his opinion that a signal of the type described in

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Novak that transitions from high to low, and is sensed, is not a bit of information. Powers Decl.

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Ex. E (Deposition of Robert J. Murphy, dated October 10, 2008) at 476:13-18 (“When the line

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you're dealing with moves from high to low, and you're using the edge, that falling edge to do

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some work, what's the bit value? I mean does it have a bit value? And the answer is no,

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because what is it? Is it high? Is it low? Is it transitioning? That's not a bit value.”); Powers

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Decl. Ex. F (Deposition of Robert J. Murphy, dated October 13, 2008) at 608:8-11 (“Q: And

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when it -- when that signal transitions from high to low and is sensed, in your opinion, is that a bit

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of information?

A. No.“). With respect to Redwine, which also discloses transition-based

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signals, Mr. Murphy further opined that a transition based signal, “W bar,” is not an operation

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code.

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614:20.

Powers Decl. Ex. F (Deposition of Robert J. Murphy, dated October 13, 2008) at 612:21-

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But Mr. Murphy presented this exact same opinion in Hynix I, and it was rejected

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by this Court as a matter of law. Mr. Murphy even admitted this in his deposition: “My

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understanding is that the opinion I’m pressing now is the same opinion that I expressed in Hynix I

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. . . and my understanding is that in Hynix I, that was not the opinion of the Court.” Powers Decl.

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Ex. F (Deposition of Robert J. Murphy, dated October 13, 2008) at 614:15-20. Specifically, in

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Hynix I, Mr. Murphy argued that Redwine teaches “transition-based signals” and “discloses

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commands based on the transition of, not the state of, the RAS signal and the W signal held high

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or low.” Powers Decl. Ex. A (Hynix Order) at 5.

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Judgment of Invalidity of the ‘020 and ‘105 patent in Hynix I, the Court analyzed both Mr.

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Murphy’s expert opinion as well as that of Hynix’s expert, David Taylor.

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as a matter of law that “[b]ased on the Redwine patent specification, it appears clear that neither

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the read nor write operations is signaled based on when the W signal is transitioning from one

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state to another.

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constitute a bit specifying a read or write operation.” Id.

In considering Hynix’s Motion for Summary

The Court concluded

In addition, even assuming that was a transition-based signal, W would still

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In deciding whether to grant Hynix’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity,

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the Court necessarily considered the evidence in the light most favorable to Rambus and drawn MANUFACTURERS’ DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MURPHY (DAUBERT NO. 3)

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all reasonable inferences in Rambus’s favor.

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Solutia, Inc., 289 F .3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Even in this favorable light, the Court still

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concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to this question when it

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determined that the W signal in Redwine constituted an operation code. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ . P.

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56(c); see also, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.

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2d 469 (1993) (if “the trial court concludes that the scintilla of [expert] evidence presented

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supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more

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likely than not is true, the court remains free to . . . grant summary judgment”).

See, e.g., See Crown Operations Int'l, Ltd. v.

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This proffered testimony of Mr. Murphy should not be permitted into evidence.

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Evidence is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 if it will “assist the trier of fact to understand the

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evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Given that this Court has already determined that a

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transition-based signal of the type described in Redwine is a bit, Mr. Murphy’s contrary

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testimony on this topic would do nothing to assist the jury with the issues in the case.

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B.

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Murphy’s Opinion Regarding Transition Based Signals Was Rejected As A Matter Of Law In Hynix I Mr. Murphy also offered opinions regarding the disclosure of an external clock in

16 certain prior art references with respect to the validity of the asserted claims in the patents-in-suit. 17 When analyzing prior art in both his expert report and deposition, Mr. Murphy repeatedly offered 18 his opinion that Novak, U.S. Patent No. 4,663,735, Powers Decl. Ex. D, does not disclose an 19 “external clock [signal]” “because there is no periodic signal from a source external to the device 20 to provide timing information” and 21

Φ

is not periodic.

See, e.g., Omnibus Decl. Ex. 3

(Attachment D to the Expert Report of Robert J. Murphy, dated September 26, 2008) at D-3. 22 23

Moreover, at his deposition, Mr. Murphy testified that it was his opinion that external signal Φ in Novak did not disclose an external clock signal because external signal

24 signal.

Φ is a gated periodic

Powers Decl. Ex. F (Deposition of Robert J. Murphy, dated October 13, 2008) at

25 605:10-18 (“A. Well, this Phi signal isn't much different from the -- excuse me -- from the Phi 26 signal we saw in Inagaki.

There's a very long period in the front where it's low, a period where

27 it looks like there's a sort of a time frame maintained and then another period where it's low.

So

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it's not periodic.

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which also discloses an external signal

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external clock signal because it is a gated periodic signal.

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Robert J. Murphy, dated October 13, 2008) at 617:14-22 (“Q. What's the basis for your testimony

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that it's not an external clock signal?

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is not maintained over the drawing area that we see drawn in this document. So it looks

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effectively like it's a gated periodic signal and the Court has told us that only internal clock

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signals are gated periodic. External ones are different, they're just a periodic signal.”).

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So therefore, it's not an external clock signal.”) With respect to Redwine,

Φ,

Mr. Murphy further opined that

Φ

also is not an

Powers Decl. Ex. F (Deposition of

A. The basis for my testimony is the period of that signal

But Mr. Murphy presented this exact same opinion in Hynix I, and it was rejected

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by this Court as a matter of law.

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signal Φ is not an external clock signal because “during both read and write operations there is a

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time period where Φ is not signaling.” Powers Decl. Ex. A (Hynix Order) at 4.

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Hynix’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity of the ‘020 and ‘105 patent in Hynix I, the

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Court analyzed both Mr. Murphy’s expert opinion as well as that of Hynix’s expert, David

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Taylor.

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‘external clock signal’ limitation.” Id.

Specifically, in Hynix I, Mr. Murphy argued that external

In considering

The Court concluded as a matter of law that the Court “finds that Redwine discloses the

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As with the transition based signals argument, in deciding whether to grant

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Hynix’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity, the Court necessarily considered the

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evidence in the light most favorable to Rambus and drawn all reasonable inferences in Rambus’s

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favor.

See, e.g., Crown Operations Int'l, Ltd. v. Solutia, Inc., 289 F .3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir.

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2002).

Even in this favorable light, the Court still concluded that there was no genuine issue of

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material fact with respect to this question when it determined that the

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constituted an external clock signal.

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Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993) (if “the trial

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court concludes that the scintilla of [expert] evidence presented supporting a position is

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insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true,

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the court remains free to . . . grant summary judgment”).

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Φ

signal in Redwine

See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ . P. 56(c); see also, Daubert v.

This proffered testimony of Mr. Murphy should not be permitted into evidence. MANUFACTURERS’ DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MURPHY (DAUBERT NO. 3)

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Evidence is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 if it will “assist the trier of fact to understand the

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evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Given that this Court has already determined that the

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Φ signal of the type described in Redwine is an external clock signal, Mr. Murphy’s contrary

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testimony on this topic would do nothing to assist the jury with the issues in the case.

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C.

Murphy’s Opinions Are Based On The Rejected Construction of “Memory Device” Proposed By Rambus The second area of impermissible testimony of Mr. Murphy relates to the

7 construction of the term “memory device.” This Court issued its Claim Construction Order in 8 these cases on July 10, 2008.

In that Order, the Court held that a “memory device” is a “device

9 in which information can be stored and retrieved electronically,” and that “[i]t need not be on a 10 single chip.” Powers Decl. Ex. B (Claim Construction Order) at 34.

In so doing the Court

11 explicitly rejected Rambus’s proposed definition, “an integrated circuit device in which 12 information can be stored and retrieved electronically.” As the Court noted, the difference 13 between Rambus’s proposal and the Manufacturer’s “is merely whether a ‘memory device’ 14 incorporates the definition of an ‘integrated circuit device,’ and with it, the single chip limitation 15 from Infineon.” Id. at 33. 16 Rambus filed a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration regarding the 17 Court’s construction of the term “memory device” on August 19, 2008, arguing that the Court’s 18 construction is contrary to both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.

(Rambus Inc.’s Mot. for Leave

19 to File Mot. for Reconsideration of Claim Construction Order for the Farmwald/Horowitz Patents 20 and Mot. for Clarification [hereinafter, “Motion For Leave”] at 1-2.) On August 27, 2008, in 21 order to “ensure that the court has not committed a manifest failure,” the Court granted Rambus’s 22 Motion For Leave and set a schedule for opposition and reply briefs. (Order Granting Rambus’s 23 Motion For Leave To File Motion For Reconsideration at 1 (internal quotations omitted).) On 24 September 11, 2008, the Manufacturers submitted an opposition, to which Rambus replied on 25 September 18, 2008.

The Court has not issued a ruling.

26 Mr. Murphy states in his Expert Report: 27 28

I understand that the Court in this case may reconsider and change its construction of the term “memory device.” It remains my MANUFACTURERS’ DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MURPHY (DAUBERT NO. 3)

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opinion that the term “memory device” should be construed as, “an integrated circuit device in which information can be stored and retrieved electronically. I include certain opinions in this Report based upon this construction, in the event the Court should choose to adopt it. Nonetheless, none of my conclusions as to the validity of any of the asserted claims of the Patents-in-suit are based solely upon this construction of “memory device.” Thus, regardless of whether the Court’s construction is modified, or whether it remains as “a device in which information can be stored and retrieved electronically,” my conclusions that none of the asserted claims are invalid remains the same.

7

Omnibus Decl. Ex. 1 (Expert Report of Robert J. Murphy, dated September 26, 2008) at 6 n.3.

8

Mr. Murphy thus understands that his construction is contrary to the Court’s, but he believes it is

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immaterial to his conclusions. Mr. Murphy does not identify which of his opinions, if any, are

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in fact based on the Court’s construction of “memory device” as opposed to Rambus’s rejected

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construction.

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then it is not entirely clear why Mr. Murphy chose to render opinions based on Rambus’s

13

construction and not the Court’s.

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Court.

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construed to be a single chip has significant implications with respect to the Manufacturers’

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invalidity arguments.”

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If the construction of “memory device” is indeed immaterial to his conclusions,

However, this is contrary to Rambus’s position before the

As Rambus states in its Motion For Leave, “[w]hether the term ‘memory device’ is

(Motion For Leave at 1.)

Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the court. Markman

18

v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).

Indeed, “[t]he decisionmaker vested with

19

the task of construing the patent is in the better position to ascertain whether an expert's proposed

20

definition fully comports with the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent's

21

internal coherence.” Id. at 390.

22

has been found to be grounds for attorneys’ fees and/or sanctions.

23

Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 224, 225 (D. Mass. 2008) (granting a motion for

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attorneys’ fees where defendants “demonstrated a failure to accept the claim construction

25

governing this case” and “urged the jury to adopt an interpretation of the patent claims developed

26

by their experts instead of the construction mandated by the Federal Circuit.”); see also

27

Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersystems GMBH, No. 98-cv-

28

01072-RPM, 2008 WL 410413 (D. Colo. 2008).

In some cases, failure to accept the court’s claim construction

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See Depuy Spine, Inc. v.

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Mr. Murphy’s continued use of a rejected claim construction is improper and

2

should not be permitted at trial. It is the Court’s role to determine the scope of patent claims, not

3

the jury.

4

construction of the term “memory device,” and his opinions based on his own favored

5

construction, will not be helpful to the jury.

6

opinions inconsistent with this Court’s prior determination.

7

serve only to confuse the issues and undermine the Court’s role in determining claim

8

construction.

As such, Mr. Murphy’s opinion that the Court should have adopted a different

The Court should not permit Mr. Murphy to offer

9

IV.

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CONCLUSION

Allowing such testimony would

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Based on the foregoing, the Manufacturers respectfully request that the Court issue

12

an Order precluding Mr. Murphy from presenting any testimony or other evidence or argument

13

(1) that a transition-based signal is not an operation code, (2) that a gated external timing signal of

14

the type disclosed in Redwine is not an “external clock signal,” and (3) that a “memory device” is

15

or should be limited to a single chip.

16

Dated: October 24, 2008 By:

17

/s/ Steven S. Cherensky

18 MATTHEW D. POWERS (Bar No. 104795) [email protected] STEVEN S. CHERENSKY (Bar No. 168275) [email protected] WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 201 Redwood Shores Parkway Redwood Shores, California 94065 Telephone: (650) 802-3034 Facsimile: (650) 802-3100

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ROBERT S. BEREZIN (pro hac vice) [email protected] MATTHEW J. ANTONELLI (pro hac vice) [email protected] WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10153 Telephone: (212) 310-8000 Facsimile: (212) 310-8007

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Attorneys for Defendants SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., and SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR, L.P.

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By:

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/s/ Sven Raz

JARED BOBROW (Bar No. 133712) Email: [email protected] SVEN RAZ (Bar No. 222262) Email: [email protected] WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 201 Redwood Shores Parkway Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Telephone: (650) 802-3034 Facsimile: (650) 802-3100

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ELIZABETH S.WEISWASSER (pro hac vice) Email: [email protected] DAVID J. LENDER (pro hac vice) Email: [email protected] WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP New York Office 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 Telephone: (212) 310-8000

17 18 19 20 21

WILLIAM C. PRICE (Bar No. 108542) Email: [email protected] HAROLD A. BARZA (Bar No. 80888) Email: [email protected] JON R. STEIGER (Bar No. 229814) Email: [email protected] ROBERT J. BECHER (Bar No. 193431) Email: [email protected]

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QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-3000 Facsimile: (213) 443-3100

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Attorneys for Defendants MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. and MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, INC.

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By:

8

/s/ Theodore G. Brown III

DANIEL J. FURNISS (Bar No. 73531) Email: [email protected] THEODORE G. BROWN III (Bar No. 114672) Email: [email protected] JORDAN TRENT JONES (Bar No. 166600) Email: [email protected] TOWNSEND and TOWNSEND and CREW LLP 379 Lytton Avenue Palo Alto, California 94301 Telephone: (650) 326-2400 Facsimile: (650) 326-2422

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KENNETH L. NISSLY (Bar No. 77589) Email: [email protected] SUSAN van KEULEN (Bar No. 136060) Email: [email protected] GEOFFREY H. YOST (Bar No. 159687) Email: [email protected] THELEN REID BROWN RAYSMAN STEINER LLP 225 West Santa Clara Street, Suite 1200 San Jose, California 95113 Telephone: (408) 292-5800 Facsimile: (408) 287-8040

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&

KENNETH R. O’ROURKE (Bar No. 120144) Email: [email protected] WALLACE A. ALLAN (Bar No. 102054) Email: [email protected] O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP 400 South Hope Street, Suite 1060 Los Angeles, California 90071-2899 Telephone: (213) 430-6000 Facsimile: (213) 430-6407

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Attorneys for Defendants HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC., and HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING AMERICA INC.

27 28 MANUFACTURERS’ DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MURPHY (DAUBERT NO. 3)

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CASE NO. C 05 00334 RMW CASE NO. C 05 02298 RMW CASE NO. C 06 00244 RMW

Case 5:05-cv-00334-RMW

1 2 3

Document 2416

Filed 10/24/2008

Page 13 of 13

ATTESTATION CLAUSE REGARDING SIGNATURES I hereby attest that I have on file permission to sign for co-counsel indicated by a “conformed” signature (/S/) within this efiled document.

4 5 /s/ Steven Cherensky Steven Cherensky (Bar No. 168275) Email: [email protected]

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MANUFACTURERS’ DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MURPHY (DAUBERT NO. 3)

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CASE NO. C 05 00334 RMW CASE NO. C 05 02298 RMW CASE NO. C 06 00244 RMW