04-1101 Motion To Recuse
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Case 6:04-cv-01101-RTH-MEM
Document 798-3
Filed 07/28/2008
Page 1 of 8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA IN RE: BAYOU SORREL CLASS ACTION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:04CV1101 JUDGE RICHARD T. HAIK, SR.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECUSE MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: A.
LAW and ARGUMENT
The statute concerning disqualification of a judge provides that a judge "shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a). The statute further delineates specific circumstances requiring recusal such as personal bias or prejudice, financial interest, or where a family member is involved in the controversy: a.
any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which partiality might reasonably be questioned.
b.
He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: ******
(1)
Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. (Emphasis added).
Mr. LeMaire submits that, because of the facts detailed and set forth herein below and in his Affidavit, Judge Haik bias, prejudice, and impartiality is seriously drawn into question. The test when considering a recusal motion is whether a reasonable person aware of all the circumstances would have doubts concerning the impartiality of the particular judge. United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d 62, 67 (3d Cir.1989); Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78
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(1980). The test for disqualification is “whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.” Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Cannon 2(A) Commentary. Because 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) focuses on the appearance of impartiality, as opposed to the existence in fact of any bias or prejudice, a judge faced with a potential ground for disqualification ought to consider how his participation in a given case looks to the average person on the street. Use of the word “might” in the statute was intended to indicate that disqualification should follow if the reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. Potashnick, supra, at 1111. The Fifth Circuit advises that § 455 (a) “requires” a judge to recuse if the judge has “any question” about the appropriateness of remaining on the case. The statute “clearly mandates that it would be preferable for a judge to err on the side of caution and disqualify himself in a questionable case.” Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1112. The United States Supreme Court significantly notes that “people who have not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges”, and that “the very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-865, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2205 (1988). In Liljeberg, the Court noted that disqualification “does not depend upon whether or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might reasonably believe that he or she knew.” 108 S.Ct. at 2202. The Court reasoned as follows: The goal of section 455 (a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists because the 2
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judge does not recall the facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible.... Under section 455 (a), therefore, recusal is required even when a judge lacks actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or bias in the case if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have actual knowledge.’ Id. Emphasis added. Thus, if a judge "concludes that 'his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,' then he should also find that the statute has been violated.' Id. Also see In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.1988). There are substantial facts that would cause a reasonable person on the street to doubt the impartiality of Judge Haik in this matter. B.
Recusal Appropriate
Mr. LeMaire provides the following as grounds that support his position that Judge Haik impartiality may reasonably be called into question. 1.
Disciplinary Complaints Involving Conduct of Ms. Dougherty and Mr. Fayard
On or about April 18, 2007, Kevin LeMaire submitted an ethical conduct complaint (“the complaint”) to the Louisiana Office of Disciplinary Counsel against Ms. Elizabeth C. Dougherty (“Dougherty”). See Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Kevin LeMaire. Ms. Dougherty is a former law clerk for Judge Haik, and was appointed by Judge Haik to the PSC and Class Counsel in the instant matter. Without providing details that Mr. LeMaire believes should have been kept confidential, at issue in the complaint against Ms. Dougherty are, among other things, actions and conduct involving Ms. Dougherty and Calvin C. Fayard, Jr., and where Judge Haik is named as a critical fact witness.1 Even though she had long ago withdrawn as counsel in this matter,2 Ms. Dougherty waived the
1
A similar ethical conduct complaint was filed by Mr. LeMaire against Mr. Fayard on October 30, 2007. Judge Haik is also named as a witness in some parts of that complaint. 2
See, Exhibit 2, Order permitting Elizabeth C. Dougherty to withdraw as counsel of record in the proceeding. 3
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confidentiality of the disciplinary proceeding, and submitted a copy of the complaint directly to the Court via the Special Master. Attached as Exhibit 3 is Invoice No. 16671 from Special Master [683] for the time period of May to August 2007. There the Court will find, at page 2, an entry for May 9, 2007 which reads, as follows: REVIEW
EMAIL
FROM
TUPPY
DOUGHERTY
REGARDING
DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINT FILED BY KEVIN LEMAIRE Followed by a thirty minute telephone conference with Judge Haik. At page 6, an entry for July 11, 2007, which provides: REVIEW CORRESPONDENCE FROM TUPPY DOUGHERTY REGARDING DISCIPLINARY
COMPLAINT
FILED
BY
KEVIN
LEMAIRE
AND
FORWARDING DOCUMENTS CONCERNING SAME. Correspondence was sent by Ms. Dougherty to the Special Master on July 11, 2007, according to Exhibit 3 concerning the disciplinary complaint and possibly the complaint itself. At the time, Ms. Dougherty was working at the ODC and should not have been working on any outside cases. Along with that email correspondence from Ms. Dougherty to the Special Master concerning the disciplinary complaint, Ms. Dougherty obviously sent the Special Master a copy of the complaint against her. Considering the billing activity in this matter, and as stated in his affidavit attached hereto, it is Mr. LeMaire’s reasonable belief that Judge Haik became aware of the contents of the submission Ms. Dougherty made to the Special Master. See Exhibit 1. Attached as Exhibit 4 is Invoice No. 17260 from Special Master Juneau [761-3] which reflects his billing to this litigation for the time period of November through December 2007. The last 3 time entries on this invoice are particularly relevant to this matter, and provide as follows: REVIEW OF CORRESPONDENCE FROM HOMER ED BAROUSSE REGARDING SERVICES RENDERED TO TUPPY DOUGHERTY AND 4
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FORWARDING INVOICE CONCERNING SAME TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH DANNY CLAVIER REGARDING STATEMENT RECEIVED FROM HOMER ED BAROUSSE CONCERNING SERVICES RENDERED TO ELIZABETH DOUGHERTY EMAIL TO DANNY CLAVIER FORWARDING APPROVAL OF PAYMENT ON INVOICE FROM HOMER BAROUSSE Mr. Homer Ed Barousse is Ms. Dougherty's personal ethics counsel before the ODC and he does not represent any class member or settling defendant in this matter. Thus, the approval of payment must have sought and then granted by Judge Haik after discussion and review of the billing as it is unlikely the Special Master would have taken unilateral action on the legal bill where the protocol established for release of funds requires this Court's approval. The protocol for disbursement of funds from the settlement were not set up to pay legal defense fees for attorneys before the Court who find themselves responding to disciplinary complaints. Ms. Dougherty is the Court's former law clerk, and she reached out to the Court for financial assistance with payment of legal fees on a separate administrative action and obtained such. Judge Haik did not personally pay the legal fees out of his own pocket; however, he apparently authorized the payment from a fund under his supervision. That this Court approved payment of the legal fees may seriously draw into question whether such demonstrates a personal bias in favor of Ms. Dougherty and partiality or bias concerning Mr. LeMaire, who instituted the complaint, may reasonably be drawn into question. The Court must certainly be aware that Ms. Dougherty was discharged from her employment by and with the ODC and that she is assisting with the present action taken by MLF and the PSC against Mr. LeMaire in this Court. That Ms. Dougherty has lost her job may also form a basis Where no fund exists to pay such and yet this Court approved such payment, there is evidence that Ms. Dougherty and Mr. Fayard will receive favorable treatment and the Court will be biased against Mr. LeMaire, whose complaint caused the legal fees and 5
Case 6:04-cv-01101-RTH-MEM
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Filed 07/28/2008
Page 6 of 8
whose present action in state court is causing MLF to exert legal fees. As shown on Exhibit 4, the offer of settlement to Mr. Irving was accepted on May 25, 2007. As detailed in Exhibit 1, on May 26, 2007, Mr. LeMaire was informed that Judge Haik was aware of and displeased with an ethical conduct complaint against a member of the PSC, and suggested that such complaints may need to be resolved prior to approval of payment of fees to Mr. Irving fees who was not involved with that complaint. Mr. Irving had made a complaint to the Fifth Circuit regarding Judge Haik and such had been resolved; thus, the only complaint pending at that time was that against Ms. Dougherty. It was almost 3 months later before the Court approved Mr. Irving’s fees. It is averred that, based upon this prior conduct, Judge Haik is biased against Kevin LeMaire for filing the complaint against Ms. Dougherty and Mr. Fayard, which name Judge Haik as a witness. The above description of the payment of Ms. Dougherty's legal fees for a separate administrative action from class funds constitutes extra-judicial conduct, as there is no order in the record nor motion filed by Ms. Dougherty to have her legal fees incurred for defending an ethical complaint approved for payment by the Court from the class settlement funds. Such strongly suggests that Judge Haik has sided with Ms. Dougherty against Mr. LeMaire to extent that her legal fees have been approved for payment from a fund supervised by the Court. Ms. Dougherty, the former law clerk of Judge Haik, will be called as a witness by Kevin LeMaire in these proceedings as she has been carbon copied on the MLK matter, because she is obviously involved in prosecuting the present matter against Mr. LeMaire. The truthfulness of Ms Dougherty’s testimony is crucial to these proceedings, and Judge Haik can not now sit in judgment of her credibility. Even though she is no longer counsel of record to these proceedings, Ms. Dougherty has been inextricably involved with the instant proceedings initiated by 6
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McKernan and the PSC, as evidenced by correspondence copied and blind copied to her by counsel for McKernan and the PSC. 2.
McKernan and the PSC Filed Pleadings Designed to Inflame Judge Haik
In their Motion seeking an order for Kevin LeMaire to show cause why his state court employment contract suit did not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court, MLF made it abundantly clear to the Court that Mr. LeMaire had provided an affidavit to an attorney who previously filed a motion to recuse Judge Haik. The purpose and intent of pointing this out served no legitimate purpose and was designed to inflame Judge Haik and to prejudice Kevin LeMaire. CONCLUSION The statute concerning disqualification of a judge provides that a judge "shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a). Respectfully submitted: s/Donna Grodner Donna Unkel Grodner (20840) Grodner & Associates 2223 Quail Run, B-1 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 (225) 769-1919 fax 769-1997 [email protected] CERTIFICATE A copy of the foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. Notice of this filing will be sent to counsel named below by operation of the court’s electronic filing system. I also certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service this filing to the parties marked non-CM/ECF participants: s/Donna Grodner Donna U. Grodner (20840) GRODNER & ASSOCIATES 2223 Quail Run, B-1 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 (225) 769-1919 FAX 769-1997 Email: [email protected] 7
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Document 798-3
Filed 07/28/2008
Page 1 of 8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA IN RE: BAYOU SORREL CLASS ACTION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:04CV1101 JUDGE RICHARD T. HAIK, SR.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECUSE MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: A.
LAW and ARGUMENT
The statute concerning disqualification of a judge provides that a judge "shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a). The statute further delineates specific circumstances requiring recusal such as personal bias or prejudice, financial interest, or where a family member is involved in the controversy: a.
any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which partiality might reasonably be questioned.
b.
He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: ******
(1)
Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. (Emphasis added).
Mr. LeMaire submits that, because of the facts detailed and set forth herein below and in his Affidavit, Judge Haik bias, prejudice, and impartiality is seriously drawn into question. The test when considering a recusal motion is whether a reasonable person aware of all the circumstances would have doubts concerning the impartiality of the particular judge. United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d 62, 67 (3d Cir.1989); Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78
Case 6:04-cv-01101-RTH-MEM
Document 798-3
Filed 07/28/2008
Page 2 of 8
(1980). The test for disqualification is “whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.” Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Cannon 2(A) Commentary. Because 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) focuses on the appearance of impartiality, as opposed to the existence in fact of any bias or prejudice, a judge faced with a potential ground for disqualification ought to consider how his participation in a given case looks to the average person on the street. Use of the word “might” in the statute was intended to indicate that disqualification should follow if the reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. Potashnick, supra, at 1111. The Fifth Circuit advises that § 455 (a) “requires” a judge to recuse if the judge has “any question” about the appropriateness of remaining on the case. The statute “clearly mandates that it would be preferable for a judge to err on the side of caution and disqualify himself in a questionable case.” Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1112. The United States Supreme Court significantly notes that “people who have not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges”, and that “the very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-865, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2205 (1988). In Liljeberg, the Court noted that disqualification “does not depend upon whether or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might reasonably believe that he or she knew.” 108 S.Ct. at 2202. The Court reasoned as follows: The goal of section 455 (a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists because the 2
Case 6:04-cv-01101-RTH-MEM
Document 798-3
Filed 07/28/2008
Page 3 of 8
judge does not recall the facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible.... Under section 455 (a), therefore, recusal is required even when a judge lacks actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or bias in the case if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have actual knowledge.’ Id. Emphasis added. Thus, if a judge "concludes that 'his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,' then he should also find that the statute has been violated.' Id. Also see In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.1988). There are substantial facts that would cause a reasonable person on the street to doubt the impartiality of Judge Haik in this matter. B.
Recusal Appropriate
Mr. LeMaire provides the following as grounds that support his position that Judge Haik impartiality may reasonably be called into question. 1.
Disciplinary Complaints Involving Conduct of Ms. Dougherty and Mr. Fayard
On or about April 18, 2007, Kevin LeMaire submitted an ethical conduct complaint (“the complaint”) to the Louisiana Office of Disciplinary Counsel against Ms. Elizabeth C. Dougherty (“Dougherty”). See Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Kevin LeMaire. Ms. Dougherty is a former law clerk for Judge Haik, and was appointed by Judge Haik to the PSC and Class Counsel in the instant matter. Without providing details that Mr. LeMaire believes should have been kept confidential, at issue in the complaint against Ms. Dougherty are, among other things, actions and conduct involving Ms. Dougherty and Calvin C. Fayard, Jr., and where Judge Haik is named as a critical fact witness.1 Even though she had long ago withdrawn as counsel in this matter,2 Ms. Dougherty waived the
1
A similar ethical conduct complaint was filed by Mr. LeMaire against Mr. Fayard on October 30, 2007. Judge Haik is also named as a witness in some parts of that complaint. 2
See, Exhibit 2, Order permitting Elizabeth C. Dougherty to withdraw as counsel of record in the proceeding. 3
Case 6:04-cv-01101-RTH-MEM
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Filed 07/28/2008
Page 4 of 8
confidentiality of the disciplinary proceeding, and submitted a copy of the complaint directly to the Court via the Special Master. Attached as Exhibit 3 is Invoice No. 16671 from Special Master [683] for the time period of May to August 2007. There the Court will find, at page 2, an entry for May 9, 2007 which reads, as follows: REVIEW
FROM
TUPPY
DOUGHERTY
REGARDING
DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINT FILED BY KEVIN LEMAIRE Followed by a thirty minute telephone conference with Judge Haik. At page 6, an entry for July 11, 2007, which provides: REVIEW CORRESPONDENCE FROM TUPPY DOUGHERTY REGARDING DISCIPLINARY
COMPLAINT
FILED
BY
KEVIN
LEMAIRE
AND
FORWARDING DOCUMENTS CONCERNING SAME. Correspondence was sent by Ms. Dougherty to the Special Master on July 11, 2007, according to Exhibit 3 concerning the disciplinary complaint and possibly the complaint itself. At the time, Ms. Dougherty was working at the ODC and should not have been working on any outside cases. Along with that email correspondence from Ms. Dougherty to the Special Master concerning the disciplinary complaint, Ms. Dougherty obviously sent the Special Master a copy of the complaint against her. Considering the billing activity in this matter, and as stated in his affidavit attached hereto, it is Mr. LeMaire’s reasonable belief that Judge Haik became aware of the contents of the submission Ms. Dougherty made to the Special Master. See Exhibit 1. Attached as Exhibit 4 is Invoice No. 17260 from Special Master Juneau [761-3] which reflects his billing to this litigation for the time period of November through December 2007. The last 3 time entries on this invoice are particularly relevant to this matter, and provide as follows: REVIEW OF CORRESPONDENCE FROM HOMER ED BAROUSSE REGARDING SERVICES RENDERED TO TUPPY DOUGHERTY AND 4
Case 6:04-cv-01101-RTH-MEM
Document 798-3
Filed 07/28/2008
Page 5 of 8
FORWARDING INVOICE CONCERNING SAME TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH DANNY CLAVIER REGARDING STATEMENT RECEIVED FROM HOMER ED BAROUSSE CONCERNING SERVICES RENDERED TO ELIZABETH DOUGHERTY EMAIL TO DANNY CLAVIER FORWARDING APPROVAL OF PAYMENT ON INVOICE FROM HOMER BAROUSSE Mr. Homer Ed Barousse is Ms. Dougherty's personal ethics counsel before the ODC and he does not represent any class member or settling defendant in this matter. Thus, the approval of payment must have sought and then granted by Judge Haik after discussion and review of the billing as it is unlikely the Special Master would have taken unilateral action on the legal bill where the protocol established for release of funds requires this Court's approval. The protocol for disbursement of funds from the settlement were not set up to pay legal defense fees for attorneys before the Court who find themselves responding to disciplinary complaints. Ms. Dougherty is the Court's former law clerk, and she reached out to the Court for financial assistance with payment of legal fees on a separate administrative action and obtained such. Judge Haik did not personally pay the legal fees out of his own pocket; however, he apparently authorized the payment from a fund under his supervision. That this Court approved payment of the legal fees may seriously draw into question whether such demonstrates a personal bias in favor of Ms. Dougherty and partiality or bias concerning Mr. LeMaire, who instituted the complaint, may reasonably be drawn into question. The Court must certainly be aware that Ms. Dougherty was discharged from her employment by and with the ODC and that she is assisting with the present action taken by MLF and the PSC against Mr. LeMaire in this Court. That Ms. Dougherty has lost her job may also form a basis Where no fund exists to pay such and yet this Court approved such payment, there is evidence that Ms. Dougherty and Mr. Fayard will receive favorable treatment and the Court will be biased against Mr. LeMaire, whose complaint caused the legal fees and 5
Case 6:04-cv-01101-RTH-MEM
Document 798-3
Filed 07/28/2008
Page 6 of 8
whose present action in state court is causing MLF to exert legal fees. As shown on Exhibit 4, the offer of settlement to Mr. Irving was accepted on May 25, 2007. As detailed in Exhibit 1, on May 26, 2007, Mr. LeMaire was informed that Judge Haik was aware of and displeased with an ethical conduct complaint against a member of the PSC, and suggested that such complaints may need to be resolved prior to approval of payment of fees to Mr. Irving fees who was not involved with that complaint. Mr. Irving had made a complaint to the Fifth Circuit regarding Judge Haik and such had been resolved; thus, the only complaint pending at that time was that against Ms. Dougherty. It was almost 3 months later before the Court approved Mr. Irving’s fees. It is averred that, based upon this prior conduct, Judge Haik is biased against Kevin LeMaire for filing the complaint against Ms. Dougherty and Mr. Fayard, which name Judge Haik as a witness. The above description of the payment of Ms. Dougherty's legal fees for a separate administrative action from class funds constitutes extra-judicial conduct, as there is no order in the record nor motion filed by Ms. Dougherty to have her legal fees incurred for defending an ethical complaint approved for payment by the Court from the class settlement funds. Such strongly suggests that Judge Haik has sided with Ms. Dougherty against Mr. LeMaire to extent that her legal fees have been approved for payment from a fund supervised by the Court. Ms. Dougherty, the former law clerk of Judge Haik, will be called as a witness by Kevin LeMaire in these proceedings as she has been carbon copied on the MLK matter, because she is obviously involved in prosecuting the present matter against Mr. LeMaire. The truthfulness of Ms Dougherty’s testimony is crucial to these proceedings, and Judge Haik can not now sit in judgment of her credibility. Even though she is no longer counsel of record to these proceedings, Ms. Dougherty has been inextricably involved with the instant proceedings initiated by 6
Case 6:04-cv-01101-RTH-MEM
Document 798-3
Filed 07/28/2008
Page 7 of 8
McKernan and the PSC, as evidenced by correspondence copied and blind copied to her by counsel for McKernan and the PSC. 2.
McKernan and the PSC Filed Pleadings Designed to Inflame Judge Haik
In their Motion seeking an order for Kevin LeMaire to show cause why his state court employment contract suit did not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court, MLF made it abundantly clear to the Court that Mr. LeMaire had provided an affidavit to an attorney who previously filed a motion to recuse Judge Haik. The purpose and intent of pointing this out served no legitimate purpose and was designed to inflame Judge Haik and to prejudice Kevin LeMaire. CONCLUSION The statute concerning disqualification of a judge provides that a judge "shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a). Respectfully submitted: s/Donna Grodner Donna Unkel Grodner (20840) Grodner & Associates 2223 Quail Run, B-1 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 (225) 769-1919 fax 769-1997 [email protected] CERTIFICATE A copy of the foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. Notice of this filing will be sent to counsel named below by operation of the court’s electronic filing system. I also certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service this filing to the parties marked non-CM/ECF participants: s/Donna Grodner Donna U. Grodner (20840) GRODNER & ASSOCIATES 2223 Quail Run, B-1 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 (225) 769-1919 FAX 769-1997 Email: [email protected] 7
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