06 Fonctionnalisme - Sachse - Lausanne Reduction Ism & Craver

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Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences: Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom 30.10.2008 : Lausanne reductionism & Craver’s position

Structure of this session : - Clarification of the sub-type strategy (consideration of the critique of the last sessions) and Craver’s position (abstract link between his position, his strong points and our reductionist strategy) - More detailed presentation discussion of Craver (2007, ch. 7) by Patrice

Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom : Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences

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The ontological argument for the sub-type strategy 1. The argument for ontological reductionism (token-identity) is based on: - supervenience - relative completeness - causal efficacy of the “higher level” property tokens This ontological reductionism + relative completeness suggest epistemological reductionism. Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom : Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences

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2. Consideration of the ontological argument against such a reductionist

approach

(Putnam

and

Fodor):

The

multiple

realization argument. Multiple realization taken as an ontological argument (if correct) exclude epistemological reductionism (failure of standard reductionism (Nagel, etc.) and standard functional reductionism (Kim). Thus, apparently, ontological reductionism can be combined with epistemological anti-reductionism. Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom : Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences

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Objection: Any anti-reductionist position entails a dilemma since, ontologically speaking, it ends up with epiphenomenalism (see Esfeld&Sachse), and epistemologically speaking, the elimination of the scientific quality of the special science is suggested (see especially Churchland and Bickle) In order to avoid this epiphenomenalist/eliminativist conclusion, we propose

the

shift

from

realizer

functionalism

to

filler

functionalism + a conservative reductionism that is based on the construction of functionally defined sub-types. Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom : Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences

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Conservative reductionism by the sub-type strategy

Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom : Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences

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Consideration

of

the

methodological

argument

against

reductionism: There are cases in which reductive explanations and parts of theories are reduced to more basic theories (almost everybody agrees on this), but this does not reflect the general practice (at least not in neuroscience; Craver, Herzog, …). In other terms, one may ask for the successful cases of entire theory-reduction, and since there are maybe no perfect cases of theory-reduction (what ever this means), it is suggested not to take a reductionism as a methodological ideal. Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom : Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences

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Objection: I agree on such a criticism on Nagel’s, Kim’s, Bickle’s account whereby I take Kim’s account not to have this strong methodological implication as Nagel and Bickle seems to have. Following Kim, our sub-type strategy does not demand to construct sub-types for methodological reasons (no ideal of methodological unity).

Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom : Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences

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Link between ontology and methodology: One may then ask why at all one should reduce theories since Craver’s position (mosaic view) seems to be methodologically more adequate? The philosophical answer is: Craver faces the same dilemma as Fodor or Putnam (anti-reductionism does not seem to be compatible with ontological reductionism and the completeness claim). Thus, my opinion, if there are good reasons for methodological plurality, this should be compatible with the common ground in ontology. Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom : Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences

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To put this in general terms, switching levels for better explanations (methodological question, I agree on this point that there are sometimes better explanation on “higher levels”) should not imply ontological different levels of causation. Proposition: Switching levels of explanations without assuming different ontological levels or different levels of causation. Argument in favour of this view: The sub-type strategy is sufficiently flexible for all of Craver’s methodological demands. In addition to this, it provides an ontological argument in favour of methodological pluralism (as Craver and any other anti-reductionist demands). Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom : Philosophie de l’esprit et neurosciences / Philosophy of mind and neurosciences

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